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ABSTRACT 
Abstract- this thesis examines a proposition that it is possible to determine why security 
fails within organisations. Within the thesis, therefore, is a definition of security, both as 
an abstract noun, but more specifically as a matrix of security manpower, physical 
security assets, electronic systems and procedures. 
The operational effectiveness of these four, distinct security facets is often not capable of 
critical assessment by the very organisation that is paying for these assets and services. It 
has been necessary, therefore, to both determine and evidence a variety of security 
failures and, ultimately, contrast these sample conditions with examples of organisational 
security successfully achieving a range of targeted objectives, - to the complete 
understanding and budgetary capability of the target organisation. 
These contrasting situations have been illustrated within the thesis by means of sampling 
and testing I 00 customer sites across 5 different business sectors and, more specifically, a 
detailed study of a multinational manufacturing organisation and the re-alignment of its 
security strategy following a comprehensive risk assessment and security audit. This 
thesis also posits that it is unlikely such security strategy can be effective unless it is 
based on the clear understanding of the threats, hazards and risks to which the 
organisation may subject. 
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The issue of risk and security auditing is, therefore, a key feature of the thesis, as is the 
requirement to emphasise that the success of a security strategy, which would follow on 
from the assessment of risk and vulnerability, is not only dependant upon the accuracy of 
these processes, but a c lear understanding of the specific corporate culture, organisational 
security awareness and fiscal imperatives. 
This thesis also examines the role of risk management in the planning of crisis, continuity 
and safety issues, again, from the perspective of contrasting the success of such planning 
when measured against the management of risks and the operationally assessed needs for 
the four elements of security, in whatever proportion each may, or may not, have a part to 
play. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, a series of books have sparked the popular imagination. The Worst Case 
Scenario Survival Handbook (Piven & Borgenich, 1 999), which deals with managing crisis 
situations that could arise in everyday domestic circumstances, during travel, or in natural 
disasters, has sold hundreds of thousands of copies in the United Kingdom alone. Such 
books appeal to the human desire to be forearmed and to contemplate disaster from the 
distance of a comfortable armchair. Aristotle identified this tendency to be fascinated and 
repulsed by tragedy as fundamental to the human psyche more than two millennia ago: "All 
tragedy creates pity and terror in the human observer" (Binstock & Shanas, 1 976: p. 1 1 2). In 
this thesis, there are two fundamental problems that are addressed: is it possible for 
organisations to plan for the worst-case scenario effectively and how can they do so? The 
focus is on this dilemma, which can be identified with two propositions: 
I. Is it crucially important to find a cost-effective method of securing susceptible assets, 
as security measures implemented on the basis of unspecified risk may be both 
costly and counterproductive? 
2. Past risk or crisis events are not solely adequate predictors of future risks as other 
socio-political environmental factors need to be considered. 
The best predictor of risk for an organisation seeking to implement security solutions and 
select appropriate security providers is a comprehensive security-risk assessment and a 
consequent security audit. Addressed within this thesis is the appropriate methodology 
required to carry out security-risk assessments and security audits and it is argued that 
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without such initial assessments, an organisation's protective measures-its security­
does not work. According to Perrow, disasters are inevitable and have unique forms, but 
with an accurate security-risk assessment ,  one can predict their likelihood, assess their 
potential impact, and implement strategies that will secure vulnerable assets and improve 
organisational capabilities. Throughout this thesis evidence has be collated and evaluated 
to answer the question "Why doesn't security work?" including the associated elements 
of risk blindness and organisational preparedness. 
Process 
To better understand why security does not work, firstly, the often-complex language of 
security-risk analysis and crisis and contingency planning is discussed. A methodology 
and its detailed development is described, as part of a defined research project, and this is 
then tested as part of a case study, which shows this methodology in action. 
In the first chapter, clarification is presented on the theoretical side of security risk and 
the establishment of a security infrastructure as a prerequisite within an organisation is 
advocated. The issue of cost versus effectiveness is addressed; an organisation should 
recognise the importance of securing susceptible assets-that is, the crucial significance 
of identifying a priori risks before the event. 
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Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical link into the field of crisis and contingency planning. 
This takes a complementary a posteriori approach by providing evidence of specific 
disasters, how they occurred, and how some of these disasters could have been avoided if 
the appropriate security-risk planning and approaches had been in place. 
Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology of this thesis, identifying the major research 
designs and techniques associated with a variety of risk-management strategies and 
providing an exposition of the views about the nature of knowledge (i.e., epistemology) 
and the nature of reality (i.e., ontology) underlying these perspectives . This chapter also 
justifies the particular strategic approach to best practice that is advocated and explains 
why both a qualitative and a quantitative approach to data evaluation. 
Chapter 4 describes the specific research project. There are two distinct parts to this 
research: ( 1 )  the measurement of the actual security risks to an organisation (i.e., the 
security-risk assessment) and (2) the concept of a security audit, that is, the measurement 
and assessment of the steps that an organisation has or has not taken to meet and nullify 
the identified security risks. 
The primary data for this project is 1 00 actual security-risk assessments carried out at a 
variety of organisations between 2006 and 2009. The findings are analysed and the 
outcomes presented in tables and matrices. The research demonstrates that none of the 
organisations surveyed had the proper security-risk mitigation strategy in place because 
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none of them conducted a security-risk assessment before implementing their security 
policy. In almost all cases, the organisations had instituted prevention measures that 
addressed only unspecified or generic risk. These strategies for security failed to address 
the specific risks encountered by the organisations-risks that could have been 
appropriately identified and addressed in advance-therefore, their security did not work. 
The thesis concludes with a case study in which an organisation is examined and analysed 
the changes that were implemented after a security-risk assessment and security audit 
took place are discussed. This provides a real-world example of the methodology for risk 
assessment and evaluates its effectiveness in practice. 
Initial Definitions 
Security 
Theorizing about security. Before embarking on a discourse on the management of 
security risks, it is important that security i s  defined as it applies to this thesis, with 
special emphasis on its extent and limits. Possibly the best capture of the essence of 
security is by Zedner (2003b: 1 55, cited in Wood and Shearing, 2007: 4, Button 2008 : 4). 
'Security is both a state of being and a means to that end. As a state of being, security 
suggests two quite distinct objective and subjective conditions. And as an objective 
condition, it takes a number of possible forms. First, it is the condition of being without 
threat: the hypothetical state of absolute security. Secondly, it is defined by the 
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neutralization of threats: the state of 'being protected from' .  Thirdly, it is a form of 
avoidance or non-exposure to danger . . .  As a subjective condition, security again 
suggests both the passive condition of feeling safe, and freedom from anxiety or 
apprehension defined negatively by reference to insecurity. ' 
Manunta ( 1 996: pp. 239) observes: 
The Socratic problem "What is security?" is underestimated and under-researched. 
Different answers are given, which are often of value at the tactical and specific level. 
There is general agreement and a surfeit of information on the physical and formal 
aspects of security. Standards, technical details and codes of practice are easily 
available. Systems, procedures, planning, training and methodologies are covered in 
great detail by many sources. None of them appears to address and formalise the 
general concept of security. 
As McCrie (2006: p. 2 1  ), notes: the term security derives from the Latin secures and 
securitas, feeling no care or apprehension, the safeguarding of (the interests of) a state, 
organisation, or person; safe. 
In this thesis, security refers to operational security defined by Manunta (2006: p. 63 1 )  as: 
a precarious condition characterized by different approaches, different scopes, and 
different goals (e.g. logical security, physical security, personal security, industrial 
security, national security). 
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An effective operational security proposition has to answer several questions before it can 
be understood and then implemented: 
1. What needs protecting and why? 
2.What is the organisation's vulnerability in relation to any actual or perceived threat? 
3 .What should the organisational response be in the event of a threat occurrence? 
4.What are the consequences of providing a "limited" overall security protective effort? 
Security in practice. The word "security" appears to indicate different things to deferent 
companies and people. Chapter 5 ("Case Study") offers a proposition, a before and after 
snap shot and some explanation as to why security was "failing" within the company 
studied. Also examined are some of the causes of failure that, in operational terms, were 
common findings within organisations studied and presented within Chapter 4 ("Research 
Project"). In support of this proposition, it is necessary to look for consequences that flow 
from each of the security failures, such as poor perimeter security, poor access control, 
lack of policies and procedures, training, and so on. Discussed is an example of each of 
these failures and rectifications in the case study, which tests both the relevance of the 
security failures, provides evidence and consequences of these failures, and provides the 
organisation's choices to overcome these issues. The case study is equally important to 
evidence change, such as, what was put in place to address the security failures?-that is, 
what conditions one can observe in the case study's organisation following the 
implementation of the risk-informed security program (this is highlighted in Chapter 1) 
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that supports both its choice as a suitable case study and the proposition of this thesis 
"why doesn't security work?" Below are some broad areas of security failures that were 
highlighted during the case study and will be discussed in Chapter 5 in detail : 
1. Failure to recognise vulnerabilities; 
2. Failure by senior management to disseminate security culture; 
3 .  Failure to use the right countermeasures;  
4. Failure to develop and implement effective policies and procedures; 
5. Failure to consider threat change; 
6. Failure to define and implement operational requirements; 
7. Failure to recognise the need for integration of key security areas (e.g., manpower, 
physical, systems, procedures); 
8. Failure to integrate security risk issues into the wider enterprise risk matrix; 
9. Failure to recognise and recruit the necessary skill sets required to manage risk; 
10. Failure by senior management to mandate sufficient authority to the security effort; 
11. Poor appreciation of security's complex role and responsibilities within the 
organisation; and 
12. Failure to appreciate the necessity to capture complex incident data for future risk 
forecasting. 
The case study also provides some corrective measures that were initiated as a part of the 
review. 
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Security Risk 
What does security risk mean? Landoll (2006: p. 36) provides succinct definition of the 
concept : "Security risks are a measurement of the likelihood that . . .  [an] organisation's 
assets are susceptible." 
If we accept this definition, we can immediately assert that if an organisation chooses to 
employ a proactive security system to protect its assets, it must necessarily perform an 
assessment of the security risks to which those assets are vulnerable. If the organisation 
chooses not to employ a proactive security system, then it would be unable to select the 
most cost-effective solution to protect its assets because it would not know the risks from 
which it needed to protect itself. Of course, if an organisation chooses only to employ a 
reactive security system (i.e., a security system designed to protect assets against only 
security breaches that have previously occurred), then a security-risk assessment is not 
necessary, as the security risks could be identified from actual breaches that have 
happened in the past, and the organisation could select a solution on the basis of damage 
assessment and appropriate safeguard design. However, such a strategy is based on a 
short-sighted epistemology of risk, which assumes previously occurring risks predict 
future risks. It is contended that an organisation's "perception of risk" can affect its ability 
to implement effective contingency arrangements and assess whether its current risk­
management strategies increase or reduce the likelihood of security failure. 
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Whereas the protection of an organisation's assets from new forms of security breaches 
must be based on understanding potential security risks, protecting an organisation's 
assets from security breaches that have already occurred requires no such understanding 
because the security risk is identified from an actual breach rather than a security-risk 
assessment or a security audit. This leads to two important consequences: 
1 .  A (solely) reactive model is not appropriate for an organisation whose environment is 
constantly changing, such as a Web-based organisation. The security threats that such 
organisations face are likely to evolve, and a purely reactive model would not be able to 
prevent future security breaches. 
2 .  Although a reactive "incident response" model may be appropriate for an organisation 
whose environment is simple, static, and unchanging, that organisation will only be able 
to reach the conclusion that a reactive model is appropriate either through exercising 
such a model and discovering that the security risks faced by the organisation are few 
and nonevolving or by performing a security-risk assessment and discovering that the 
security risks are few and nonevolving. Some companies base their security measures 
on "best guess" solutions and only address issues when incidents occur. However, no 
prudent security professional would ever promote this option unless the organisation's 
assets have so little value that it is not cost-effective to perform a comprehensive 
security-risk evaluation. 
16 
The only contentious element of this assertion is that comprehensive security-risk 
assessment and security audits are the only way to find an effective security solution. 
Assessments are the key tools for uncovering security issues that otherwise may have 
remained hidden. Often, an assessment leads to a compelling event that increases internal 
awareness of an organisation's security shortcomings-it may uncover an undiscovered 
prior breach or a penetration test may "create" such an event (e.g. ,  a weakness in the 
perimeter or a procedure that needs to be put in place for managing access control) by 
highlighting vulnerabilities. Assessments can also help create budget resources for 
security enhancement-besides identifying problems, an assessment report can provide 
justification for making the investment necessary to solve the problems and freeing up 
resources that have been appropriated to ineffective security measures. 
The i ssue in question is whether it is possible to select a proactive security solution 
without first conducting an assessment and audit. From the evidence presented, without a 
comprehensive assessment and audit, an organisation cannot identify and quantify each 
security vulnerability and therefore cannot create a successful comprehensive security 
solution. 
To ensure that the most effective security solution is maintained in an evolving 
organisational environment, the organisation must conduct regular security-risk 
assessments and security audits. The reason for this is self-explanatory: as the 
environment changes, so too do the potential security risks. A previously effective 
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security solution, based on a comprehensive assessment and audit, can become outdated. 
Additionally, a security-risk assessment and security audit will not be useful unless the 
resultant solutions are actually implemented. As Axt (2003: p. 98) notes: "more than one 
manager has nodded in agreement to proposed solutions without having any intention of 
adopting the suggested measures." 
Organisations should employ independent auditors to conduct the security-risk 
assessments and security audits. As Goldman and Orton (2001 )  note: 
Only independent and impartial tests can validate corporate security efforts, ensure that 
all potential security problems have been examined and exposed and provide the 
service's clients with objective proof that sufficient due diligence has been exercised in 
securing their data . . . .  Companies need external expertise to audit their sites . . . .  
Bringing somebody in from the outside creates a greater initiative to find a problem. 
Having your internal people, who set up the security, does not only create a 
questionable initiative for them to find things that are wrong but it might simply be hard 
for them to do. (p. 2) 
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Why Are Organisations Reluctant to Undertake Security-Risk Assessments? 
The evidence for the importance of security-risk assessments and security audits in 
maintaining effective security strategies is compelling. However, as the data in Chapter 4 
illustrate, many corporate bodies still regard such measures as optional extras. There are a 
number of possible explanations for their reluctance. 
The "Take a Gamble" Strategy 
This strategy derives from the principles, that the organisational risk exposure levels, when 
coupled with the cost of protecting the company's assets are lower than the anticipated 
insurance premiums. As with insurance, security costs are viewed as a "distressed 
purchase." This strategy originates from a perspective on past-oriented perception of risk; 
future risks are assessed on the basis of past risks or crises experienced. It is argued in this 
thesis that, contrary to the "take a gamble" strategy, a correctly designed security assessment 
becomes an observable asset in the present, protecting tangible and objective corporate 
assets as well as the intangible assets, such as public perception ofthe stability of the 
corporate brand and the company's reputation. 
The "It Will Never Happen Here" Strategy 
This approach to risk, first coined by Elman and Hicks (2006), is less about implementing a 
reactive strategy in the light of past circumstance than a denial that the assets of an 
organisation are susceptible to risk and loss at all. Security-risk assessments are not 
undertaken because the epistemological orientation of the corporate body denies that there is 
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any real threat. Even if an organisation perceives real threats as negligible, the range of 
government legislation determining behaviour, performance, and governance of 
organisational activities makes it increasingly important that appropriate risk-assessment 
strategies are in place. "Unless a contingency plan has been prepared, the peril of escalation 
of the loss cannot be avoided. Before embarking on the preparation of a contingency plan or 
plans, the potential risks must be evaluated and a full audit of the company's facilities 
undertaken" (IPSA , 1 996: p. 1 . 1  ). 
The necessity of preparation is echoed by both Turner ( 1 996) and Perrow's ( 1 984) 
systematic models (for details see Determining the Probability in Chapter 1 ), which argue 
for the inevitability of loss and the place of strategic planning in minimizing and managing 
damage. 
The "Flying Blind" Strategy 
Some of the reluctance to implement proactive security assessments stems from a belief in 
the perceived unpredictability of major risk events. The apparent uniqueness of major risks 
suggests that, as a general rule, specific categorization may be difficult. However, many 
disasters and large-scale accidents display similar features and characteristics, such that one 
can gain a greater understanding from historical events available to us, and it is argued 
within this thesis that organisations can achieve accurate predictions of future risk with a 
sound security assessment methodology. 
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Argued and evidenced in this thesis is that, security does not work where appropriate risk 
assessment strategies have not been applied. However, with a sound initial methodology for 
security-risk assessment, appropriate responses can be implemented. This should include the 
training contingency, as crisis-management recovery teams must also include the personnel 
that are most likely to receive the initial notification of a potential crisis, such as the 
receptionist who may receive a telephone threat or bomb hoax. This will allow the 
organisation to seamlessly activate its preplanned contingency procedures to maintain 
service stability. 
Assessment 
The three strategies-take a gamble, it will never happen here, and flying blind-and their 
associated perceptions of risk may explain why organisations neglect security-risk 
assessments and security audits. In each case, such responses are short-sighted. 
Subsequently, evidence is provided that an appropriate risk-assessment strategy may become 
a tangible corporate asset in itself; even for companies reluctant to recognise the reality of 
risk, legislation increasingly requires visible preventative strategies to be in place. 
Crises typically develop quickly, confronting decision makers with large quantities of 
conflicting or erroneous information. Conversely, during a crisis, decision makers may not 
have access to any information, or at least less information than the media. It is certainly not 
unusual for a crisis to receive heavy and close monitoring by the media. With modem 
communications facilities, the media are often more up to date than the decision makers who 
are attempting to respond (Borodzicz, 2005: p. 83). 
2 1  
Security-risk assessments provide protection of another more intangible asset of any 
organisation-brand reputation or corporate reputation. Risk perception research has come 
to focus on factors that influence the public perception of risks (e.g., Fischhoff et al . ,  
1 978;  Lee, 1 998; Graham, 200 1 : p. 243; Slovic, 1 986). With the inevitable involvement of 
the media placing more strain on the decision makers, the professionalism of the 
organisational response in a crisis is under closer public scrutiny. An ineffective response 
may ultimately damage the reputation, brand, or customer confidence of the organisation. In 
1 987, for example, the reputation ofTownsend Thoresen was irreparably damaged after the 
Herald of Free Enterprise sank, causing the loss of 1 87 lives. The company was later sold 
to P&O. There are two consequences faced by an organisation in the aftermath of a major 
risk event. The most immediate is the threat posed to its survival. Less tangible but 
potentially as damaging is the threat posed to its reputation. This increasingly accepted area 
of concern is referred to as business continuity or contingency management. This includes 
the implementing of technology-based recovery plans to restore critical information and 
communication systems and normal operations at the earliest opportunity. At an operational 
level, it also establishes the interdependencies between departments and the assets required. 
Furthermore, it establishes time frames within which key business functions must be 
recovered. 
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Literature Review 
In this section, the research project is contextualised and it is argued that the only way to 
ensure effective security is to undertake a security-risk assessment and audit, identify 
perceived risks and developing strategies to address, and minimize those risks. The thesis 
also assesses the literature on risk and security management, looking closely at the 
growing debates about the benefits of having security measures implemented within an 
organisation as well as the challenges this produces. 
Firstly, we trace the genesis and development of risk-management systems, then consider 
the variety of resistance mechanisms within corporate structures. After that, there is a 
review of research into corporate attitudes, the gaps in our understanding of security 
practices, and the need for more collaboration between security departments and the 
wider organisation, particularly at the level of the board of directors. This is concluded 
with a look at the growth of the relatively new field of business-continuity management. 
The Origins and Development of Risk Management 
"The entire history of the human species is a chronology of exposure to misfortune and 
adversity and of efforts to deal with these risks." 
(Vaughan, 1997: p. 1 6). 
"Risk is the hidden danger lurking beneath everything that we do; from the moment that 
the unborn child is established, to death, we are at risk from something." 
(Borodzicz, 2005 :  p. 2) 
23 
The word risk has become a common and widely used part of today's vocabulary, relating 
in  its popular sense to personal circumstances, like health, pensions, insurance, and 
investments; to social issues, like terrorism, economic performance, and food safety; and 
to elements of business and corporate life, such as governance, strategy, and business 
continuity (Hillson, 2006). The origins of risk management as a strategy are located in 
this third category. "In the world of business, risk management has a special place, being 
recognised as a management discipline in its own right, with a broad supporting 
infrastructure" (Hillson, 2006: p. 2). 
The term risk management "provides a common language and framework for dealing 
with and reacting to uncertainty, enabling professionals from different functions to better 
communicate with each other" (Fowler, 2006: p. 22). To do this, one must develop some 
definition of the nature of experienced risks. One of the most effective and widely 
accepted classifications is found in Adams ( 1995) .  Risks can be divided into three 
categories: 
1. Directly discernible risks are risks that can be assessed by human faculties. Although 
this category can also include complex risks, the common feature is that such risks can 
be assessed on the basis of human experience alone. 
2. Risks discernible through science must be assessed through special training, 
mathematical models, instrumentation, or some combination of these. 
3. Virtual risks include all other risks in which uncertainty or a lack of information is such 
that people may argue from their position or from prejudice (Adams, 1995). 
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Risk management has developed in recent years into an accepted discipline, with its own 
language, techniques and tools. Many management textbooks include sections on risk 
management, and there is a growing library of reference texts specifically devoted to the 
subject in its own right. The value of a proactive formal structured approach to managing 
uncertainty has been widely recognised, and many organisations are seeking to introduce 
risk processes in order to gain the promised benefits (Newland, 2005 : p.5) .  
This evolution is a reflection of the fact that in the 1 980s and 1 990s there was little in the 
way of corporate governance standards such as Turn bull ( 1999) or the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002) and the majority of companies did not have an understanding of, nor an 
appetite for, risk-based solutions until the standards materialized from 2000 onward. 
Organisations may face a wide range of hazards, with their associated risks and crises 
(Mitroff, Pauchant, & Shrivastav 1988; Pearson & Clair, 1 998; Pearson & Mitroff, 1 993; 
Smallman, 1 997). "Perhaps the most serious risk that can be posed to any organisation is 
survival" (Borodzicz, 2005 : p. 62). With major risk failures no longer legally viewed as 
"acts of God" but the direct result ofhuman error (Reason, 1990), irrationality 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Lopes, 1 987), cultural misunderstandings (Pidgeon, 199 1 ), 
failed communication (Drotz-Sjoberg, 2003; Irwin, 1 995), systemic failure (Perrow, 
1984; Turner, 1 978), or simply a homeostatic need to keep enough risk in one's life 
(Adams, 1 995; Wilde, 1 994), "the management and prevention of risk is a laudable aim, 
but this must be viewed within an understanding that good risk prevention will never 
guarantee 100% protection from hazards" (Borodzicz 2005, p. 153). 
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Borodzicz argues that the development of risk-management strategies is an evolution 
from a position of risk prevention, but this thesis argues that it depends on a 
fundamentally different and ever-evolving perception of risk. As Johnson and Shearing 
(2003) note, our objective sense of security (i.e., our feelings of safety) is just as 
important to most of us as any objective measure of our actual security (i.e., the risks that 
we actually face). 
This is particularly evident in Turner's ( 1978) disaster sequence model, in which he 
describes how all sociotechnical disasters involve an information or communication 
failure of some kind, because they are preceded by a series of discrepant events that are 
ignored or discounted. An example of this would be the Deepwater Horizon explosion 
20 10, where this BP semi-submersible Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit, burnt and sank, 
killing 1 1  workers. The massive offshore oil spill, that resulted in the Gulf of Mexico, is  
now considered the second largest environmental disaster in U.S. history, behind the 
1 930's Dust Bowl. 
Drawing on Perrow's (1984) early writings, Gephart (1999: p. 21 1) finds that the 
communication problems and unheeded warnings conceived by Turner [ 1 978] as central 
to the pre-onset stages are actually only seen in retrospect. They are present in all 
disasters and in a variety of non-disasters as well. Considerable noise blends with 
potential warning signals to mask the warnings; they are distinguishable from normal 
signals and false warnings only after the event. Further, complex systems are not 
responsive to unusual warnings. 
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Many varied risk-assessment tools have been created in many industries to help identify 
risk, the factors contributing to risk, and how this risks and potential threats can then be 
managed. Beck ( 1 992: p. 3) describes this heightened focus on risk as a "crisis of 
modernity and industrial society." The research project (see Chapter 4) is built on the 
recognition of this basic tension in risk management: disasters may be inevitable and their 
forms unique, but one can predict their likelihood, assess their potential impact, and 
implement strategies that will secure vulnerable asset and improve organisational 
capabilities in the event of such an occurrence in advance if an accurate security-risk 
assessment is properly implemented. 
Scholars are increasingly recognising the secondary strategies. 
Risk Management is the optic through which senior managers are now able to drive 
performance. Improved performance is being driven by more effective processes, closer 
collaboration with partners and better motivated people in a finely tuned organisation. 
This a contrary view to one held by many people who regard risk as negative and risk 
management as bureaucracy. Viewing risk as a strategic issue and risk management as a 
strategic tool can turn negative, energy-sapping, compliance-driven risk management 
programmes into performance-enhancing, energy-releasing, positive programmes 
(Anderson, 2006: p. 1 0). 
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Changes to the economy and the world in general since the 1 980s have had an impact on 
the way businesses have tackled the issue of risks and the security strategies they have 
subsequently implemented. Security is no longer only provided by policing and other 
governmental agencies-now security solutions and security management are becoming 
more complex and are often provided by a range of agencies and a for-profit security 
industry. Today, businesses are in a position to implement their own risk-based security 
solutions, and both the solution and the implementation is becoming a serious function of 
the business itself. The concept and the degree of risk have evolved in line with new 
rneasures and methods of managing security. 
Security Managers are constantly working to tackle the threats posed by terrorism, 
organised crime, cybercrime, forgery, theft, and so on. However, companies will only 
implement the correct prevention and risk-management measures if they conduct a 
security-risk assessment and security audit. Loader and Sparks (2002) discuss these 
developments in the area of security and risk and highlight the major changes, including 
the commercial supply of guarding and patrol services, markets supplying security 
hardware and technology and the policing of new spaces, such as cyberspace, concluding 
that, although innumerable prevention measures exist, companies must ensure that they 
choose the appropriate solution to protect their organisation. 
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Risk and Resistance in Corporate Structures 
The evolution of risk management depends on previous developments within 
organisations and social structures. "Politically, it is exceedingly difficult in low-crisis 
societies to gain systematic attention for risks, vulnerabilities and threats" ('t Hart, 1 997: 
p. 207). Wildavsky ( 1 988) finds that; recognising 
the strategic challenge is to keep issues concerning crisis preparedness and crisis 
response on the political agenda and to achieve a better balance between the strategies 
of anticipation (prevention) and resilience (the ability to combat and overcome crisis) in 
dealing with social and technology hazards and risks. (p. 207) 
't Hart ( 1997) identifies one of the most prevalent grounds for resistance of risk­
management assessments in corporate bodies. The successful safety record of the past 
tends to foster assumptions that "these things cannot happen here" resulting in 
organisations not wanting to face the prospect that prevention may fail and that they could 
have a major emergency on their hands (p. 207). 
Such organisations live with a perception of their environment that overemphasises both 
its stability and predictability and thus makes assumptions about the security of the 
organisation and its capacity to cope with change. According to Sharp (2006: p. 1 17) 
"Each organisation will have a level of management that is particularly sceptical about 
the introduction of new initiatives; this is very often the middle management level." 
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Pertinent to this, Lagadec ( 1 993) notes that 
Such people are extremely reluctant to think as a group about potential weakness of 
these measures, about possible flaws in the structure of their organisation and about 
collective uncertainties that would be raised by a proper crisis preparation process. 
Experience has shown that it can take many years, including a major negative 
occurrence, before this kind of gathering with its special agenda can be envisaged. (p. 
28) 
Some of the resistance to appropriate risk assessment may stem from the particular 
structure and culture of an organisation itself. Clarke ( 1 993) concludes that organisational 
cultures may be organized to enhance imaginations about risk and safety. But they can 
also insulate organisational members from dissenting points of view and organisational 
cultures can perpetuate myths of control and maintain fictions that systems are safe. (p. 
687) 
Toft and Reynolds (2005: p. 4) provide an example of such thinking by quoting a Dr. 
Brooke, who was a member of the in-house team that responded to a fire at the Allied 
Colloids chemical plant in Bradford, West Yorkshire, in 1 992, as saying, "Never in my 
worst nightmare did I think that this sort of thing could happen, and I 'm sure you think 
that about your organisation. But there it was-happening." 
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Distinctive organisational culture provides a "symbolic universe" (Berger & Luckmann, 
1 967) in which organisational experiences are interpreted. However, as Vaughan ( 1 996: p. 
394) highlights, organisations' distinctive cultures or ways of seeing the world "may 
simultaneously dictate ways of not seeing." As Gherardi ( 1 998: p. 82) puts it, 
organisational culture may be "a cause of blindness and the origin of numerous failures of 
foresight." The danger here is that risk assessment may be compromised by a corporate 
culture of complacency, skepticism, or even risk denial. Slovic, Fichoff, and Lichtenstein 
( 1 980: p. 1 26) define the epistemic strategy, which develops from such corporate 
cultures, and assert that "new evidence appears reliable and informative if it is consistent 
with one's initial beliefs; contrary evidence tends to be dismissed as unreliable, erroneous 
or unrepresentative." This might be termed the "tell me what I want to hear" tendency. 
The consequences of Slovic, Fichoff, and Lichtenstein's assessment are significant for the 
presupposition that people's beliefs are slow to change and can still persist even when 
presented with evidence that demonstrates their view is inappropriate. It therefore 
becomes increasingly crucial to develop a security-risk assessment strategy and 
consequent audit process based on a sound and recognizable methodology and able to 
combat the epistemic strategy of denial that Slovic, Fichoff, and Lichtenstein identify. 
Two further epistemic strategies mitigate against risk assessment. The first may be termed 
"the credit tendency." 
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According to Langer (2002: p .  2 1 4), people in organisations seek desirable outcomes for 
which they can be credited and attempt to avoiding the blame for failures, as the "initial 
expectation of success leads one to attribute the success to one's ability; if one fails then 
the failure may be attributed to bad luck, a result which makes the re-evaluation of one's 
mastery unnecessary." Security-risk assessment can be integrated as a part of an 
organisation's overall strategic plan, so it can be "owned" by that organisation and 
successful risk management credited. 
The second epistemic strategic relevant to this thesis can be termed "the self-preservation 
tendency." Dombrowsky ( 1995) suggests that under circumstances of stress and social 
upheaval, organisations can turn selfish and become interested only in self-preservation, 
simultaneously changing their perception of reality from creative, problem-oriented 
awareness toward a defensive, solution-oriented persistence. This implies that under 
certain circumstances, organisations are less aware of potential upcoming problems and 
have a tendency to define reality within the framework of its available solutions. This 
recognition influences the development of the security-risk assessment and my case study 
(see Chapters 4 and 5). The proactive model is based on the findings of Reason ( 1990): 
In the absence of frequent bad events, the best way to induce and then sustain a state of 
intelligent and respectful wariness is to gather the right kinds of data. This means 
creating a safety information system that collects, analyses and disseminates 
information from accidents and near misses, as well as from regular proactive checks on 
the system's vital signs. All of these activities can be said to make up an informed 
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culture-one in which those who manage and operate the system have current 
knowledge about the human, technical, organisational, and environmental factors that 
determine the safety of the system as a whole. In most important respects an informed 
culture is a safety culture. (p. 294) 
The term 'safety culture ' originates after the major reactor accident at Chernobyl,  near 
Kiev in Ukraine, and can be traced to the subsequent reaction of Western nuclear 
industries to that event (Pidgeon 1 99 1  ). The initial assessment by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was able to point out failures in 
practice at the Chernobyl plant that would serve as a warning to Western agencies: "The 
errors and violations of operating procedures by some, in hindsight, to be evidence of a 
'poor safety culture' at this plant and within the former Soviet nuclear industry more 
generally" (OECD, 1987). 
The promotion of a good safety culture is the other side of the strategic coin from the 
development of appropriate models of risk assessment. Further, the promotion of a safety 
culture may be a more acceptable first step in risk assessment for those institutions 
wedded to the negative perceptions of risk previously outlined and the three underlying 
epistemic strategies-the credit tendency, the self-preservation tendency, and the tell-me­
what-1-want-to-hear tendency. According to Pidgeon ( 1997), there are four facets to the 
promotion of a good safety culture in any organisation. These are: 
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. senior management commitment to safety; 
1• shared care and concern for hazards and a solicitude over their impacts on people; 
. realistic and flexible norms and rules about hazards· and ,
'L continual reflection on practice through monitoring, analysis, and feedback systems. 
1 nterestingly, in this process, organisational safety culture has often been conceptualized 
in terms of a set of individual attitudes and practices within a hazardous work context, 
and, framed in this way, closely resembles the earlier notion of an occupational climate of 
safety (Zohar, 1 980). 
In exploring safety cultures as a route to resilience, one must go beyond individual 
attitudes to safety to the level of shared cognitions and the organisational structures. This 
requires a clear analysis of the resources, which support, rather than constrain, the 
development of organisational intelligence and safety imagination (Pidgeon, 1 988). 
According to Turner ( 1 996: p. 332), 
Managers cannot simply install a culture . . .  viewing safety culture as a continuing 
debate makes it clear that it is a process and not a thing; that it is dynamic and needs 
continuing support; and that it deals intimately with symbolic and rhetorical matters, 
crucial matters which are also subtle and difficult to control (p. 332). 
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Risk and Security in Corporate Structures 
The issue of security and risk management is very important to companies in today's 
global world. "In a 2004 MORI poll, 97% [of companies] said security was of concern to 
them, with just over half saying it was of great concern" (Briggs & Edwards, 2006: p. 
26). It would appear that security is one of the main priorities within an organisation and 
form part of its objectives to reduce security risks. Over the years the issue of security has 
become increasingly recognised, which has led to the introduction of separate security 
departments within organisations. In a research study conducted by Briggs and Edwards 
(2006: p. 1 2) that sought to investigate the security challenges faced by large companies, 
it was found that companies are increasingly seeking to "align security with the business, 
so that doing business and doing security go hand in hand." 
Thus, the security function of an organisation is no longer seen as a separate entity; 
companies are instead increasingly recognising that the issues of risk and security need to 
be incorporated in all departments. If an organisation fails to implement the correct 
measures to manage the risks, the company will inevitably adopt a "best-guess" approach 
to security. This thesis argues that security will not work, unless the benefits are derived 
from the security risk assessment and audit programme. Furthermore, nonsecurity staff in 
an organisation need to get involved in the security agenda by complying with policies 
and procedures and reporting any criminal activity instead of turning a blind eye. Without 
this overall support, the senior management team will not achieve effective security. 
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Interestingly, Briggs and Edwards also highlight another key feature of security 
management that relates to security departments helping companies to take risks and 
devise contingency plans. In so doing, companies are better placed to ensure that their 
security needs are optimal and meet the challenge of new threats. 
Gill et al. (2008) find that senior management in large corporate organisations agree that 
security is an important corporate function. Nearly two thirds of those interviewed stated 
that security management was linked to the overall success of an organisation. A 
significant proportion of respondents believed the security function was as important as 
other company functions, such as human resources and sales. However, being important 
and implementing the correct security risk mitigation strategies are two different things. 
Without carrying out a security-risk assessment to apply the correct management of risk, 
security does not work. This clearly indicates that security needs and wider company 
objectives are becoming increasingly aligned, which is leading to enhanced company 
performance. Security has a consequential impact on all areas of an organisation. The 
correlation between better security and improved company performance is likely the 
result of security measures and risk-management ensuring that corruption is minimized, 
threats to the company and its finances are reduced, and criminals deterred. 
Gill et al. 's (2008) study resulted in somewhat optimistic findings in the types of 
companies that effectively incorporate risk-management and security strategies. Some 
studies from the United States and the United Kingdom have shown that only companies 
that are worried about acquiring significant losses as a result of crime will incorporate 
risk management and security measures (Cavanagh, 2006; Levi, Morgan, & Burrows, 
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2003). In other words, whether a company perceives itself to actually be threatened or at 
risk will determine whether or not it will undertake risk management into account at a 
strategic level. It is also possible that the size of the organisation and the funds available 
will determine the extent to which security is prioritized. Smaller companies might be in 
less of a position to consider the impact of risks and consider the value of security 
measures. 
Cultural divides also impact the integration of security measures into corporate 
companies. Security management provides a specific function-that of providing 
protection and security. This view of the security profession is held by other divisions in 
addition to the security division, who may see themselves as having a purely dedicated 
and focused role within a company. However, as Gill et al. (2007) note, the issue of 
security should no longer be viewed as a separate entity, but rather as adding value to the 
company and thus improving company performance. Gill et al. report some interesting 
findings surrounding the perception of security management as well as the extent to 
which security adds value to an organisation. 
In terms of perceptions, some respondents saw security as an added cost to the company 
instead reducing losses and thus saving money. However, the benefits of security are not 
only related directly to finance; Gill et al. also report that security measures bring about 
both hard and soft benefits. Hard benefits include quantifiable benefits, such as cost 
reduction whereas soft benefits include more qualitative benefits, such as improving staff ' 
morale and the working environment. Such benefits are equally important, as the 
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improvement of morale may lead to a decline in the number of sick days taken, which in 
effect will have an impact on finance. Gill et al.'s findings show both the direct and 
indirect benefits of risk and security management. 
Despite the benefits of having a risk and security management resource within a company 
and recommendations from security professionals to align security with the wider 
business objectives, some research has shown that there are debates around what the 
professional background of the person appointed to lead security should be (Gill et al. ,  
2007). Manunta ( 1996: 1 35) argues, those employed in the private sector tend to be 
mature, retired people with military or police background who are unlikely to have had 
education at university level. Most of them have little or no career prospects, and some on 
there own admission are in search of a 'warm, comfortable retreat' .  Button (2008: 91)  
argues, in some nodes the security manager need to be attuned to the business 
environment and to be able to talk that language. There is a view amongst many in the 
security community that some security managers drawn from the ex-services/law 
enforcement community cannot talk business. I contend that a company should give the 
security lead to an individual with business skills to have an impact and influence on the 
whole of the business agenda. However, there are serious detriments to this proposition; 
security managers who are primarily equipped with business skills will focus on the issue 
of security from the perspective of business priorities and may be in a disadvantaged 
position to consider the wider risks to which the company is exposed. The business 
professional also lacks the wide range of skills in identifying and managing risk that a 
38 
professional who is trained and skilled in this particular field has. What may be more 
beneficial is a closer working relationship between the head of security and the board of 
directors to ensure that security risks are acknowledged and risk management is in line 
with the company objectives. Heamden ( 1 995) found that 58 per cent of those security 
managers surveyed reported to a director or to the main board. More recent research on 
American security managers in Fortune 1 000 companies found nearly, three-quarters 
reported to either to the chair, president, senior vice president or vice president of the 
board (Nalla and Morash, 2002). Given the growing resources and attention that many 
organisations have devoted to security post-91 1 1  it is likely the level of reporting to UK 
boards has increased (Briggs and Edwards, 2006). 
Both security experts and those in business agree that there is a need for security. 
However, Gill (2007) states that the heads of organisations tend to marginalize their 
security departments. Gill et al. (2007) have noted the inadequacies of many security 
managers from an ex-service and law enforcement background in embracing and 
articulating the language of business. In one illustrative quote a security manager argued, 
' . . .  most senior security people are just plain thick. Many cannot write basic policy or 
process, as much as they may understand what needs to be achieved and they cannot 
articulate a business case' (Gill et al., 2007: 52). As a result, the effectiveness of the 
department, which may not be in a position to identify all potential risks and threats or be 
in a position to respond if it is not well incorporated within the company, is limited. Gill 
finds a further failing of security departments: the security department tends to prioritize 
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technological methods and thus falls short of effective security planning and risk 
strategies. Others have raised additional issues about the security agenda. Button (2007) 
highlights the critical issue of effective regulation. Security procedures and processes 
need to be effectively monitored and regulated by governments to ensure that they are 
ethical and comply with legislation such as human rights, data protection, and corporate 
governance standards. Button also highlights the lack of understanding of what works in 
terms of security practice; there is no evidence that the department's security procedures 
and practices actually work. Research needs to be conducted to determine the 
effectiveness of security measures and to analyze what impact they have on a company, 
examining both the benefits and the drawbacks. 
Past investigations, such as Gill et al. (2007: p. 6), note that " in reality, security is a key 
aspect of all organisational processes. Modem security management should see security 
as integral to all organisational activates not as a separate function on the edge." 
Corporate risk and security management have demonstrated that although the security 
agenda is becoming recognised as an important company function, the department is still 
marginalized within organisations. The benefits of effective security management are 
diverse; security measures have both financial and nonfinancial benefits for a company, 
and effective security planning and strategies can even boost employee morale and 
improve the working environment. The limited research in this area shows that employees 
within companies, including those in senior management positions, generally 
acknowledge the value of security, but they may not be aware of all the benefits a security 
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department can provide. Most of the research in this area suggests that security 
departments need to be more integrated with other departments of an organisation, 
particularly at the board level, to insure that security measures are aligned with the wider 
company objectives. This will also lead to greater information sharing between 
departments, which may lead to better identification of potential risks and threats to a 
company as well as the implementation of more thorough risk-management strategies. 
Finally, research into corporate security and risk management is limited, particularly 
research that has investigated what works in the discipline of security. Little is understood 
about the types of methods or strategies that are the most appropriate and successful, and 
therefore future research should aim to fill this gap. By researching what actual security 
measures work within different sectors, corporations and other organisations will be 
better placed to understand the value of security and be in a better position to select the 
methods that are proven to work. 
The Development of BCM 
A holistic approach to risk management is necessary and appropriate, particularly in the 
light of specific resistances developed by organisational cultures. BCM is a relatively new 
management discipline, developed in the mid- 1 980s as a new way of addressing the need 
for holistic management of business risks (Sharp, 2006). It "establishes a strategic and 
operational framework to implement, proactively, an organisation's resilience to 
disruption, interruption or loss in supplying its products and services" (PAS, 2003 : p. 56) .  
Ginn ( 1 989) argues that business continuity planning may best be  defined as  thinking the 
unthinkable, whereas Borodzicz (2005, p. 87) concludes that "business continuity 
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planning is about achieving a balance between preparing for situations in which 
contingency plans will have to be used, while at the same time doing everything 
conceivable to stop them ever having to be used," and Sharp (2006) argues that 
BCM is about prevention, not just cure, it is about anticipating that things are beginning 
to go wrong and taking planned and rehearsed steps to protect the business and hence 
the stakeholders' interests. It is about maintaining confidence in the management's 
ability to handle a crisis and to prevent disasters occurring, thus protecting the brand, 
reputation and the image of the organisation as much as the physical infrastructures and 
its employees. BCM goes beyond recovery from a disaster to establishing a culture that 
seeks to prevent failure and crisis. (p. 99) 
In this section, are explored, the developments of the BCM model as a holistic approach 
to risk assessment and management. The ('research project' - Chapter 4) employs some 
of the definitions and solutions of the BCM model to explain why security does not work, 
and the strategic adaptations required to ensure that it can. 
Elliot, Schwartz, and Herbane (2002), in one of the most authoritative books on the 
subject ofbusiness continuity, suggest that the evolution of BCM can be divided into 
three phases: technology, auditing, and value based. The technology stage of business­
continuity planning has grown out of the requirement to provide computer disaster 
recovery for information systems.  Sharp (2006: p. 98) supports this assessment, noting 
"Traditionally disaster planning had concentrated on the restoration of facilities after a 
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major incident such as the loss of computing or telecommunications, or of a building or 
plant through fire or flood." It is hard to think of an organisation in which computers are 
not to successful operations. In this respect, BCM is about the prudent management 
of infi.Jrmation technology (IT) resources, so the response to these types of scenarios is 
likely to focus on the ability to arrange alternative sites and sufficient back-up systems to 
enable them to continue to function after the failure (Borodzicz, 2005) . 
According to Borodzicz (2005), 
The second phase identified by Elliott et al . [2002] is the auditing phase and can be 
characterised as a shift in emphasis to the auditing of organisational systems in order to 
achieve compliance with corporate governance and regulatory pressures. Organisations 
arc now under a greater degree of regulatory control than ever before (p. 88). 
Borodzicz (2005) further recognised the increasing impact of corporate legislation on 
organisational behaviour and predicted that such influence would only develop further. 
Since 1 995, large organisations have tended toward tighter governance and risk control 
(Cadbury et al., 1 992; Hampel Committee on Corporate Governance, 1 998; Tumbull, 
1 999). According to Heamdon ( 1 993: p. 89), "Good corporate governance is suddenly no 
longer an optional extra. In the early 1 990s, some 30% of organisations had some form of 
contingency plan." Borodzicz (2005, p .  89) updates this, noting that "Ten years later, 
nearly every large organisation operating in the European or US context must comply 
with a complex ' latticework' of regulatory requirements." 
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In 1 992, the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance published the 
Cadbwy Report in London. It emphasised that "it is for the shareholders to call the 
directors to book if they appear to be failing in their stewardship . . .  and they should use 
this power" (Cadbury et al. ,  1 992 : p. 39). Then, as Smith and Politowski (2006: p.43) 
report "The Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales issued Guidance 
for Directors on the Combined Code, the Tumbull report [ 1 999] , which has since become 
one the principal authorities on the subject." The guidance sets out an overall 
framework ofbest practice for business, based on an assessment and control of their 
significant risks: "for many companies, [BCM] will address some of these key risks and 
help them to achieve compliance" (Tumbull, 1 999; cited in Sharp, 2006: p. 1 0 1 ) .  
I t  i s  increasingly obvious that reaction to unspecified risk is no longer a valid or  cost­
effective approach to security risk management. Borodzicz (2005 : p.8) finds that "There 
is certainly evidence emerging to suggest that directors will increasingly need to be 
accountable for the failure of their risk management policies," and that "with increasing 
litigation following many major incidents, organisations need to demonstrate to the legal 
establishment, and to society generally, that possible precautions are being taken in order 
to avert and where necessary manage potential hazards" (p. 7). However, the success of 
such legislation largely depends on the extent to which organisations set out merely to 
minimally conform or whether they adopt and embrace the principles and use them for 
their strategy development (Smith & Politowski, 2006). 
The third phase identified by Elliott, Swartz, and Herbane (2002) is the value-based 
phase, in which the emphasis moves beyond compliance to understanding how the 
organisation works, and improving performance. BCM in this phase is not about 
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minimizing downside risks, but also recognising that human and social risks are as 
important, if not more so. Most organisations typically consist of a number of separate 
departments, resembling Darwin's theory of evolution inverted, and are staffed by the 
appropriate experts, by their nature they are concerned with risks pertinent to their own 
sphere of interest. This division of the risk analysis functions means that little attention is 
paid to the interaction of the individual sub-systems within the organisation and 
increasingly the risk management has become a compartmentalised affair. The key issue 
here is in designing "resilience" [Home Office, 1 997a] into the organisational structure 
without constraining the purpose for existing (Borodzicz, 2005 : p .  89). 
In the 1 980s, businesses introduced the technique ofholding team meetings at each level 
of an organisation to consider how output improvements could be made as part of total 
quality management. The same principle can be applied to BCM, with teams being asked 
to iden6fy areas that prevent or impede the continuity of their area of operations. 
Experience has shown that even the lowest-level employees are able to relate to the BCM 
concept, and not only identify areas of potential disconnection but also possible solutions 
(Sharp, 2006). 
In seeking to establish BCM within an organisation, it should be made fit-for-purpose, 
business-owned-and-driven activity that unifies a broad spectrum of business and 
management disciplines in both the public and private sectors, including crisis 
management, risk management, and technology recovery, and it should not be limited to 
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IT disaster recovery. Many organisations start by developing continuity plans against such 
perceived risks as loss of IT or of a building. This is the traditional disaster-recovery 
approach that, although delivering a degree of comfort to senior managers that something 
has been done to protect the organisation, has an inherent problem in that it might 
overlook critical activities outside these facilities and services (Sharp, 2006). 
The basic purpose of BCM is to construct teams that can move forward in a mutually 
supportive, structured manner when potentially discomforting signals are detected around 
sensitive issues. "The very first, indispensable, step is to have executive teams working 
on the issues of major, potentially disruptive events that could undermine the whole 
system" (Lagadec, 1 997: p. 27). This process is known as BIA and looks at the impact of 
business interruption from the effects rather than the causes, meaning the impact rather 
than the risk. 
The measurement of impact may be financial loss, the effect on service delivery, 
embarrassment to reputation, personal safety, personal privacy infringement, failure to 
meet statutory or regulatory obligations, and effects on project objectives and schedules. 
Time is also a major consideration within this process, measuring how soon the disrupted 
activity wil l  impinge on the organisation and how long it could take to recover critical 
activities (Sharp, 2006). This mapping of the critical processes should assist in identifying 
the support infrastructure and key resources used to sustain these activities. Often third 
parties have a major role, particularly as suppliers of goods and services, and their part in 
this process should also be considered. 
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Following on from identifying risk exposure, BCM requires effective plans to ensure that 
an organisation can respond to any incident. These plans should be comprehensive and 
realistic. However, the process does not stop at the planning stage. Plans are of little use 
unless they are rehearsed, and exercises should be planned and observers appointed to 
note the way the BCM team handles situations. There are various forms of exercises 
ranging from desktop reviews, in which the participants review and challenge the 
contents of the plan, to walkthroughs, in which interaction between players is assessed, to 
full-plan tests, in which the site or building is shut down and moved to an alternative 
location (Sharp, 2006). 
Problems in the Literature 
A great deal of research has already been carried out on risk, including works by Turner 
( 1 978); Penow ( 1 982); Mitroff, Pauchant, and Shrivestava ( 1 988); and Adams ( 1 995). 
However, most of these writers focused on a post even tu m assessment of why systems 
fail. The problems these authors identified were caused by tight coupling and, in some 
cases, systems of interactive complexity. They and many others have also identified basic 
problems with communication and the crucial issue of epistemic strategy-that is, the 
subjective way that organisations perceive risk. This can lead obvious warning signals or 
triggers to be ignored, discounted, or simply not recognised. 
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There are further valuable hindsight evaluations, including those of Pidgeon ( 1 99 1 ), who 
carried out research to understand whether cultural misunderstanding influenced risk 
failures; 1rwin ( 1 995) and Drotz-Sjoberg (2003) consider failed communication. The 
normal accidents model developed by Perrow ( 1 982) and continued by Gephart ( 1984), 
argues against the presuppositions of the high-reliability theory (Roberts, 1 993). 
Hindsight is valuable in illuminating the problems faced within many organisations, 
which often become apparent only after a major system failure. These insights can be 
used to develop a proactive risk assessment strategy, contributing to Pidgeon's ( 1 99 1 ,  p. 
1 3  7) theory, which identifies the four facets of a good safety culture. Evaluated within 
this thesis are the pre-event conditions within organisations to allow for isomorphic 
learning and define a model that will enable a company to mitigate against identified risk. 
The overall aim is to address the current suspicion in organisations that security does not 
work and to provide a comprehensive and persuasive alternative approach to 
organisational preparedness. 
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CHAPTER 1 :  RISK MANAGEMENT OVERVIEW 
Without any sort of security infrastructure or understanding of risk management in 
an organisation, security will fail at the first appearance of trouble. In this chapter, 
the theoretical side of security risk is clarified and it is argued that the establishment 
of a security infrastructure is a prerequisite for any organisation. Also, addressed is 
the issue of cost versus effectiveness; an organisation should recognise the 
importance of securing susceptible assets-that is, the crucial significance of 
identifying and anticipating a priori risks before they occur. 
Merkhofer ( 1 987) defines risk as an uncertain situation in which a number of 
possible outcomes might occur, one or more of which is undesirable. Another 
definition comes from Haimes ( 1 999), who defines risk as the measure of 
probability and severity of adverse effects. Kumamoto and Henley ( 1 996) define 
risk as a collection of pairs of likelihoods and outcomes. 
Risk 
Risk is a threat or exposure of which one is aware but the effect of which cannot be 
forecast with regard to timing or extent. The risks to which any business is exposed 
can be more specifically defined as either: 
1 .  Pure risk (i.e., insurable) loss is the result of unavoidable circumstances, for 
example, damage to property, theft, legal liabilities, injury to people, or death. This 
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also includes such elements as fire, flood, storm damage, lightning, and seismic 
activity; or 
2 .  Speculative risk (i.e., entrepreneurial) in  which there i s  the chance of gain or loss, 
for example the purchase of merchandise that may be sold at a profit or the opening 
of new, speculative markets. 
There are four ways of measuring risk in business risk management: Solvency­
related measures, performance-related measures, covariance, and covariance matrix 
(Miccolis, 2002). Risk management is a systematic way of protecting the resources 
and income of a business against losses, so that the aims of the company can be 
achieved without interruption. 
Insurance 
The annual cost of insurance to a corporation rises each year, forcing companies to 
constantly scrutinize premiums and seek alternative methods of financing loss 
exposure. 
Many insurance companies are no longer prepared to expose themselves to pure risks, without first 
questioning what efforts organisations have applied to prevention, but increasingly, what steps 
management could be expected to take in order to minimise the loss potential. A further factor here, is 
the growing trend among extremely large organisations to self-insure and hence to absorb potentially 
serious business losses. The old proverb, the bigger they are, the harder they fall  may be an 
appropriate metaphor here. (Borodzicz, 2005: p. 5) 
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With this in mind, the development of a group risk-management policy should become 
part of an overall corporate strategy. The objective of this policy is the economic 
protection of the company against pure risks-that is, all those uncertainties facing the 
business with the exception of those risks relating to commerce, marketing, sales 
supply, and demand. 
Such risk-management policies aim to minimize the adverse effects of pure risks at 
minimum cost through identification, measurement, and control. The risk­
management process embraces all the methods of risk control and risk fmancing in 
which insurance plays a vital role. However, security professionals recognise that 
relying on insurance to protect against losses that can impair the operational capability 
or financial integrity of a company is not enough. Insurance is basically a postevent 
technique---that is, the insured is usually reimbursed only a proportion of the loss, 
albeit substantial, after the loss has occurred. Insurance will not replace other losses, 
such as lost associate morale, public confidence, or market share. 
Corporate Governance 
A variety of corporate legislation now exists, affecting the behavior, performance, and 
governance of organisational activities. "How organisations should be governed, who 
should be responsible for this, and how they might be made more accountable are key 
issues of corporate governance . . . .  In the UK over the last ten years, three reports 
have been highly influential in shaping corporate governance: Cadbury [et al.]  ( 1992), 
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Hampel [Committee on Corporate Governance] ( 1998) and Turnbull ( 1 999). Each of 
these reports can be seen, fundamentally, as a reaction to a number of high-profile 
corporate disasters in the last two decades" (Borodzicz, 2005: p. 8). In the United 
States, there is now the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), which has the potential to impact 
companies in the United Kingdom. "What Sarbanes-Oxley has done is open up lines 
of communication between upper level management and their security staff as to what 
is required in ensuring proper-and auditable-security measures are in 
place" (Chides, 2005: p. 29). There are several links between the Sarbanes-Oxley 
requirements and a company's security program. They include ensuring appropriate 
awareness of company security policies and commitment by management; 
designing and implementing appropriate security controls; and documenting and 
auditing security policies and making sure they are understood by management and 
end-users. (Williams, 2003). 
The Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined Code on corporate 
governance, recently issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants ofEngland and 
Wales, London (n.d.), now requires directors ofUK-listed companies to develop a 
corporate-wide risk-management approach to internal control, as an integral part of 
corporate governance policies and systems. Tumbull ( 1999) holds directors 
specifically accountable for developing organisation-wide risk-management policies 
and for implementing integrated, inclusive, and dynamic risk-management strategies. 
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After December 2000, all UK stock exchange-listed companies were required to make 
a statement of compliance with the Tumbull guidelines in their financial reports. 
Noncompliance with Tumbull would result in a disclosure that could quickly attract 
media comment; affect share price, credit rating, and corporate credibility; and lead to 
a suspension from the stock exchange, which in itself could trigger an organisational 
CflSlS. 
While Tumbull ( 1 999) sets specific responsibilities for directors, it also allows 
flexibility to develop corporate-risk strategies, including self-assessment of risks and 
risk-control effectiveness. However, the onus of proof is on the directors to show that 
their policies and systems satisfy the London Stock Exchange compliance 
requirements. Given the critical need to satisfy the investment stakeholder, the 
governance standards are likely to be a key incentive for directors to maintain or 
improve corporate share prices. 
Tumbull ( 1 999) emphasizes the need to exercise a logical and systematic process 
when developing an integrated, organisation-wide approach to risk analysis and 
control. Tumbull also expects directors and managers to exercise judgement based on 
the cost-benefit analysis and the trade-off between the expected impact if risk 
materializes, the probability of the risk occurring, and the cost of controlling the risk. 
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This is because risk management is inevitably a compromise. Complete risk coverage 
or risk elimination is uneconomic and unachievable. Zero tolerance of risk is an 
impractical and unprofitable policy objective for companies to pursue. A company 
must decide what risk levels will be accepted based on a cost-benefit analysis and then 
identify and prioritize risk exposures against these benchmarks. 
Risk Management 
Risk management is a concept by which all the potential and actual sources of accidental 
loss are collectively studied under one jurisdiction, so that they can be dealt with in the most 
effective manner at the most economic cost. Professional security is that part of risk 
management which seeks to reduce the chance by preventing, detecting or dealing with fire, 
crime, accident and waste (often called "loss prevention"). (Group 4, 1 992: p. 1 3) 
Risk, security and safety issues are not part of a company's daily worries. (Wilson & 
Slater, 1 990: p. 6) 
One perspective on risk management is derived from a not unfounded belief that risk 
and security are often unpopular and therefore neglected within organisations. There 
appears to be no standard approach or process by which companies approach the task 
of the resolution of their risk and crisis issues. Another perspective is the process, 
whereby decisions are made to accept a known or assessed risk and/or the 
implementation of actions to reduce the consequences or probability of occurrence 
(Royal Society, 1 992: p. 27) .  
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These quotes illustrate some of the dilemmas that those charged with the management 
of risk and crisis face. In this tradition, risk is seen as inherently subjective 
(Krimsky & Golding, 1 992; Pidgeon, Hood, Jones, Turner, & Gibson, 1 992; Slovic, 
1 992; Weber, 200 1 ;  Wynne, 1 992). Risk management encompasses the corporate 
body's need for profit protection and mitigation of risks. The security manager's role is 
also to reduce the risks so that the company may increase its profitability by avoiding 
losses. Security management and risk management are effectively two sides of the 
same coin; therefore, if organisations were to embrace both methods simultaneously, 
they could significantly improve their overall financial performance. Bartol and 
Martin ( 1 99 1 :  p. 264) emphasize this view, stating that "any chosen action could lead 
to losses rather than the intended results." 
In the article "Risk Management 1 990 and Beyond," Kloman ( 1984: p. 35) notes that 
"the majority of risk managers in industry and commerce still maintain strong ties to 
the insurance industry." Risk management describes a wide range of activities-from 
corporate strategy to health and safety, from investment appraisal to crime prevention 
techniques. The risk managers service the day-to-day operational needs of companies 
or organisations in the analysis, quantification, and management of those risks. They 
implement the policy or strategies. 
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The function of risk management can be broken down into four parts : risk 
identification, risk analysis and measurement, risk control, and risk financing. Risk 
management is the technical procedure of identifying and evaluating vulnerabilities 
and for balancing risks against the cost of countermeasures. 
However, when people learn about outcomes and their likelihood in a purely 
experiential way (by making repeated choices, starting out under complete 
ignorance and basing subsequent decisions on previously obtained outcomes), they 
tend to underweight rare events (Erev, 1 998; Weber, Sharoni, & Blais, 200 1 ). 
The correct identification and measurement of risk exposure in quantitative terms is 
probably the most critical part of the risk-management process. If this is not done 
correctly, any subsequent action taken could be based on an incorrect premise. To use 
a medical analogy, if a doctor misdiagnoses a patient, then he or she will most likely 
prescribe an incorrect treatment with potentially disastrous consequences. It is 
absolutely essential that all loss-producing factors are correctly evaluated in terms of 
likely frequency and severity before arriving at a strategy for dealing with the risks. 
The Cost of Risk Failure 
For the purpose of risk management, the security-risk manager should be able to read 
profit-loss trading accounts. Balance sheet practices need to be understood along with 
capital investment appraisal and any post-investment reviews that may be in place. 
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Security managers must assess risk and clearly define and monitor the results. It is 
only by measuring the success or failure of risk and security initiatives that the process 
will be both effective and better understood by organisations, making it more 
acceptable for them to integrate these systems into mainstream management 
processes, where the functions of security and risk management link together. A clear 
strategy brings together both strands, each with its unique perspective, unified by a 
single goal. 
The cost of a security failure can be calculated; the methodology for doing so is 
subsequently demonstrated in this thesis. For security managers, the task is, again, the 
assessment of the risk and the formalization of policy to reduce risk; the financial cost 
of this usually consists of two parts: primary costs and secondary costs. 
Primary Costs 
Primary costs are the simplest costing and consists of the price of lost assets. When 
goods for resale are involved, the purchase (as opposed to the sale price) can be used 
as the potential profit; I subsequently deal with this. Actual cash or financial loss can 
be counted as a simple sum, and other property can be counted at its replacement cost. 
These calculations do not immediately bring to light the additional costs to the asset 
loss. 
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Secondary Costs 
Every loss has a secondary cost. A simple example would be the cost of repairing 
damaged property. Security managers must discover the secondary cost of every loss, 
which may be greater than the primary loss and potentially the largest financial 
penalty of the whole event. The replacement of a security door that successfully 
prevented an attack might cost more than if it had been opened undamaged and the 
room's contents stolen, meaning that repairs after a ram raid could cost considerably 
more than the stock loss itself. 
Secondary costs can also be significant when an offender has been caught. The cost of 
taking statements, the use of staff as witnesses, and court appearances can be quite 
expensive. The cost of recruiting and training the replacement is a secondary cost that 
should always be considered on dismissal or prosecution of staff, likely amounting to 
thousands of pounds, and the more senior the staff member, the higher the secondary 
cost. In these situations, it may be more prudent for some organisations to not 
prosecute. This is a classic example of how security-risk management assess the costs, 
both financial and the less obvious, such as reputation. 
Total Cost 
The total cost of security failure is the sum of the primary and secondary costs of 
incidents. Those businesses that have conducted this costing exercise have found that 
the sum is never less than 1 0  times the primary cost; in high-capital businesses, it can 
be as high as 20 times the primary cost. But what can be done, and what are the costs 
involved? 
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In calculating primary and secondary costs, it is essential that security costs also be 
known; these include hardware costs, such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) 
cameras, alarms, and their associated maintenance or labor costs-for example, guards 
and investigators. These costs must be calculated as fully allocated; that is, all ongoing 
costs and overheads must be added to the cost of wages. Only then is the security-risk 
manager in a position to deal with a business impact formula and able to produce 
realistic and understandable investment proposals. 
The impact of the total cost is not just the financial loss. It is the loss plus the profit 
that would have been made if that sum had been invested in the enterprise instead of 
being lost through security failures or spent on prevention. The financial term for this 
sum is lost-profit opportunity, and it completes the data collection needed to construct 
security investment proposals. 
The security-risk manager must also understand the methods used by an enterprise to 
measure its profits. In commercial businesses, it will probably be a return on sales, 
turnover, or capital employed, but all enterprises--even charities and nonprofit 
services-have some kind of profitability measure, such as real unit cost. The 
security-risk manager's decisions will undoubtedly have an impact on these 
measurements. 
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Risk Blindness 
Other difficulties and problems to be overcome by security-risk managers are those 
caused by risk blindness. Researchers in psychology and more recently anthropology 
use the tenn to describe the risk of catastrophe that can be subject to illogical 
management, and there are powerful influences at work in both personal and group 
behavior, resulting in the acceptance of risk blindness as the "least-worst" option. 
Security managers are likely to spend significant amounts of time trying to persuade 
others that there is a risk and that it can be managed and at an acceptable cost. 
However, there will always be companies that will take the view, "we're so big and 
powerful, nothing can happen to us." Exxon and the operators of roll on-roll  off 
ferries will forever be the textbook examples of catastrophic risk blindness. 
Even when the security manager's dire predictions come true, it is unlikely that there 
will be any obvious change in the degree of risk blindness as a result. More likely, the 
organisation will find someone or something to blame for an event, and the incident 
will then be accepted as unpredictable and therefore unmanageable. Safety 
researchers point out that the most common reaction in an organisation is to focus 
on the actual event itself and the immediate response is to find responsible culprits 
to blame (Berwick, 1 998; Cook, Woods, & Miller, 1 998; Reason, 1 997, 1 998). 
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Many improvements have taken place within the field of security-risk management. 
Security-risk managers increasingly realise that human behavior and an organisation's 
safety culture have important parts to play in reducing corporate risks. References to 
the role played by organisational culture in major accidents are to be found in the 
reports of a number of disasters of recent years. For example, Desmond F ennell OBE, 
QC ( 1 988: p. 62) discussing the organisational aspects of the King's Cross fire notes 
that "London Underground has accepted that a cultural change is required throughout 
the organisation." Lord Cullen ( 1 990: p. 26), in his report on the Piper Alpha disaster 
observes that "It is essential to create a corporate atmosphere or culture in which 
safety is understood to be and is accepted as the number one priority." 
Risk Identification 
IdentifYing risk for an organisation is a time-conswning task and if not handled well can 
result in no more than a "tick box" approach, often heavily criticised by those against 
regulation. Risk identification involves listing and reviewing every type of risk that an 
organisation might conceivably face (this may not actually be possible, but it is still 
important to try to do this). It is important, at this stage, that both "pure" and "speculative" 
risks are included in the identification and that the process covers all levels of the 
organisational hierarchy. (Borodzicz, 2005:  p. 90) 
Effective risk identification includes three main areas of consideration: natural 
phenomenon, human activity, and breach of laws (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley). These are 
subsequently described in the IdentifYing the Threat section. 
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Risk Analysis 
One establishes the nature and source of the threat usingrisk analysis. One must 
exercise good intelligence gathering, collation, and evaluation to satisfY both of these 
criteria. This is achieved using existing data, establishing current, and authentic 
information sources, and applying good investigative skills. 
No security plan or program can be effective unless it is based on a clear 
understanding of the actual risks it is designed to control. Access controls, intrusion 
detection, CCTV, and manned guards all have their place. However, unless the 
complete systems and security strategy are designed and installed on the basis of a 
proper risk analysis, they will result in little more than the illusion of protection. Real 
security can only be achieved when precious resources are carefully allocated to the 
most pressing security needs. 
Traditionally, a corporate security department would look at a list of threats, from 
internal and external theft to natural or man-made disasters, and decide that the most 
pressing need is to defend the company against theft. 
For example, the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City 
on April 1 9, 1 995, which cost 1 68 lives, is an example ofthe "flying blind" strategy. 
Two conspirators were arrested for planning and executing the bombing of the federal 
building in Oklahoma. They appeared to have no links to organized terror groups, and 
the bombing was unprecedented in scale-the largest loss of life through terrorist 
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attacks on U.S.  soil until September 1 1th 200 1 .  However, there had been an escalating 
series of minor attacks, including death threats directed toward federal employees, 
petrol bombs, mail bombs, and hoax bomb alerts perpetrated by white-supremacist 
groups against federal buildings in the southern and midwestern United States for the 
previous 1 0 years (Michel & Herbeck, 200 1 :  pp. 1 7 1- 173 ). The contrasting example 
is the bombing of the Docklands area of London by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
on February 1 0, 1 996. The Docklands bombing was part of a pattern that made 
anticipation of the risks easier-the IRA had conducted a bombing campaign against 
commercial, military, and political targets in the United Kingdom since at least 1 97 1 .  
Their strategy before the 1996 ceasefire had been to target flagship commercial 
buildings at times that would minimize casualties and maximize economic damage 
and publicity impact. However, the bombing was far from predictable because it 
proved the dramatic end to a ceasefire that had held since October 1 994. In the case of 
the Oklahoma City bombing, the scale of the effect was the unpredictable risk element 
(the timing and the target were not); in the IRA bombing ofDocklands, the target and 
particularly the timing were the unpredictable factors. 
Having a crisis-management team prepared to respond to manage any disaster or crisis 
situation with pre-established recovery teams allows the organisation to act decisively. 
A clearly defined organisational structure of the team with unambiguous duties and 
responsibilities for the members allows the organisation to perform the difficult tasks 
associated with the management of a chaotic and stressful situation. It is crucial that 
the strategy be maintained and updated appropriately as new threats are identified. For 
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example, during the bombings by militant Islamic terror cells in London on July 7, 
2005, a manager in the United Reformed Church in Tavistock Place reported that 
those present at the time of the 2005 bombings, which targeted moving vehicles, 
followed the evacuation plan developed during the IRA bombings (i.e., plans 
developed for the bombing ofbuildings). Using the same plan under different 
circumstances actually put the people following it in greater danger. 
Both the attack on the World Trade Center on September 1 1th 200 1 ,  and the 
Oklahoma City bombing are evidence that protecting against only the most common 
possible threat is a fatal mistake. Instead of looking past low-probability risks, 
corporate security professionals should look at the consequences of all potential 
losses. This is known as consequence analysis; it addresses the consequences of losing 
a particular asset. Whether it is a secret rocket fuel formula, a one-of-a-kind processing 
plant, a chief executive's life, or the lives of children at a high school, if the 
organisation cannot stand the loss of the asset, then ensuring its protection is the 
highest priority. 
This means a company cannot afford to not protect that asset against any real threat, 
even if the probability is low. In consequent analysis, the relationship between threats, 
assets, the probability of loss and the consequence of loss of that asset is examined to 
determine whether resources should be used to protect it. 
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The four elements in the process of asset protection-the identifying of threats, 
identifying critical assets, determining the probability of the occurrence, and 
determining the consequences of loss-are brought together within the risk 
assessment, which would eventually be compiled into a report format. 
Identifying Threats 
When an organisation is "brainstorming" the range of threats it may face, it must 
understand the different elements, which may alter its perspective toward protecting 
the company's assets. For example, an organisation may place travel restrictions on 
staff members who want to travel to high-risk areas like Afghanistan or Iraq.A number 
of different areas could be considered part of an organisation's threat analysis. The 
human threats and pure-risk loss events lists are not designed to be comprehensive, but 
to assist with the basic understanding and principles. 
Human Threats: Overview 
Class 
Tactics 
Goals 
Motivation 
Capability of adversary 
Outside or insider 
Force, stealth, deceit 
Theft, sabotage, extortion 
Financial gain, ideology, mental instability 
Numbers, resources, skills 
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Pure-Risk Loss Events: Overview 
Natural catastrophe 
Industrial disaster 
Bribery 
Crime 
Terrorism 
Civil disturbance 
Environmental incident 
Structural collapse 
Conflicts of interest 
Other risks 
Identifying Assets at Risk 
Earthquake, flood, extreme weather 
Explosion, fire, major incident (external or internal) 
Disaffection, espionage, kickbacks, unfair competition 
Person or property 
Major sabotage, kidnap, extortion, assassination 
Insurrection, riot 
Flooding, hurricane 
Earthquake 
Directors holding positions with similar companies 
Travel/traffic accident, illness/death, personnel poaching 
To identify in detail all the elements of the area covered at risk, the security team 
should have all details relating to the company and its business available for analysis. 
This could include other organisations outside the immediate business area, and it 
might even be necessary to grant access to personal and family details pertaining to 
key personnel. The team's discretion and integrity are essential. 
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The assets that require protection may be physical (e.g. , buildings, plants, equipment, 
stock, telecommunications, computer systems, raw materials) or people (e.g., staff and 
visitors) or proprietary information (e.g., marketing data, formulas, financial, human 
resource databases, strategic planning information). 
In many instances, threats might produce more than one consequence or assets might 
suffer many consequences from one single threat. For example, repeated internal 
pilfering from staff will result in financial loss, loss of morale, and loss of confidence 
in the security effort. Assaults on staff can result in personal injury, loss of morale, 
legal liability, and so on, and the theft of computer hardware is not only the physical 
loss of the item, but can result in the loss of vital project data, proprietary information, 
and potentially extortion demands or project delays. 
Determining the Probability 
Merely identifying the internal assets or processes at risk from a range of potential 
hazards is insufficient to actually assess the risk, both internal and external risk factors 
also need consideration. The next factor in the risk-analysis process is the probability 
of the risk event occurring. The loss-event probability is the likelihood of those threats 
becoming actual loss events. One must consider the fact that the more ways an event 
can occur under given circumstances, the greater the probability that it will occur. 
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There are several approaches available to determine the probability of an event, 
including examination of the site's historic records, consultation with others in similar 
industries, professional associations, and law enforcement agencies. The principal 
factor that affects the probability of a loss event is vulnerability. Therefore, the security 
manager should run a vulnerability analysis alongside the probability analysis. 
Because vulnerabilities can cause deviation from intended outcomes or unauthorised 
access to an asset, the more factors are involved in a process, the more vulnerable the 
outcome. For example, with finished goods, if there are no controls, many similar 
high-value product lines that are easily portable and not identified by a serial number 
would suggest that vulnerability is significantly increased, because the more factors 
are present, the more probable pilfering becomes. 
When all available data have been gathered concerning each risk and its factual 
circumstances, managers should assign a probability rating. Ratings at this stage will 
not consider any precaution or countermeasures that may later be taken to reduce or 
eliminate the risk. 
There are many ways of representing probability, and whichever is selected must be a 
good fit with the company's principal risk assessment methodology, which is used for 
their more commercial risks and opportunities. Table 1 . 1 is a typical example of 
probability ratings assigned to risks. 
68 
Assessment Description Indicators 
Potential of occurring several 
times within the next 1 0  years 
High Has occurred within the last 2 
(probable) Likely to occur each years or more recently year or more than 25% 
chance of occurrence Typical of operations type 
because of external influences 
Could occur more than once 
Likely to occur in a 5- within the next 5 years 
year period or 20-25% Could be more difficult to Medium chance of occurrence 
(possible) control because of some 
external influences 
History of occurrence 
Not likely to occur in a Has not occurred 
1 0-year period or less 
Low (remote) than 20% chance of 
occurrence 
Table 1 .1  Description of Risk Probability Ratings ()ource: ALARM. (2002) A Risk 
Management Standard: AIRMIC. London, IRM.) 
Probability is measured as: the number of ways in which a particular event can result 
from a certain activity, divided by the number of events, which could occur from that 
activity. This is: 
P =fln 
in which 
P = the probability that a given event will occur; 
f = the total number of outcomes or results favorable to the occurrence of that event; 
and 
n = the total number of equally possible outcomes or results. 
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To predict the probability of security-loss events, one must settle for something 
considerably less than the precision of a classic equation. Even if efforts were made to 
apply an equation, such attempts would be impractical because of the amount of time 
and data needed to determine the nature of the relationship between contributing 
events and their individual and combined probabilities of occurrence. As low 
probability is not zero and every enterprise has some consequences that are 
unacceptably high (Garcia, 2000). 
In the previous example of pilfered finished goods, the more "circumstances" there 
are, the higher a probability there is that goods will be stolen. In other words, there is 
more probability of the pilferage of finished goods if two sets of favorable 
circumstances are present, even more so with three, and so on. 
To effectively assess the probability of security-loss events, the security team should 
uncover and recognise as many of the circumstances that could produce a loss as 
possible. However, common sense alone is not an adequate basis or yardstick for 
identifying risk. The team must have specialized knowledge, and the larger and more 
complex the organisation or loss environment, the greater the need for such expertise. 
Predicting the future is often a function of analyzing the past-that is, frequency of 
occurrence suggests the probability of future recurrence. However, in most enterprises, 
not enough historic data is collected in usable form to permit forecasting. Health and 
safety incidents and insurance claims are often adequately recorded, but security and 
natural-risk events are often not. A risk manager must have systems in place to capture 
and analyze the causes of the range of relevant incidents. 
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When it comes to conducting the risk assessment, every aspect of the organisation or 
facility under review should be examined to isolate those conditions, circumstances, 
objects, activities, and relationships that can produce a loss. To do this properly, the 
observer must take into account the dynamic and changing nature of the organisation. 
He or she must understand the daily routines, because the loss-producing causes can 
vary hom to hour. 
Determining the Criticality 
Assessing the criticality, or the consequence of loss, is the next stage in the assessment 
process. \Vith some highly probable risks, countermeasures may not be required if the 
damage they would produce is only limited. However, moderately probable risks 
require attention if the size of the loss the criticality would produce is increased. The 
relationship between the probability of occurrence and its severity or criticality forms 
the basis of the assessment process. 
Criticality is first considered on a single event basis. Events with established 
frequency or high-recurrence probability must be cumulatively considered. One can 
determine the consequence of loss in lost capital, reputation, lives, and other factors. 
The loss should be essentially expressed in terms of how it will affect the organisation. 
The most important measure overall is arguably money. Security vulnerability is most 
easily grasped if stated in monetary terms. Security and asset protection programs 
must be cost justified-not spending more than the benefits derived are worth-to fit 
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into a typical manager's frame of reference. Ignoring or underplaying cost 
implications but emphasising the need for security will generate low-grade programs. 
Although social responsibility, in a broad sense, is becoming a recognised part of 
organisational management, most managers and senior executives still set goals and 
measure results in financial terms, either profit gained or costs reduced. 
It is often very difficult for the security-risk manager to be able to quantifY the cost of 
the permanent replacement of a factory, piece of equipment, or lost production and he 
or she may need to work closely with the insurance department to establish whether 
extensive critical data is available. Many losses will be covered, at least in part, by 
insurance of some kind. To the extent that it is available, this amount should be 
subtracted from the combined costs of loss. 
When the cost data has been collected, a decision can be made regarding the correct 
criticality rating to be applied to the loss under consideration. If the same general 
technique is used here that was used in assessing probability ratings, we can achieve 
an effective, although rough, grading. Table 1 .2 shows one system that can be used. 
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High 
Financial impact on the business is likely to exceed 
£500,000-£ 1 ,000,000 or significant impact on the 
organisation's viability, strategic impact on operational 
activities 
Significant political or community sensitivity 
Financial impact on the organisation likely to be between 
£ 1 00,000-£200,000 
Medium Moderate impact on the organisation's viability of 
strategic or operational objectives 
Moderate political or community sensitivity 
Financial impact on the organisation likely to be less than 
Low 
£50,000 
Low impact on the organisation's viability of strategic or 
operational objectives 
Low political or community sensitivity 
Table 1 .2. Criticality Ratings System (Source: ALARM. (2000) A Risk 
Management S'tandard: AIRMIC. London, IRM). 
The nature and size of an organisation also determines the limits that should be 
decided for the above three categories. A £40,000 loss may be fatal to a small 
company, but unimportant to a large corporation. The value of the rating system 
therefore has to be relevant to the size of the organisation. 
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The Risk Table 
Types of threats, likelihoods of occurrence, and the effects on an organisation's 
survival can be translated into a simple table in which impact is scored against the 
frequency, as described in Table 1 .3 .  
THREAT ASSETS AT RISK PROBABILITY CRITICALITY 
1. Major Disaster 
Fire Physical assets Dismption of services 
Flood Risk to life and injury Low High 
Collapse o visitors and staff image 
�- Political Threats 
Terrorism Physical assets Low High Disruption of services 
Civil Disturbance Risk to life and injury Low High 
Demonstration o visitors and staff, Low High image 
3. Property Crime 
Burglary Company property Medium Low Tenant property 
Vandalism Customer property Medium Low 
Arson Staff property I morale Medium High Public confidence 
Theft Medium Medium 
Vehicle (theft of/ High Low 
from) 
4. Personal Crime 
Assault Staff Medium Low Staff morale 
Theft Public confidence Medium Medium 
Robbery Medium High 
Murder Low High 
5. Personal lnjury 
Accident ��� staff and visitors Low High 
RTA Low High 
Table 1 .3. Risk Table (Note. RTA = road traffic accident). 
RISK 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium/Low 
Medium/Low 
Medium/High 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium/Low 
Medium 
Medium/High 
Medium 
Medium 
Medium 
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Security Audit 
The risk and security assessment process will cover all those issues already examined 
but should also encompass a thorough security audit. There are a variety of approaches 
to conducting security audits, and it may be either as an integral part of the wider risk 
assessment or as a "stand-alone." However, the security audit must always follow on 
from the clear identification of risk targets. 
The objective of the security audit is to assess how the security manpower, physical 
security, systems security, procedures, and policies help or hinder the management of 
the identified potential risks and to make recommendations to reduce those potential 
losses. The security-risk manager should also consider the local-area intelligence, such 
as that provided by the law enforcement agencies. Such an appraisal aims at 
identifying specific characteristics of threats (including inherent hazards or social 
mobilization potential) and does not focus merely on the likelihood of 
consequences and damage potential (Klinke & Renn, 2001) .  
Site perimeter. For the security for any site to be  effective, the two basic 
requirements are a sound perimeter and the proper control of access and egress. In 
their simplest form, most people practice these in their own homes. We shut and 
lock doors and windows and only allow those whom we want to come in to enter. 
Thus, the audit should start with these two features. 
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First, the security-risk manger should identify the perimeter. There should be a clear 
boundary designated by a fence line. This normally surrounds the extent of the 
property, including parking facilities. In some cases, it is the building or buildings 
themselves that form the perimeter. In either case, the fabric of the recognised 
boundary should be fit for use. In the case of a fence line, it should be supported by 
an alarm system that is in working order and linked into an alarm system or a 
CCTV system. There should be a clearly published response in the case of a 
successful or attempted breach. 
The surveyor should check any incidents ofbreaches. He or she should inspect the 
perimeter, escorted by a representative of the security team if possible. During this 
examination, the surveyor should make a note of any improvements that may be 
required. These improvements should be included in the audit report as 
recommendations, along with an explanation of why they are necessary. 
Access and egress. The control of access and egress is a more complicated matter. It 
may be that control needs to be exercised at both the entrance to the property and 
the entrance into the building or buildings. There may be more than one of either of 
these. It may be that access control needs to be exercised on certain rooms or 
departments within the building. Once the surveyor determines the places where 
control needs to be exercised, he or she should measure the adequacy of the control. 
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The surveyor may adopt several methods, ranging from a key or keys being issued 
to an individual or individuals, to digital combination locks to an identification 
badge system, to an electronic card access system. With any of these, the 
fundamental requirement is that the list of individuals granted access needs to be 
current, updated regularly, checked whenever that authority is used, and withdrawn 
when and if  necessary. Access should always be withdrawn when an individual 
leaves the organisation. The implementation of this policy is lax in many 
organisations. One of the most common faults with any access system is that 
people, mainly security officers, lean toward the recognition of faces because it is 
convenient. 
Modern technological swipe cards access systems, combined with turnstile-type 
entrances, if properly used, prevent pass back and tailgating, which are common 
flaws with many systems, and are very effective in taking the human element out of 
the equation. However, the same authority for issues and withdrawals should still be 
followed. 
Many organisations use a CCTV system. Often these systems are used mainly to 
support the perimeter defense and control of access and egress and should be 
installed accordingly. However, the vast majority of installations that I have 
surveyed were installed without any recognised operational requirement. The use 
and operation of the system further compound these original installation issues. The 
monitoring of the system, in the majority of cases, is secondary to other tasks. 
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Where CCTV has proven to be successful-shopping centers, town centers, and on 
an increasing number of the more notorious housing estates-it is because the 
system is properly managed and monitored, with the appropriate response. When a 
CCTV system i s  properly monitored, it becomes a proactive tool; in the vast 
majority of organisations surveyed, however, it is used as a reactive instrument. The 
most common phrase used is : "We think there was an incident last night at about 
midnight, check the CCTV system and see if you can spot something." Many 
organisations invest huge amounts of money into a system and then do not use it to 
its full potential. 
Monitoring and control equipment is usually located in the security officer's 
workstation, where the officer normally performs myriad other tasks. When they are 
located in a control room-type environment, monitoring the system is not a 
dedicated task; it plays second fiddle to many other tasks. Again, in the majority of 
cases, the requirements of the Data Protection Act are neither understood nor met. 
With the use of modem technology, a CCTV system is a very effective and 
powerful tool. Where it is linked to a fence and other alarms, it can benefit the 
security of an organisation and, combined with the use of technology in access and 
egress control, reduce the security costs by facilitating a reduction in manning 
levels. 
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Security officers ' work conditions. Many of the security workstations are not 
ergonomically fit for the task. In some cases, they are not even aesthetically 
pleasing. Many security officers work long shifts. However, once a risk assessment 
and audit has been completed, presented, and discussed, organisations often reduce 
the duration of shifts. Because of the possible reduction in man-hours, the reduction 
in working hours in the week is compensated with a substantial increase in the 
hourly rate. 
There is, however, some reticence in improving security officers' working 
conditions. Some workstations, although not all, do not have basic amenities, like 
running water or toilet facilities. The furniture is not designed for proper use; it is 
often second-hand, taken from an office or department that no longer wants it. The 
design of the workstation usually does not fit the task, and in some cases, it 
prevents the task from being adequately performed. 
There are many examples of this. In one company, the dayshift security officer's 
main task was to control the access to and egress from the car park. The gate 
remained open during the working day. There were no barriers to control the traffic. 
The unmarked security lodge was tucked away in the corner of the park some 50 
yards from the entrance. The lodge had neither running water nor toilet facilities. 
The security officer, to answer the call of nature, had to vacate the lodge to use the 
facilities in the main building. One of his other tasks was to react to door closure 
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failure alarms in the main building. This again involved vacating his workstation to 
close the offending door. Because of the high volume of traffic, he was not allowed 
to shut the main gate while he was away from the lodge. Therefore, one cannot 
accurately say that he was controlling access to and egress from the car park. 
The audit process should be conducted both during the working day and during 
silent hours. Most businesses' modus operandi is different during silent hours. Even 
when operations are conducted around the clock, the senior management team and 
the staff are normally not in attendance after business hours. 
One of the critical checks by the security officer during the hours of darkness is on 
lighting. This should be viewed from both a security and a safety aspect. In terms of 
security, it is imperative that the officer's assignment instructions are scrutinised, 
his or her actual tasks are fully observed, and then a comparison made. This will 
highlight any discrepancies and the ergonomic suitability of the workstation. 
Disaster-recovery plan. It is a further imperative that the organisation have a 
feasible disaster-recovery plan. The plan should cover any likely cause of disruption 
to the business: from fire to flood, from robbery to theft, from sickness to other 
unscheduled absences from work, from racial tensions to stalking. These plans 
should show the way to carry on with business or, ifbusiness needs to cease, how 
that is managed. It should address such questions as who is going to deal with the 
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media and how. These plans should be constantly updated through practice in the 
form of desktop exercises. Where necessary, the plans should be practiced with the 
entire workforce. 
Most organisations practice evacuation procedures. The main cause for concern is, 
in the majority of these practices, the accounting of the safety of personnel, which 
for most operations relies on individual knowledge regarding who is or is not 
present at work. It is also, in many cases, reliant on the individual responsible for 
accounting being present at work. 
Most security audits recommend some form of target hardening techniques, such as 
improvements to the physical security arrangements. In this context, the aim is to 
"deter, delay and detect" (Heamdon & Moore, 1 999: p. 1 9).  It is also important to 
remember that this may conflict with contingency arrangements, for when people may 
need to leave urgently. "One very good reason for unifying the processes of both 
security and risk management from a business continuity perspective is to resolve 
these conflicts centrally . . . .  Similarly the best way to manage risk may be not to let 
any people in. However in the terms of the organisational purpose for existing, this 
would constitute organisational disaster. Security then, like risk, is about finding a 
socially acceptable balance" (Borodzicz, 2005: p. 9 1) .  
81  
Developing a Security Strategy 
Depending on the findings and recommendations of the risk assessment and security 
audit, the resultant strategy may amount to no more than fine-tuning procedures. 
Strategy is the best name for the significant plans that allow the organisation's 
objectives to be achieved by aligning the enterprise with its environment (Johnson, 
Scholes, & Whittington, 2005: p. 60). Hannagan (2005) shows that objectives are 
expected to be SMART: specific about what is to be accomplished, measurable, 
attainable, result-orientated, and time-specific. However, it may be that a complete 
revision of systems, procedures, manpower usage, and policy development is required, 
possibly taking several weeks or months to implement and with possible substantial 
cost implications. The relation between risk and return is a central concern of 
strategic management and has been extensively studied (Baucus, Golec, & Cooper, 
1 993; Bowman, 1 980, 1 982, 1 984; Bromiley, 1 99 1 ;  Fiegenbaum, 1 990; 
Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1 985, 1 986, 1 988; Miller & Bromiley, 1 990; Miller & 
Leiblein, 1 996; Ruefli, 1 990; Wiseman & Bromiley, 1 99 1 ). 
A written strategy should follow a structure: 
1 .  Foreword, 
2 .  Policy statement and objectives, 
3 .  Mission statement, 
4. Security environment (description), 
5 .  Security methodology (description), and 
6 .  Individual objectives (strategies for achievement of these). 
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Creating Security Awareness 
For any security strategy to have a chance ofbeing successfully established within an 
organisation, certain positive conditions must first be in place, not least security 
awareness. In any human activity, a specific state of mind or attitude is desirable for 
maximum performance. We must first, however, distinguish awareness from education 
and training. 
Security awareness may be defined as a state of mind through which an individual is 
conscious of the existence of a security program and is persuaded that the program is 
relevant to his or her own behavior. This definition emphasizes that security awareness 
is part of a conscious process-that is, a continuing attitude that can move the 
individual to specific actions. The distinction between awareness and education and 
training is that awareness seeks to solicit conscious attention for the others to happen. 
Because a security program will impact different functional groups within any 
enterprise in different ways, it is important to identify awareness as it applies to 
various levels within the organisation. 
Integrated Solutions 
The results from the risk-management/security survey process have caused a number 
of organisations to consider crime prevention (risk reduction) through environmental 
design. "This environmental approach to crime prevention originated from the work of 
Oscar Newman ( 1 973, 1 976) and Barry Poyner ( 1 983). This works on the basis of the 
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reduced likelihood of crime, through the design of a defensible environment, based on 
an enhanced criminal risk perception" (Borodzicz, 2005: p. 9 1 ). 
Although many security organisations have historically considered their purpose to 
simply supply manpower services to their customers, they may only complete a basic 
risk assessment and security survey to enable them to comply with the current security 
standards. This could have potentially catastrophic ramifications for themselves and 
their customers alike. 
However, the more forward-thinking security organisations have seen the consequence 
of the wider implications and opportunities and offer total security solutions, 
combining the elements of risk management and crime prevention through 
environmental design, sometimes referred to as an integrated solution. 
Conclusion 
It would seem self-evident that if threats and hazards remain unidentified, 
vulnerabilities unacknowledged, incidents unrecorded, security poorly managed, 
and risk unqualified, that security will fail. In reality, however, it often succeeds, 
albeit more by good fortune than sound, strategic planning. It succeeds at one 
specific level, in that the most common threats can be guarded by the most common 
defenses, in other words, those defenses provided by physical security assets. This 
creates an illusion, on both objective and subjective levels, that security is working 
because it is visible (e.g., CCTV cameras and access controls), working, and 
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effective-objective in the sense that a seemingly strong physical feature is a 
defense against all vulnerabilities and subjective in the sense that the resultant 
complacency becomes a byproduct of the visual (i .e, the mentality that there is a 
camera on the wall so we must be okay). 
Some of the companies that contributed to my research truly believed that crisis­
management planning was another department's responsibility and that they would 
be told what do when the time came to respond to an incident or site evacuation. 
The illusion of security satisfies a variety of demanding issues: corporate 
management 's requirement to discharge (mistakenly, as it often transpires) best 
practice, deterrence by means of the visual existence of security assets, and the 
comfort and morale of staff. Security manpower, with the hours of deployment of 
staff involved may enhance the deterrence factor in a positive way, but more often, 
it only further compounds the illusion that security is working when in reality there 
are serious deficiencies. 
85 
CHAPTER 2 : BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT 
BCM is a process that identifies potential impacts that threaten an organisation and 
provides a framework for building both resilience and the capability for an effective 
response. This response must safeguard the interests of its key stakeholders, as well as 
the organisation's reputation, brand and value-creating activities. Business continuity 
management (BCM) is the subject of continuing development and research. In the 
United Kingdom, some aspects of BCM are covered by legislation, and others are 
covered by industry safety standards such as the British Standard Code of Practice, 
BS25999 (first issued in 2006 and now incorporating various subsequent updates and 
supporting documents) provides "guidelines and recommendations on setting up and 
managing a business continuity management programme" (Business Continuity 
Institute, 201  1 ) . 
Borodzicz provides a useful summary: 
The most serious risk that can be posed to any organisation is survival. This area of 
increasing concern is referred to as "business continuity" or "contingency 
management"; also sometimes as "crisis management." Business Continuity 
Management (BCM) is a new area of professional activity, but also an area of 
academic study and research, which aims to facilitate the mitigation of emergencies, 
crises and disasters in organisations. (Borodzicz: 2005, 85) 
This chapter will consider "the mitigation of emergencies, crises and disasters" in 
more detail, first defining what can be considered to be a major disaster and then 
examining how organisations can respond to disasters. The more recently developed 
BCM techniques for ensuring that organisations are prepared and resilient, including 
the use of risk assessment and business continuity planning (BCP) and the 
importance of crisis management plans will then be discussed. 
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What Constitutes a Major Disaster? 
A major disaster can be defined as an occurrence, natural or man-made, that causes 
significant disruption to everyday activity and involves numerous casualties and loss of 
life: 
[Disasters] are a serious disruption to life, with little or no warning, causing or threatening 
death or serious injury to such numbers of persons, in excess of those, which can be dealt 
with by the public services, operating under normal conditions at that time. Which calls, 
tht�retore for special mobilisation and organisation of those services. (Wilson & Slater, 
1 990: p. 6) 
Examples of major disasters can be drawn from space exploration, such as the deaths of the 
Apollo space capsule crew who perished in a fire during practice drills in January 1 967 or 
the crew of the Soyuz XI space capsule who died following the capsule's decompression 
during reentry in June 1 97 1 ,  or from industry, such as Three Mile Island on April 26, 1 986; 
Piper Alpha on July 6, 1 988;  and the explosion in Guadalajara on April 22, 1 992. Other 
disasters, like the April 1 8, 1 986, San Francisco earthquake; the Bangladesh floods in 
September 1 988; and Hurricane Andrew in August 1 992, remind us that nature has the 
power to create even greater mayhem. A key factor in each case is our inability to 
accurately predict the probability of these disaster scenarios occurring; even in the case of 
natural disasters, which can increasingly be predicted with more accuracy using modern 
technology, it is still not possible to pinpoint precisely the areas to be affected or the extent 
of the damage that will occur. 
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Ways that Organisations Can React to Disaster 
Because of this difficulty in assessing probability and the comparatively remote chance of 
major disasters occurring, in the past, there was not a credible possibility of managers 
preventing such disasters or even providing mechanisms that would help prevent the losses 
sustained fi·om such events. As a result, their efforts were focused on protecting their 
organisations by purchasing insurance. 
However, this approach led to cases where managers failed to take action that could have 
prevented a disaster. One such example is the tragic fire at the Bradford City football stand 
on Saturday, May 1 1 , 1 985, when more than 50 people lost their lives. As early as August 
1969, the Fire Prevention Association had published an article in the Fire Prevention 
Journal ( 1 969), giving details of several fires that had taken place in football stands like the 
one at Bradford and warning of the fire risk associated with them. If this information had 
been fully brought to the attention of the security management team at Bradford City, 
they could have acted on that risk, and the incident would have been averted. This is one 
area in which both security managers and health and safety roles could have combined to 
prevent risk. 
To some extent this is what distinguishes crisis management, where both the physical 
and symbolic dimensions of a crisis are addressed before and after a crisis, from security 
management, which is limited to the technical side of safety, and from crash 
management, which is limited to reactive actions (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1 992: p. 1 8) .  
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Although such events as terrorist attacks cannot be predicted, organisations can have 
different responses in the aftermath, depending on their level of preparedness. The 
particular organisational crises triggered by the 1 993 City of London bombings were 
largely determined by internal factors-the degree of centralization, hardware and 
software backup, and staff communications outside of normal working hours. These 
were not the result of the disaster being specifically a terrorist attack: a gas explosion or 
earthquake might have had similar effects. NatWest data transfer routines were cited as a 
key factor in its ability to maintain operations. Conversely, the routines of the Hong 
Kong and Shanghai Bank Corporation did not facilitate a quick return to normality. 
(Swartz, Elliott, & Herbane, 1 995). Linkages and dependences with other business units, 
suppliers, customers, and other agencies, and so on are equally important for continuity 
(Elliott, Swartz, & Herbane, 2002). 
The threat of litigation often prevents organisations from revealing or sharing information 
on actual and potential problems. Management and staff are often embarrassed or afraid of 
having their employment terminated if they reveal that they were responsible for an 
unwanted incident. As a result, they tend to not inform management of any errors that they 
might have made. This reluctance to admit to mistakes that may have been made, 
unfortunately, also includes "near misses." Any organisation trying to manage risk and 
security should adopt a no-blame policy for its employees to ameliorate this tendency. 
Problems that plague organisations are often geographically dispersed. Each of the 
individual parts of the organisation are affected, but each particular area will often believe 
that they are the only ones suffering. Therefore, it can take time before the actual size of a 
particular problem comes to light; the number of people actually affected by upper-limb 
disorders caused by engaging in repetitive actions on computer workstations is one such 
example. 
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Although there are problems with some departments working together, they are not 
intractable, and the benefits to be found in using risk-management principles are 
significant. It is within this area that risk and security-management principles combine to 
achieve a better understanding of the operational functions of risk. When viewed through 
the lens of consequentialist models such as the expected utility model, people's risk­
taking behavior often appears to be highly variable and inconsistent across domains and 
situations (Barsky, Juster, Kimball, & Shapiro, 1 997; Isaac & James, 2000; 
MacCrimmon & Wehrung, 1 986; Schoemaker, 1 990). 
Consequential models of risk-taking predict that early resolution is preferable if other 
decisions must be made that depend on the value of the obtained outcome (Markowitz, 
1 959; Mossin, 1 969; Spence & Zeckhauser, 1 972). 
In recent years, research has been carried out into disasters and large-scale accidents, and it 
is now better understood that although disasters remain unpredictable, many display similar 
features and characteristics. The Texas City Refinery Explosion and the Buncefield Fire, 
which happen in March and December 2005 respectively, provide two examples where 
the subsequent investigations found that systemic failures had occurred primarily due to 
negligence. However, some organisations now realise that it is possible for them to take 
positive steps that will significantly reduce their risk. This, to some extent, is based on the 
fact that insurance coverage cannot be purchased for many of the risks that organisations 
face (e.g., gradual pollution). Security managers must assess these risks and use 
information to devise and implement strategies. 
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As the prospect of an uncertain aversive event approaches in time, fear tends to increase, 
even when cognitive assessments of the probability or likely severity of the event 
remain constant (Loewenstein, 1 987; Paterson & Neufeld, 1 987; Roth, Breivik, 
Jorgensen, & Hofmann, 1 996). 
Unfortunately, from one perspective, risk management can be seen as being similar to 
soothsaying and prophecy, insofar as the general idea is to forecast what potential 
misfortunes the future might hold for an organisation and to then try to prevent them from 
occurring. As a consequence, many managers in the past appear to have held (and in some 
cases managers still do hold) the belief that risk management is some kind of secret-a 
form of black magic, an undertaking outside normal management practices. 
Opinions are changing, however; recent developments show the advantages to be gained 
through the appropriate management of risk. Once organisations have recognised the value 
of risk management and security input, as they now increasingly seem to do, they are in a 
position to improve their financial performance by either preventing or reducing the 
potential losses to which they are exposed; both functions again coming together to make 
one collective decision. Toft and Reynolds (2005) support this line of thinking in their 
publication, Learning for Disasters. 
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There is, it seems, a decision by corporate management to engage in this kind of strategy, 
and there will be a strong message to the security manager that the risk profile has changed. 
In the light of this, the security manager will need to review current and projected security 
measures based on this new security-risk assessment. 
For example, knowing what risks may be involved in that particular company's area of 
operation, it would be foolish of a security manager not to review security procedures in 
the light of the organisation moving into certain Middle Eastern markets. The series of 
protests and demonstrations across the Middle East and North Africa, known as the Arab 
Spring, resulted in a series of Governments being overthrown and the stability of the 
region being brought into question. The risks to be taken cannot be worth exposing the 
company's reputation against a low-profit return. The long-term implications fall within 
security and risk assessment already described. This again links arms with both the security 
manager's and the risk manager's functions in a useful positive way, for the benefit of their 
company. 
The July 7th 2005, London Bombings and the Glasgow International Airport attacks 
2007, along with the thwarted attacks, which occurred in London 2 1 /7, and the London 
Car Bombs 2007, where Islamist extremists aimed to kill and maim as many people as 
possible shows how predictable risk was realized. 
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This is not to suggest that these terrorist attacks could have been prevented. However, 
security procedures in these areas and elsewhere were a great deal tighter after the 
bombings than before: this was based on security managers' reaction to the risk 
encountered, and the introduction of operational functions to reduce that risk. 
It is now a matter of record that the City of London Police openly display firearms in the 
streets on routine road checks in a preventative role. This is undoubtedly a result of 
pressure from businesses within the city by some security managers assessing the risks and, 
in discussion with other agencies, agreeing on a policy to reduce the risk. 
The message, therefore, is to be prepared, but not to overestimate the risk, as the Knight did 
in Through the Looking Glass: 
"I was wondering what the mousetrap was for" said Alice, "it isn't very likely there would 
be any mice on the horse's back." "Not very likely, perhaps" said the Knight, "but if they 
do come, I don't choose to have them running all about." "You see," he went on after a 
pause, ''it's as well to be prepared for everything, that's the reason the horse has all these 
anklets around his feet." "But what are they for?'' Alice asked in a tone of great curiosity. 
"To guard against the bites of sharks" the Knight replied (Carroll, 1 896: Chap. 8). 
Disasters: What Is the Cause? 
As far as technological disasters are concerned, many of the popular ideas regarding 
their underlying causes are myths. Examples include attributing such events to divine 
wrath or claiming that these disasters are solely technical in nature. The former suggests 
we cannot learn from these events, whereas the latter suggests that an engineering 
solution will of itself be sufficient to prevent a recurrence of the incident. Toft and 
Reynolds (2005) explain this further: 
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However, much research suggests that the underlying causes of catastrophes are far 
more complex than the simple explanations generated by such beliefs. Subsequent 
analysis of these events reveals that their underlying mechanisms invariably have 
organisational and social dimensions, while technological factors are sometimes, but not 
always present. Utilising the theoretical framework of systems theory, and the concept 
cf organisations as socio-technical systems, analysis allows technological disasters to be 
more appropriately understood as a result of human rather than divine actions. Similarly, 
this mode of analysis flags up the more complex socio-technical nature of these events 
as opposed to the exclusively technical. (p. 1 2) 
Turner ( 1 978) rightly argues that, in the search for some general principles to aid our 
understanding of disasters, it is better to think of the problem of understanding disasters 
as a sociotechnical problem, with social organisations and technical processes 
interacting to produce the phenomena to be studied. 
Turner was highly influential in developing the understanding that technological 
disasters do not simply happen but rather are incubated during a sociotechnical 
operation of a system. He also went further and developed a disaster sequence model, in 
which he described the six stages of a disaster's life cycle. The six stages of Turner's 
disaster model are as follows: 
1 .  Notional normal starting point: Security managers and society as a whole do 
not question the culturally accepted beliefs about the world and its hazards; 
associated precautionary norms set out in law, codes of practice, mores, and 
folkways. 
2 .  The incubation period: The accumulation of an unnoticed set of events that 
are at odds with the accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for their 
avoidance. 
94 
3 .  Precipitating event: Forces itself to the attention and transforms the general 
perceptions of Stage 2 .  
4 .  Onset: The immediate consequence of the collapse of cultural precautions 
becomes apparent. 
5 .  Rescue and salvage: First stage of adjustment-the immediate postcollapse 
situation is recognised in ad hoc adjustments, which permit the work of 
rescue and salvage to be started. 
6 .  Full cultural readjustments: An assessment is  carried out and precautionary 
norms are adjusted to fit the newly gained understanding of the world. 
(Turner, 1 978) 
However, for Perrow, organisational systems are the background precondition to most 
disasters. According to Perrow, it is not the humans but the system itself that is to blame. 
In Normal Accidents ( 1 984: p. 46), he argues that "catastrophic events are an inevitable 
feature of advanced technological society." 
For Perrow, the creation of high-risk systems is a function of humanity's technological 
attempts to control nature. He argues that "these systems are likely to fail when two or 
more components or processes malfunction in some previously unanticipated 
way" (cited in Borodzicz, 2005 : pp. 1 33-144). 
In other words, the greater the number of tightly coupled or mutually reliant 
components, the more likely it is, that there will be serious fai lure when two or more 
linked components fail .  Such accidents, resulting from tightly coupled or complex 
interactive system failures, Perrow calls normal accidents (Borodzicz, 2005: p. 30). 
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If interactive complexity and tight coupling-system characteristics-inevitably wil l  
produce an accident, we are justified in calling it a normal accident or system accident. 
The term normal accident signals that, given the system characteristics, multiple and 
unexpected interactions of failures are inevitable. This is an expression of an integral 
characteristic of the system, not a statement of frequency (Perrow, 1 984: p.  5). 
Perrow questions the risk acceptability of many high-technology industries, suggesting 
the number of possible coupling errors is simply incalculable. The Tohoku earthquake 
and tsunami in Japan 20 1 1  and the resulting nuclear disaster that occurred at the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant demonstrates the difficulties faced. The 
acceptability of risky systems remains a high-profile and emotional political question, 
with both Germany and Switzerland phasing-out nuclear power following public 
pressure. However, in the short term at least, the number of such systems (and their 
consequent failures) is likely to increase. Therefore, the immediate demand for 
improved preventative measures and the ability to respond to incidents is likely to 
remain (Borodzicz, 2005 : p .  32) 
Business-Continuity Planning 
B CP is the aspect of BCM that establishes what is vital for an organisation's survival 
fol lowing a major disaster affecting normal operations. BCP can be viewed as a four­
stage cycle: 
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1 .  Mitigation: Reducing and managing risks; 
2 .  Readiness: Instituting all measures that need to be in place, especially 
planning and warning systems; 
3 .  Response: Managing the emergency or  crisis; and 
4. Recove1y: Identifying the requirements to return to normality once the 
incident is over. 
A natural overlap occurs between the identification of risk, its management by means of 
security analysis and necessary adjustments outlined in the security strategy, the 
establishment of the crisis plans, and the implementation ofbusiness recovery strategies. 
One theorist argues that business continuity planning may in fact be defined as "thinking 
the unthinkable" (Ginn, 1 989). Borodziz (2005: p. 87) states that BCP "is about 
achieving a balance between preparing for situations in which contingency plans will 
have to be used, while at the same time doing everything conceivable to stop them ever 
having to be used." 
Business continuity establishes key processes and business functions and determines 
what resources departments will require, and within what timeframes, to recommence 
their critical processes and functions. 
Organisations have many dependencies, both internal and external, that support their 
critical processes and functions. These may include, but are not limited to, suppliers, 
customers, IT systems, and manufacturing processes . The critical needs of departments 
should be analyzed and ranked in order of importance, for example: essential, important, 
and nonessential. 
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Each functional area of the organisation should be analyzed to determine the potential 
consequences and impact associated with several disaster scenarios. The assessment 
process should also evaluate the safety of critical documents and vital records. 
This assessment is carried out by means of a business impact analysis (BIA). The BIA 
identifies the impact of disrupted or lost critical processes and functions on the 
organisation's goals. The BIA enables the organisation to focus BCP activities on 
essential business elements through a systematic assessment of the risks faced. 
Risk Management 
Risk management is increasingly becoming a key tool in the protection of the reputation 
and brand values of many organisations. With an increased understanding of threat 
potential and more complex research data available, organisational awareness has 
improved considerably over the last 1 0  years. 
With the variety of corporate legislation that now exists affecting organisations' 
behavior, performance, and governance and an emerging culture of "no win, no fee," 
insurance implications related to threat potential have skyrocketed to previously 
unthinkable levels. However, many businesses are still failing to fully comprehend the 
advantages to proactive security and risk management in a world where technological 
advancements and the inevitability of an organisational failure will result in major 
losses. 
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Risk management is not the ability of hindsight or some form of black mag1c. It 
represents organisational awareness of the potential threats, which may affect an 
organisation's stability. By identifying its pure or speculative risks, an organisation can 
systematically protect its resources, income, and reputation. 
However, Borodzicz (2005 : p. 6) argues that many organisations, largely as a response 
to regulatory pressure, place too much emphasis on risk identification and avoidance 
and too little on response. He also questions the assumption that risk and security can 
ever be effectively managed, given the nature and contexts of many difficult-to-manage 
crises, which act to continually remind us of our vulnerabilities. 
Additionally, many insurance companies are no longer prepared to expose themselves 
without first asking what their clients have done, or what they could have reasonably 
done, to prevent losses. This has resulted in many larger organisations self-insuring, thus 
increasing their potential for a catastrophic failure. Insurance companies ask the 
question for a perfectly good reason: their risk increases with organisations that neglect 
to consider the potential for organisational failure. 
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales's introduction of corporate 
governance, making directors responsible and companies compliant, has assisted in 
raising awareness of the implementation of risk-management strategies. 
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The identification, analysis, measurement, control, and financing of risk enables 
organisations to evaluate their vulnerabilities and balance the risk against the cost of the 
countermeasures required to direct their response to the threat potential. The 
development of appropriate measures for the protection of the firm's assets has to take 
place gradually, after evaluating the conditions relevant to the specific firm and 
particularly its position in the market and the threats facing its particular sectors. 
However, the turbulence in international financial markets creates constraints on 
accurately evaluating the value of organisational assets. Borodzicz (2005) shows that: 
changes in the financial and monetary regimes since the early 1 980s may have made it 
more likely that financial factors in general, and the booms and busts in credit and asset 
prices in particular, act as drivers of economic fluctuations; as a result, the current 
environment may be more vulnerable to the occasional build-up of financial imbalances. 
(p. 84) 
In view of this turbulence, the strategies followed by the compames regarding the 
security of their assets have to be formulated accordingly. 
Lehman Brothers, which had an estimated pretax income of $800 million in 2007, found 
this to be no consolation when it was declared bankrupt in 2008, following a massive 
exodus of its clients, drastic losses in its stock, and a devaluation of its assets by the 
credit rating agencies. 
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Globalization's impact is extensive in this kind of case. As Stiglitz (2004, p. 57) states, 
"one of the most controversial aspects of globalization is capital-market liberalization-
not so much the liberalization of rules governing foreign direct investment, but those 
affecting short-term capital flows, speculative hot capital that can come into and out of a 
country." However, despite the existence of common rules in the regulation of 
international financial markets, each country follows its own regulations in all issues 
related to commercial activities. 
International rules can have only a supplementary role, and only in cases in which there 
is no appropriate national framework of rules regulating all aspects of commercial 
activity. Pagano and Volpin (2001 )  underline this issue, stating that: 
the regulations that shape the design and operations of corporations and credit and 
securities markets differ vastly from countryto country while even similar regulations 
are often unequally enforced in different countries; economists still have an imperfect 
understanding of why these international differences exist and of whether they tend to 
persist over time (p. 502). 
However, the existence of these differentiations could be limited because of the 
existence of the Internet, which imposes specific rules and principles on the transactions 
made. 
The structure of business operations can also be influenced in instances in which a 
particular business operates online. In an article on continuous auditing, Rezaee, 
Sharbatoghlie, Elam and McMickle (2002) note that: 
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electronic commerce, electronic data interchange (EDI), and the Internet are 
dramatically changing business practices and record keeping; for this reason real-time 
accounting needs real-time auditing to provide continuous assurance about the quality 
of the data; thus, continuous auditing is likely to become commonplace as audit clients 
increasingly shift to electronic real-time accounting systems. (p. 1 47) 
The study carried out by Rezaee, Sharbatoghlie, Elam, and McMickle refers specifically 
to online accounting systems as an element of business operations. However, several 
elements of the business strategy and many sectors of its activities can be differentiated 
in that a specific business uses the Internet to communicate with its clients and promote 
its products or services. In regard to organisational assets, the Internet represents a 
severe threat to the firm's online systems, including computers and all mechanical 
equipment employed in the firm's online activity. Significant files relevant to the firm's 
daily operations or other important corporate activities can also be at risk. To minimize 
this risk, the company should take all appropriate measures to ensure that regular 
controls over the firm's assets take place in all sectors of the organisation. The relevant 
measures should be included in the firm's crisis-management program. 
Every firm is obliged to incorporate the appropriate measures to protect its assets. When 
such a strategy is not applied, the firm's employees can claim that the firm is 
accountable for the potential damage caused to them and ask for relevant compensation. 
Raffer (2004), supports his finding, noting that: 
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two types of financial accountability can be distinguished: external, accountability of 
corporations to their customers, or state agencies to people; and internal, between firms 
or legal entities and their own staffs while employees may under certain conditions be 
liable to refund to their employers damages that they have caused and that their 
employers had to pay for unless if they conscientiously followed rules, procedures, and 
orders (p. 61 ) . 
However, the identification of the appropriate measures for the protection of the firm's 
assets can be a complex task, presenting different aspects according to the particular 
organisational sector to which the assets belong. Both BCP and risk assessment 
techniques combine in the formation of programs to manage potential crises. 
Crisis-Management Programs 
Crisis management is a systematic response to unexpected events that threaten the people, 
property, and operating continuity of the organisation. 
Crisis Management builds upon the practices of emergency management, the principles of risk 
management, and the elements of risk and crisis communications, the concepts of business 
continuity and contingency planning and security considerations (Consterdine, 2005: p. 1 2). 
There are a number of management concepts that address crisis-management issues for 
business. Most focus on public relations, media relations, or computer system recovery. 
However, for a company to be fully capable of responding to diverse situations, it needs 
to address all the organisation's management functions and develop a crisis-management 
program. 
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The psychological dimensions of crisis were also identified by Eberwein ( 1 978): 
structural concepts of crisis stress the objective aspect of the phenomenon that is the 
specific state of affairs independent from the fact of being perceived or not. . . .  while 
psychological concepts are those defining the subjective of perceptual aspects of a 
specific state of affairs . . .  irrespective of the fact whether such a state of affairs exists or 
not outside . . .  perception. (p. 1 26). 
As Turner (I 976: p. 378) observed, common causal features are "rigidities in 
institutional beliefs, distracting decoy phenomena, neglect of outside complaints, 
multiple information handling difficulties, exacerbation of the hazards by strangers, 
failure to comply with regulations and a tendency to minimize emergent danger." 
A CMP provides integrated crisis management capability through planning, 
organisational development, training, exercising, and continuous improvement at every 
level of the organisation. The prime purpose of such a program is to provide the 
framework that will enable the organisation to cope efficiently and effectively in times 
of emergency. 
Crisis-management training, planned prevention, and immediate response all reduce 
losses and keep a company operational and productive during a disaster. Simple plans 
with basic procedures can give employees an outline for decisions and the support 
framework for fast action. 
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A well-developed crisis-management plan includes areas such as incident handling and 
business continuity and provides the outline for decision making to support a framework 
of good recovery practice, in order to aid companies in getting back to normal business 
operations as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
Critical aspects that must be in the crisis-management plan are: 
1. effective coordination of activities within the organisation; 
2.  early warning and clear instructions to all parties if  a crisis occurs; 
3. continual assessment of actual and potential consequences of the crisis; and 
4. continuity of business operations after the crisis. 
The crisis-management plan should also include: 
1. identification of crisis-management team members and their substitutes; 
2. policy (i .e. ,  what constitutes a crisis, and when the plan should be activated); 
3. responsibilities and actions of the crisis-management team; 
4. tasks of the crisis-management team coordinator; 
5. crisis room communications (e.g., white boards, telephones, radios); and 
media relations. 
Subject-specific action guidelines also must deal with threats such as criminal or 
terrorist activity, hostage situations, civil unrest, catastrophe or natural disaster, 
sabotage, and major industrial accidents. 
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Research shows that only 25% of UK organisations have a regularly tested disaster-based 
business plan. Even fewer have run full scenario testing of other, core recovery plans. 
Companies that cannot demonstrate clear and comprehensive risk management strategies 
will be penalized by an already harsh insurance market; conversely, insurance companies 
may lower their premiums if they are convinced that a disaster recovery plan is adequate. 
Company officers are increasingly held liable for such occurrences as "corporate killing." 
However, it is clear that most organisations are only prepared to deal with emergencies at 
the incident site and often only because of legislative requirements, such as fire drills and 
evacuation plans. 
Tversky and Kahneman ( 1974) argue that decision makers are conservative in adjusting 
to new information; individuals anchor their expectations on prior experience and 
insufficiently adjust this anchor point when provided new information . Thus , 
understanding the allocation of attention (March & Simon, 1 958) seems critical to 
understanding risk-return decisions . 
Research by Zajonc ( 1 980, 1 984a, 1 984b), Bargh ( 1984), and Le Doux ( 1996) likewise 
shows that affective reactions to stimuli are often more rapid and basic than cognitive 
evaluations . Many theorists have given affect a direct and primary role in motivating 
behaviour (Barrett & Salovey, 2002; Clark & Fiske, 1 982; Forgas , 2000; Le Doux, 1 996; 
Mowrer, 1 960; Tomkins, 1 962, 1 963 ; Zajonc, 1 980) . For example, few would question 
that cognitive evaluations give rise to affective responses , although there is debate about 
the relationship between specific cognitions and specific emotions (e .g . ,  Ells worth & 
Smith , 1 988;  Ortony, Clore, & Collins , 1 988;  Roseman, 1 984; Scherer, 1 984; C .  A .  
Smith & Ellsworth, 1 985) .  
106 
Numerous studies have found that people in good moods make optimistic judgments and 
choices and that people in bad moods make pessimistic judgments and choices (Bower, 
1 98 1 ,  1 99 1 ; Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp, 1 978; Kavanagh & Bower, 1 985; Mayer, 
Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1 992; Mayer & Hanson, 1995; Schwarz & Clore, 1 983; 
Wright & Bower, 1 992). 
The systematic models of Turner ( 1 978) and Perrow ( 1 984) appear to suggest that 
organisational failure is inevitable; the homeostatic model (Adams, 1 995) suggests that an 
unconscious or instinctual need to create risk will always balance out against risks that are 
eliminated. New approaches of participatory governance, combining elements of both 
risk communication and risk management concerning technological risks, have been 
added to the management of large-scale risks (Bradbury, 1 994; Rowan, 1994; Fischhoff, 
1 995; Bier, 200 1 ) . Problems with risk, irrationality, and the complexities of social 
communication and regulation again point to the need for more resources to be applied to 
response, rather than prevention (Borodzicz, 2005: p. 73). 
Prevention, whenever possible, is always better than responding after things have gone 
wrong, but in the complex world we now inhabit, a failure to be able to respond to failure 
is of equal concern (Borodzicz, 2005 : p. 73). Some theorists have argued that more 
attention needs to be given to understanding and managing crisis situations. The French 
sociologist Lagadec also raised the issue that crises have become increasingly more 
dangerous phenomena (Borodzicz, 2005: p. 75). 
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Major crises-from the Challenger, Bhopal, Tylenol, or Chemobyl to Exxon Valdez and 
Braer-are no longer exceptional events. "The risk of crisis is even becoming structural as 
large networks become more complex, more vulnerable, and more independent . . .  crises 
continue to become more frequent and destabilizing" (Lagadec, 1993: p. 45). 
Lagadec is not alone here; as crises become more numerous, visible, and calamitous, 
organisations have no choice but to accept them as an inescapable reality that must be 
factored into their planning and decision making (Lerbinger, 1 997). 
Planning and Preparation 
A disaster usually overwhelms those affected by it when there has been no planning or 
preparation. Even in repetitions of calamitous events, such as the annual flooding of 
certain rivers, people often seem to be unprepared. Residents will repeatedly be 
devastated but never become better equipped than the time before. (Walsh & Healey, 
1 987: p. 1 0) 
The nature of threats is changing and so too are the types of responses. (Gill, 2006: p. 1 )  
Most companies do not make preparations to deal with catastrophic incidents or events 
that threaten fundamental operations. The senior management of many organisations 
often feels there is enough skill and management expertise to handle just about any 
situation, "two actors may be in precisely the same situation, yet one may feel 
uncertainty, time pressure etc. and define the situation as crisis, while the other may see 
it as a routine decision-making situation." Crisis resides in the person as well as in the 
situation. (Billings, Milbum, & Schaalman, 1 980: p. 306). 
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Even when this is true, talented people need a support structure. Even an abundance of 
resources and an archive of experience cannot ensure a company's security and rapid 
recovery in the event of a crisis, as was demonstrated by the different recovery times of 
HSBC and NatWest after the Bishopsgate bombing. Internal structures must be resilient, 
and employees must be prepared for setting them back in motion after a disaster. 
Support Framework 
Industries and legislation often dictate the type of organisational support a company 
requires. With high-risk industries, such as the nuclear industry, the legislation is 
controlled by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (Nil) in the United Kingdom and has 
much further reaching powers than legislation controlled only by corporate governance. 
By insisting on regulation and the issuing of a nontransferable nuclear site license, the 
Nil can monitor the organisation's compliance with emergency procedures. The Nil also 
insists that once the arrangements for dealing with any accident or emergency and their 
effects have been approved, no alterations or amendments can be made without its 
approval. 
For this type of industry, most would agree that this form of control is a minimum 
requirement because of the catastrophic effects a disaster of this nature would have for 
the organisation, people's lives, and the environment. Such a disaster could potentially 
damage the reputation ofboth the organisation and that of the government in power. The 
potential risks to the governments involved have affected their strategy in dealing with 
this form of installation. 
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Other industries have much less potential to dramatically damage the government; less 
stringent controls reflect the lower risk potential. Even with corporate governance 
reports such as Tumbull ( 1999), which provides guidance on self-regulation, many 
organisations still fail  to implement procedures for dealing with potential risk. However, 
greater numbers of organisations are becoming increasingly aware that by managing risk 
potential and planning for low-probability events as well as more frequent occurrences, 
they can reduce the possibility of an incident becoming a crisis. Organisations can 
achieve this by creating a crisis-management team specifically designed to deal with 
incidents in a structured manner and with specific responsibilities for dealing with team 
members' respective areas of expertise, while providing an overall communication 
platform and reporting structure. 
A typical crisis-management team's structure will consist of a core team, comprising a 
head of the team and other members responsible for operations, planning, and 
communication, which is normally supported by additional members and nominated 
support groups. The extended membership may include specialist assistance from the 
legal department, human resources, and IT. The support groups normally include 
administrative support, security, health and safety, finance, material, and logistics. 
The core team should presume that when a crisis hits, most of them and their support 
groups will be unavailable, and they should hedge against this by providing substitutes 
to replace the allocated positions, thus identifying the full extent of the crisis­
management structure. 
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The utility of this organisational structure-a core and a support team-is supported by 
the findings in the crisis management element of the case study (see Chapter 5) and the 
development of the company's plans, which was shaped by the directions of its 
European Group Security Department and the company's Group Crisis Organisation. 
The latter organisation states that effective crisis management requires: 
1. defined responsibilities; 
2. distinct and planned assignment of tasks; and 
3. defined establishment of a crisis organisation as well as respective communication 
channels. 
The Group Crisis Organisation further describes the key roles of the "local entity" core 
CMT as 
1. head of CMT; 
2. operations manager; 
3. legal role; 
4. personnel role; and 
5. IT/communications role. 
It acknowledged that the constitution of a CMT depends on the size of the location, the 
scope of its business processes, and the availability of its personnel and that members of 
the CMT should hold positions (e.g., decision competencies) within the company. 
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The Group Crisis Organisation's directions were equally clear that if the initial situation 
assessment so demanded, other roles, such as security, external advisors, health and 
safety, and the like, could be added to the core team. 
Communications 
Communications between the functions of the crisis-management structure are of 
paramount importance. At Bhopal, for example, safety planning had been hindered by 
the fact that operating manuals were only available in English. There are two different 
areas to consider when thinking of the communication processes. Internal interaction 
between the relative functions will allow the core team or decision-making unit to 
develop an awareness of the situation as it unfolds. External interaction with media 
involvement can often be trickier to manage than the crisis itself. 
Internal communication. The internal communication element begins with notifying the 
crisis-management team of the incident, this is sometimes referred to as the first-alert 
procedure. This allows the source to effectively communicate the nature of the threat. 
For example, if a switchboard operator receives a telephone threat, the first-alert 
procedure is designed to initially record and preserve this information in a controlled 
manner and to allow crisis-management procedures to be activated by requiring the 
operator to call the team, who will record details and implement the security strategy. 
After activating the crisis-management procedures, the information will be assessed, 
including the source, content, and time factors relating to the potential threat. Then, the 
team will determine the type of response. 
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Effective communication between the different elements of the crisis-management 
structure is extremely important and will allow the decision-making unit to assess the 
possibilities and provide clearer guidance to the organisation. Each element of the crisis­
management structure typically compiles its own incident log, which includes the date, 
time, a description of the action taken, and who undertook what action. Providing the 
crisis-management team with dry-erase boards can also assist their administration­
support function; by collating the information as it unfolds, the core team can develop 
an understanding of the overall picture. Regular debriefings between the different 
elements involved ensure that the information provided has been correctly understood. 
The core crisis-management team is normally working on a more strategic level than the 
nominated support functions, and it is vitally important that situation awareness is 
maintained during the life cycle of the crisis. 
External communication. The crisis-management team must also deal with external 
agencies, such as the emergency services, environmental health, health and safety, 
public inquiries, and the media. Although the response to a crisis in general is extremely 
rapid in the United Kingdom, this is not always the case across the globe; when 
operating in remote locations, the team must consider the response time before 
assistance can arrive. Being prepared to assist the emergency services by providing them 
with comprehensive and accurate information on the threats and actions taken can result 
in helping to prioritize their immediate response, potentially saving lives and reducing 
losses to the organisation. 
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When a major incident occurs, the press and broadcasting journalists will be at the scene 
of the event within the first hour, sometimes within minutes. They will often expect to 
be able to interview senior personnel from the organisation shortly after their arrival. 
Dealing with the media can often be trickier than dealing with the crisis itself and should 
only be attempted by trained personnel. 
When dealing with the media, the contact person should take his or her time, think 
before answering, keep to his or her area of expertise, stick to the facts, and assume that 
everything is on the record. The contact should never lie, guess, speculate, discuss 
confidential information, or use the expression "'no comment." If the answer is not 
known, then he or she should simply state that it is not known at this stage, or that the 
organisation is unable to provide that information at this time. During and after the crisis 
of contaminated Tylenol in 1 982, Johnson & Johnson's swift recovery was greatly 
assisted by its CEO's frequent public appearances and frank statements. Conversely, the 
appearance of evasiveness or unconcern at a time of crisis can be hugely damaging to an 
organisation, as was seen in the Exxon Valdez disaster of 1 989, when the company had 
no public relations staff equipped to deal with the situation and the senior management 
refused to comment. Subsequently, the captain was confirmed to be asleep when the 
ship crashed in Prince William Sound's reef, but in light of the other findings, 
investigative reporter Greg Palast stated in 2008 "Forget the drunken skipper fable as the 
Captain Joe Hazelwood, was below decks, sleeping off his bender. At the helm, the third 
mate never would have collided with the reef had he looked at his RAYCAS radar. But 
the radar was not turned on. In fact, the tanker's radar was left broken and disabled for 
more than a year before the disaster, and Exxon management knew it. It was [in Exxon's 
view] just too expensive to fix and operate, instead Exxon blamed Captain Hazel wood 
for the grounding of the tanker. 
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However, in the immediate aftermath of the 20 1 0, Deep water Horizon explosion and oil 
spill, the chief executive officer of BP appeared to be minimizing the aftereffects of the 
spill, allowing the media to identify BP as "the bad guy" although it was not the only 
corporation involved in the drilling operation, which is now considered the second 
largest environmental disaster in U.S. history, behind the 1 930's  Dust Bowl. Using 
simulations to train key staff in dealing with the media will be subsequently discussed. 
The crisis life cycle can include, as in Turner 's ( 1 978) model, an inquiry. "When 
explaining difficult decisions to inquiries after an incident, it is important to be able to 
show what information was actually available to the decision makers" (Borodzicz, 2005: 
p. 1 06). 
Depending on the nature of the disaster, the "Government usually requires a Public 
Inquiry to allay the public fears. Forensic evidence, eye witness reports, expert witness 
statements are collected and all the evidence from the organisation is subject to public 
scrutiny during the course of the inquiry" (Toft & Reynolds, 2005: p. 1 9) .  
Crisis-Management Training 
Crises and disasters are complex events taking place within complicated environments 
and resulting in diverse responses. To simulate those conditions adequately, 
organisations must undertake extensive preparation to provide a training situation that 
will nurture learning, understanding, and added competence (Rolfe, Saunders, & Powell, 
1 998:  pp. 1 4-1 5). 
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Simulation exercises provide the only experiential means by which to train people in an 
environment that is as realistic as possible for an as-yet-unknown crisis. Real crises do 
not happen frequently enough to allow an organisation to use them as a training 
environment. In this sense, at least, a crisis simulation is somewhat unique, because 
effectiveness cannot be gauged against other modes of training. Exercise and simulation 
also pose specific challenges to trainers and educators in their role as designers, 
facilitators, or evaluators (Borodzicz, 2005:  p. 1 1 3). 
A number of areas of disciplinary learning could be used to facilitate the usage of crisis 
simulations, suggesting a scope of knowledge transference. For example, there is 
considerable theoretical body of knowledge dedicated to simulation design, 
implementation, and evaluation in many other training contexts that could improve an 
organisation's ability to run crisis simulations. A number of organisations run specialized 
journals and conferences and promote research into simulations and gaming. One of the 
main academic journals is the International Simulation and Gaming Association 
(Borodzicz, 2005: pp. l l3- 1 1 4). 
The commercial implications of employing experts to run crisis games raise serious 
ethical question regarding the "expertness'" and "motivation" for running simulations. If 
simulations are to be used as a form of insurance against litigation, it is important to 
establish whether these exercises are appropriately valid (Borodzicz, 2005 : p. 1 28). 
"Assessing the value of a crisis simulation is a key issue and should be considered from 
four perspectives : selecting an appropriate crisis team, purpose of training, definition 
and learning requirements" (Borodzicz, 2005 : p. 1 39). 
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The selection of appropriate personnel for crisis-management exercises is essential. 
Exercises can be used to select the types of people most suited to operating in a crisis 
environment. Most managers like to think that they can manage their departments better 
than anyone else, particularly in a crisis situation, but this is an unfortunate fallacy. 
Some managers are naturally good at working on crisis committees and generally have 
the flexible range of personnel skills necessary to facilitate crisis management. Others 
can also be trained to do this. Unfortunately, some managers do not fit this description 
(Borodzicz & van Harperen, 2003). 
The purpose of the training must be clear to the exercise designers; if it is not, the 
players involved will be unable to understand the exercise. Designers should ensure the 
purpose meets organisational requirements. Exercises can be used to assess the 
capabilities of individuals ,  groups, or the organisation as a whole to respond to a crisis. 
Turner ( 1 996: p. 33)  argues that the "clarity of goals is an essential feature of good 
simulation design." 
The target group needs to understand the message that is being delivered from the 
exercise. The players need to understand the relevance of their participation if the 
learning experience is to be productive. "Players need to attend crisis simulations, not to 
re-establish what they already know, but to learn something new; in other words, how to 
manage other people's crises as well as their own" (Borodzicz, 2005 : pp. 1 33-134). 
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"A number of theorists have argued that learning does not take place on its own. It is 
important to recognise that simulations are not self-teaching and that a good debriefing 
is required to reflect on purpose and actions" ( Gillespie, 1 973 : p. 2 1 ;  see also Petranek, 
2000). Experience-based learning is particularly useful because it enables the trainees to 
acquire knowledge, competence, and skills; to craft their own mental model; and to try it 
out and observe and evaluate the results (Thompson & Dass, 2000: p. 29). 
Debriefing is one of the most important and most overlooked areas in crisis simulations 
and is often merely an optional add-on to wind up the day. However, it is at the 
debriefing that the real implications of the exercise may become apparent. 
Debriefing allows parallels to be drawn between simulation realities and 'real' realities; 
it allows realities to be examined in a new, more 'realistic' light. Participants are then 
able to export the learning and insights gained from their experience in the simulation 
exercise to their other 'real' (non-simulation) world" (Crookall & Saunders, 1 989: p. 
1 28). 
"A crisis plan is needed to prepare all sorts of persons to know what to do in the event of 
a crisis" (Millar & Heath, 2004: p. 6). "There is growing amount of literature on 
'organisational' and 'safety culture' which suggests employees respond to various 
hazardous stimuli in accordance with informal rules as sanctioned by the 
organisation" (Borodzicz, 2005: p. 1 34). Crisis-management scenario training assists 
organisations in preparing to defend their reputation and market share. 
1 1 8 
Organisational Learning 
Business continuity is concerned with the survival and continued smooth running of a 
business operation; hence, learning the lessons of disasters is a two-fold process: 
perception and implementation. It is not sufficient only to perceive the e\ents that create 
disasters. "Effective learning requires immediate implementation of those lessons using 
control action within the organisation" (Toft & Reynolds, 2005 : p. 23). 
Turner's ( 1 978) model tacitly assumes that the organisations involved in such incidents 
will implement all of an inquiry's recommendations, both interim and final. However, 
although the inquiry may result in increased awareness of the hazards and make 
recommendations to deal with them, the organisation will not necessarily implement all the 
recommendations--or any control action at all-leaving itself less than properly protected 
against a recurrence of the event (Toft & Reynolds, 2005: p. 23). 
The public and those responsible for investigating disasters similarly seem to assume that 
other organisations that share similar hazards will also pick up and implement an inq.1iry's 
recommendations. However, although organisations not involved in a particular incident 
generally do register that an incident has taken place in their industry, they often do not 
appear to incorporate the findings of the inquiry into their organisation unless legislation is 
passed to that effect (Toft & Reynolds, 2005: p. 23). 
Hindsight is undoubtedly one of the most important and costly information sources, both in 
terms of lives and capital expenditure lost. Organisations should attempt to gain as great an 
understanding as possible from others' mistakes, thereby assisting their efforts in changing 
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the organisation's safety culture. In a risk context, the question of organisational learning 
is crucial for at least three reasons: ( 1 )  sociotechnological evolutions of systems force 
the organisations to permanently update and adapt their knowledge and competencies; 
(2) systems safety is built for any part of safety data that has to be updated by everyday 
measures; and (3) organisations have moral and legal obligations to take lessons from 
each incident, because the public and government services would not tolerate an 
accident knowing that it could have been avoided if lessons had been learned from 
previous accidents (Amalberti, 1 996; Nicolet, Carnino, & Wanner, 1 990). 
Organisational Safety Culture 
The concept of culture is part of twentieth-century philosophical productions about 
humankind and society. The most commonly cited definition has been proposed by 
Tylor ( 1 87 1 ). Culture is described as a complex whole that includes knowledge, belief, 
art, law, morals, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of a society. 
An organisation's safety culture is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, 
perceptions, competencies, and patterns ofbehavior that determine the commitment to­
and the style and proficiency of-an organisation's health and safety management. The 
term organisational safety culture can be traced back to literature relating to the Western 
nuclear industry's response to the Chernobyl disaster. The industry saw employees in the 
Soviet nuclear industry as having a poor safety culture, which was deemed to be a 
contributory factor to the accident (OECD, 1 987; Pidgeon, 1 99 1 ) .  
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Organisations with a positive safety culture are characterized by communication 
founded on mutual trust, shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and confidence 
in the efficacy of preventative measures (ANSCNI, I 993). Feedback from the results of 
experiences contributes to enriching safety knowledge, practices and therefore safety 
culture (Wybo, 2004; Wybo et al., 2001 ). 
Many believe that they have this positive safety culture incorporated within their 
organisations. However, to what extent does this culture function with regard to their 
planning and preparation for a disaster? In particular, the extent to which an organisation 
can both generate and ultimately act on many unknown risks that could be identified and 
avoided is determined by the safety culture. Risk blindness, as previously described, is a 
major contributory factor to the continuing lack in many organisations of adequate 
provision to deal with disasters. 
Therefore, risk management has integrated cultural i ssues and developed 
communication and implication practices to enhance safety culture (Grote & Kunzler, 
2000; McDonald, Corrigan, Daly, & Cromie, 2000; van Vuuren, 2000). The quest for 
safety is never-ending, not only because of a growing need for the prevention of all 
remaining accidents, but also because of market demands and the continuous individual 
search for new benefits that chronically expose (expected) safe systems to (new) risks 
(Polet, Vanderhaegen, & Amalberti, 2003). 
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Conclusion 
In this context, it is necessary for a company to develop a particular network of 
measures referring to its particular sector. These measures are effective compared with 
generally applied rules and methods, which may present weaknesses in covering 
particular organisational assets. As an example, Alexander (2005: p. 3) refers to the 
financial risk-management applications of econometrics and notes that this type of 
organisational management focuses "on the accurate assessment of individual market 
and credit risks with relatively little theoretical orapplied econometric research on other 
types of risk, aggregation risk, data incompleteness, and optimal risk control." Bielski 
(2003:  p. 59) refers to the "ideal" security policy in the financial market and mentions 
that this policy should incorporate the following elements: 
1 .  An operational risk plan (including dashboard of risk indicators for the entire 
corporation); 
2. BCP (the plan used to ensure that people, processes, and technology can be brought 
online in the event of a situation); and 
3 .  A disaster recovery plan that focuses in on the technological components and how 
they will be protected in emergency situations. 
However, these plans are just indicative. Each firm can choose its own strategies 
regarding the l imitation of risk in relation to its assets. 
The development of appropriate risk-management tools and methods should be the 
starting point of the relevant business strategy. For any security strategy to be effective, 
it is necessary that it is related to the organisation's operations and that it provides the 
appropriate support in a crisis. 
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The risk assessments that formed the basis for my research highlighted some interesting 
findings in relation to crisis management and why it sometimes fails. In some cases, 
senior management did not believe that a plan was necessary, because they expected 
their experienced personnel to manage most incidents. What they failed to recognise was 
that a crisis or major incident could happen through the night, during a time when the 
company was shut down, on weekends, or when there were limited staff or personnel (or 
none at all) on site to ensure that the correct decisions were made to manage the 
problem. Less experienced employees need the psychological and practical support of a 
well-known and structured crisis management policy. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Both quantitative and qualitative research methods include an array of research 
methodologies that can be used to study almost any set of phenomena in any field. 
In this chapter, I explain the use of qualitative and quantitative research methods 
and methodologies; both methodologies were used to create 1 00 individual com­
pany security-risk assessments, based on information obtained over a three-year 
period. This data makes up the primary research for this study. Here, I define and 
briefly explain the concepts in qualitative and quantitative research. The similarities 
and differences of these two methodologies are explained, and the benefits of using 
qualitative and quantitative research methods are examined to show that these 
research methods were the most appropriate for investigating the thesis question, 
"why doesn 't security work?" 
Research Efforts 
Research efforts can be described as "a systematic inquiry that uses disciplined 
methods to answer questions or solve problems" (Polit, Beck, & Hungler, 200 1 :  p. 
4). Every researcher's aim is to create knowledge in the relevant field, to develop, 
refine, and expand the horizon of what is known and attempt to proffer answers to 
the unknown within the field (Polit, Beck, & Hungler, 2001 ). Moreover, research 
studies in the human science (e.g. , health and social sciences) not only refine and 
add to what is already known in theory and practice, they also empower the profes­
sional to forecast and manage the complex and constantly changing challenges fac­
ing these professions by considering the shifting conditions of human beings 
(Laws, Harper, & Marcus, 2003 : p. 1 7). 
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Furthermore, the drive toward evidence-based practice in several fields has caused 
professional decisions to be increasingly made on the basis of the best available 
evidence (Crawford, 2002). Making use of the most appropriate research instru­
ments and methodologies is important for the validity of the final results and the 
utility and relevance of the result findings to professional practice. Deciding the 
best methodology for any particular research effort is one of the most important de­
cisions a researcher can make. 
Over the decades, researchers have developed several methods, continually refining 
the existing ones to meet the demands of the modem researcher and operational 
security professional. 
Quantitative versus Qualitative Risk Analysis 
Security in any system should be commensurate with its risks . However, the proc­
ess to determine what security controls are appropriate and cost effective is quite 
often a complex- and sometimes a subjective-matter. One of the prime functions 
of security-risk analysis is to put this process onto a more objective basis . 
There are a number of distinct approaches to risk analysis. However, these essen­
tially break down into two types: quantitative and qualitative. 
Although quantitative and qualitative research methodologies are composed of an 
array of several (and sometimes contrasting) principles, they have stood the test of 
time in a number of research fields (Murphy, 2000). 
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Quantitative Risk Analysis 
Quantitative analysis makes it theoretically possible to rank events in order of risk 
(called ALE), on which a company can base its decisions. The problems with this 
type of risk analysis are usually associated with the unreliability and inaccuracy of 
the data. Probability is rarely precise and can, in some cases, promote complacency. 
Further, controls and countermeasures often tackle a number of potential events 
individually, but in real-life situations, events are often interrelated. 
Notwithstanding the drawbacks, a number of organisations have successfully 
adopted quantitative risk analysis. 
Qualitative Risk Analysis 
This is by far the most widely used approach to risk analysis. Probability data is not 
required and only estimated potential loss is used. 
Most qualitative risk analysis methodologies make use of a number of interrelated 
elements: threats, vulnerabilities, and controls. 
Threats. Threats are things that can go wrong or that can "attack" the system. 
Examples might include fire or fraud. Threats are always present in every system. 
Vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities make a system more prone to attack by a threat or 
make an attack more likely to have some impact. For example, a vulnerability for 
fire would be the presence of inflammable materials (e.g., paper). 
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Controls. Controls are the countermeasures for vulnerabilities. There are four types : 
• Deterrent controls, which reduce the likelihood of a deliberate attack; 
• Preventative controls, which protect vulnerabilities and make an attack 
unsuccessful or reduce its impact; 
• Corrective controls, which reduce the effect of an attack; and 
• Detective controls, which discover attacks and trigger preventative or 
corrective controls. 
These elements can be illustrated by a simple relational in Figure 3 . 1 .  
�---- - '«.,._ _ __ __ _ ( DETERRENT . 
-�ONTRO:.,J'·, Creates - - � R?�uces �elihoodof 
- --- - - ---
(/'DETECT;v.E · -� 
�ONTROL,J 
ATTACK 
FIGURE 3.1.  Flow diagram demonstrating the likelihood of attack and how 
controls in place impact and supports each element. Source: Security Risk 
Analysis {n.d.) Introduction to Risk Analysis. [Online] Available from 
http://www.security-risk-analysis.com/ [Accessed 1 December 2010] .  
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Data Analysis 
Quantitative data is used to describe a type of information that can be counted or expressed nu­
merically. This type of data is often collected in experiments, manipulated and statistically ana­
lyzed. Quantitative data can be represented visually in graphs, histograms, tables and charts. When 
the data is collated this way it can then be analyzed to inform the decisions making process. 
(Cherry, 20 1 0) 
Statistical methods and measurement models are two important features of quanti­
tative methods of inquiry (Stange & Zyzanzki, 1 989). However, whereas statistics 
are a widely accepted and widely used branch of mathematics in quantitative 
research studies, views regarding the role of measurement in quantitative methods 
are often divergent (Ragin, 1 994). 
Qualitative Research Methods 
Qualitative methodology uses a naturalistic approach and seeks to understand phe­
nomena in a specific context: the "real world setting where the researcher does not 
attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest" (Patton, 2002: p. 39). This 
methodology reveals findings observed in a real-world context in which the phe­
nomena being studied unfold naturally (Patton, 2002). The number of various quali­
tative research designs is even greater than the number of philosophical perspec­
tives underlying the qualitative perspective. The most commonly used qualitative 
study designs are: 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
Ethnography: Ethnography is a renowned form of qualitative research originally 
used in studies of social and cultural anthropology. The basic goal of ethnographic 
research is to provide the reader with the story of life of the group being studied 
and also to identify the cultural beliefs and meanings members of that group at­
tach to their behaviors and lifestyle by immersing oneself in the setting of the 
phenomenon studied (Patton, 2002). 
Case study: Yin ( 1 994: p. 1 3 )  defines a case study as "an empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident," 
and it "relies on multiple sources of evidence." This method is perhaps the most 
popular type of qualitative inquiry in business and management research. 
Action research: Rapoport ( 1 970: p. 499) proposed the most widely accepted 
definition of action research. "Action research aims to contribute both to the prac­
tical concerns of people in an immediate problematic situation and to the goals of 
social science by joint collaboration within a mutually acceptable ethical frame­
work." This method includes conducting interviews. 
Phenomenology: Phenomenology as a method of inquiry attempts to understand 
the phenomenon of a lived experience that may be related to emotions, relation­
ships, or to being part of a group or organisation. The phenomenological ap­
proach's core assumption is that there is an essence to shared experience. This as­
sumption is rooted in the social sciences and requires a researcher to become im-
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mersed in the life world of participants and draw a parallel between the re­
searcher's own experiences and experiences of  the target groups or individuals 
(Patton, 2002) . 
• Grounded theory: This technique focuses on the task of developing and verify­
ing a theory grounded in systematically collected and analyzed data. This qualita­
tive study design is widely defined as "an inductive theory discovery methodol­
ogy that allows the researcher to develop a theoretical account of the general fea­
tures of a topic while simultaneously grounding the account in empirical observa­
tions or data" (Martin & Turner, 1 986: p. 1 43).  As Myers ( 1 997: p. 24 1 )  argues, 
"the major difference between grounded theory and other methods is its specific 
approach to theory development-grounded theory suggests that there should be a 
continuous interplay between data collection and analysis." This latter point is 
clearly evident in this thesis's case study (Chapter 5). 
Research Methodology: Investigating "Why Doesn't Security Work??" 
In the research conducted, interview techniques were used to establish what sys­
tems, policies, and procedures were currently in place at the organisations exam­
ined. Qualitative methods of action research were used and consisted of case study 
and grounded theory through surveys. Open-ended questioning techniques were 
used to determine how the surveyed organisations operate in the real world, work­
ing with company employees and observing organisational environments and situa­
tions while conducting company risk assessments. In the research, the results of the 
risk calculation were scored to determine the risk ratings. 
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Qualitative research methods enabled rapid data collection; for example, I con­
ducted structured interviews with focus groups,  which in turn helped generate a 
deeper understanding of the experiences of the subjects involved in this study. This 
became most helpful in planning intervention measures to cut risks. 
Starting the Risk Assessment Process 
The logical place to start both the quantitative and qualitative approach to risk as­
sessment is examining the existing best practices for the assessment of risk. In par­
ticular, it is important to distinguish business risk, market risk, and other types of 
risks, as well as to understand the accepted methods for determining the key risks 
and mitigating said risks (Knight & Garritt, 2008 :  p. 34). A good example of best 
practice can be found in the IT industry. 
In any business system, risk can be defined as the likelihood of some external 
forces interacting with some internal vulnerability of business operations, with the 
potential to create a negative impact to the business. Although this discussion may 
imply that the risk assessment process is relatively simple, Hatfield and Hipel 
(2002, p. 1 043) note that "there still remain numerous examples of risk-based deci­
sions and conclusions that have caused great controversy." Specifically, one should 
understand the importance of subjective values and ethics when attempting to quan­
tity or qualify a given risk and the role of uncertainty and incomplete information 
in determining and assessing risk. To achieve this, one must first determine the val­
ues and ethics of the organisation and how these could impact the nature and as­
sessment of the risk (Hatfield & Hipel, 2002: p. 1 044). Once this has been 
achieved, the qualitative and quantitative analyses of the organisation and its risk 
profile can begin. 
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Conducting the Quantitative and Qualitative Assessments 
The main role of the quantitative security-risk assessment carried out in the five 
business sectors was to characterize any risk and uncertainty and assign it a value 
for risk-management purposes. As such, the quantitative risk assessment focused on 
assessing situations in which there was a degree of risk that included potential 
negative consequences to the business and a potential degree of ambiguity or uncer­
tainty. These factors were then combined to give a numerical and financial assess­
ment of the risk, to allow mitigation and management activities to be undertaken. 
All the various conclusions were reconciled into a single approach to security-risk 
management; this was vital in ensuring that the risk assessment was not viewed as 
too absolute, as a purely quantitative approach to assessment would be. 
Finally, many advanced risk management techniques (e.g., hedging and diversifica­
tion) used within the financial services industry require some quantitative assess­
ment of risk. As such, it is important to ensure that an organisation does have a 
valid and relevant framework it can use to quantify important aspects of its risk, 
particularly credit and operational risk, to accurately assess the need for such tech­
niques (Risk, 2002: p. 1 00). This requires the organisation to compare various as­
pects of qualitative data and compare the various models that could be used to 
quantitatively describe the data and to run stress tests to determine how the various 
models respond in the real world. 
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As such, when carrying out a quantitative and qualitative approach to risk assess­
ment, the quantitative assessments of interview techniques and data analysis were 
primarily used when deriving the risk-management strategy and methods. Qualita­
tive assessments were used to ensure that the risks had been interpreted correctly 
and complied with any of the identified subjective ethics and values of the organi-
sation. However, these assessments were quantified as much as possible to produce 
the most realistic model of the organisation's risk profile possible. This overall  
model was flexible, but required me to suggest multiple approaches to risk man-
agement. 
In terms of the specific survey methodology, this consisted of: 
1 .  Assessment of incident data bases (where they existed) as a guide to future risk 
profiles and threat trends; 
2 .  Interviews with senior managers, operational staff and personnel directly respon-
sible for corporate governance; 
3 .  Photographic and filmic evidence of security breaches; 
4. Personal observation of personnel, procedures, and systems in operation; 
5 .  Assessment of the extent and validity of security and risk guidance documenta­
tion, including corporate security policy; 
6 .  Assessment of the levels of security awareness among the corporate communities; 
7. Assessment of wider sociopolitical issues by means of discussions with security 
services, police, and government and nongovernment agencies, together with 
research of published security threat levels; and 
8 .  Assessment of the adequacy security manpower, mandated procedures, technical 
systems, and physical security, all mapped against published national standards. 
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Risk-Assessment Models 
One of the main qualitative risk-assessment systems, models use ordered labels to 
describe and assess the risks. Some such models use high-medium-low measures 
for various aspects of the risk, such as the likelihood and the impact of the risk, 
whereas others use red, amber, and green in a similar system. However, although 
these models can potentially simplify the risk assessment and analysis process, it is 
debatable whether this simplification adds significant value or improves the nature 
of managerial decisions. In particular, Cox, Babayev, and Huber (2005, p. 65 1 )  ar­
gue that such a simplified and essentially quantitative model of risk assessment is 
not likely to encapsulate all the concerns and contingencies of highly qualitative 
risks. However, these types of risk ratings are used in worldwide organisations and 
satisfied my customers. In my experience, these methods can be used to help guide 
the risk assessment and management process, but they should not be treated as the 
only critical aspect of risk management. 
Another important model to consider when conducting security-risk assessment is 
the need to model the potential for any risk to cause a disruption to overall opera­
tions, as well as to the specific area of business affected by the risk. This type of 
disruption is typically associated with overall organisational systems, such as in­
formation systems or communications, as any failure of these systems will affect 
the organisation's ability to function in a business-as-usual state. Unfortunately, tra­
ditional risk-assessment methods are not sufficient when assessing the loss from 
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disruption of operations; quantitative assessments fail to measure the potential loss, 
and qualitative assessments are highly subjective and often fail to consider the full 
costs of any disruption (Suh & Han, 2003 : p. 1 49). As such, it is important to create 
an effective model of the organisation's business and operations, including a sys­
tematic analysis of the links between these operations and the requirements of 
operational continuity. 
When conducting a quantitative and qualitative approach to risk assessment, a 
combination of the high-medium-low measures were used and quantified the quali­
tative information on risks models for each company and sector situation. In a rela­
tively standard business situation with well-defined and understood risks, the high­
medium-low model proves sufficient, as the companies with which were involved 
in this study were supported by experienced managers and employees who under­
stand the model's limitations. In contrast, for unexpected or critical risks, the quan­
tifying qualitative information on risks model should be used to obtain a full picture 
of the risk and its potential impact on the project or area of the business. This model 
should also be combined with the organisational investigation models already dis­
cussed to ensure that the organisation can understand the full impact of risk and to 
enable effective contingency plans to be prepared and used when needed. 
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Descriptive Report and Prescriptive Action 
Once the assessments are complete, the various risks are identified, and their prob­
ability and impact-distribution functions are created, the final stage of the assess­
ment process is to determine what the most important risks are and what resources 
need to be allocated to the management of each risk. One method for achieving this 
is to assess the weight of evidence that emerged from the risk assessment to deter­
mine what the most significant risks the organisation faces are based on the avail­
able data. Unfortunately, the use of weighted evidence is complicated by the exis­
tence of various kinds of qualitative and quantitative weights (Weed, 2005: p. 
1 545). 
As such, a key part of this stage of the risk assessment was to determine what the 
most important weights were from the organisation's point of view. This can only 
be achieved through a detailed understanding of the organisation's perception of 
risk and how various factors should be weighed against the various sources of cost 
and benefits to the organisation (Gregory & Lichtenstein, 1 994: p. 1 99). This aspect 
of the study must also be informed by an appreciation of the broader organisational 
context in which any decisions about risks will be undertaken, as well as an under­
standing of the potential uncertainties and limitations of the assessments and how 
these could influence stakeholder perceptions of risk in the event that a risk does 
materialize (Thompson & Bloom, 2000: p. 333) .  
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The final phase of the risk assessment is strongly influenced by the overall percep­
tions and influences of the stakeholders who are affected by the various risks and 
risk-management strategies. As such, in this part of the assessment, the focus was 
on communicating the findings of the initial assessment and the qualitative and 
quantitative details of the various risks to the associated stakeholders. Communica­
tion and dialogue were then relayed to build an understanding of the broader organ­
isational context, and the impact of the various factors in this context of the weights 
that should be given to the various risks. For example, some of the large organisa­
tions were more willing to take risks on events with a low probability of occurrence 
but a high impact on business outcomes, as these risks would not be too harmful to 
the organisation and can easily be offset by positive outcomes in other operations. 
Bias and My Role as a Consultant 
Entering as a consultant, employees perceived me as an insider in the organisations 
where the security-risk assessments were carried out, which had a number of influ­
ences on the assessment itself, although efforts were made to minimize negative 
influences (e.g., following best-practice guidance). However, the concepts of threat 
and opportunity, which are used to judge most risks, tend to be strongly influenced 
by the views of organisational decision makers. In particular, research by Jackson 
and Dutton ( 1 988:  p. 370) indicates that most organisational insiders have threat 
bias, and this "results in managers being more sensitive to issue characteristics as­
sociated with threats than to those associated with opportunities." This is not neces­
sarily a negative influence, as this bias would make me more sensitive to the threats 
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to the organisation and hence help make the assessment more cautious and risk 
averse. However, It was important to be aware of probable insider bias to ensure 
that it did not become too strong and cause overestimation of the importance of 
some risks. To accomplish this, several individual opinions and analysis of the risk­
assessment data methodically had to be taken in to account before reaching any 
conclusions. 
Somewhat strangely, this status as an insider can lead to optimism bias, meaning 
individuals "perceive risks to be smaller for themselves than others" (Costa-Font, 
Mossialos, & Rudisill, 2009, p. 27). The evidence indicates that optimism bias oc­
curs when individuals are dealing with familiar risks, and the threat bias discussed 
occurs when individuals are judging an unfamiliar risk. The evidence further indi­
cates that this is because optimism bias is strongly driven by social norms, with the 
risk perception being reduced when the risk has been encountered by a large num­
ber of people and is well-known (Costa-Font, Mossialos & Rudisill, 2009: p. 27). 
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Conclusion 
When implementing a quantitative and qualitative approach to risk assessment, the 
literature indicates that it is important to follow a detailed and systematic approach. 
This was achieved by carrying out the risk assessment in stages. First, best practice 
and standards were used to guide the research wherever possible, while remaining 
aware of subjective factors, such as ethics and corporate values. Then, quantitative 
risk assessments were used to characterize any risk and uncertainty and assign it a 
value for risk-management purposes, using qualitative methods to achieve different 
analysis modes and reach different conclusions depending on the subjective factors. 
Once these initial assessments were complete, an overall risk profile was produced 
for the organisation. This profile was discussed with the organisation's stakeholders 
and decision makers to determine the relative weightings for each risk, and this 
helped produce a more complete assessment. However, limitations as a consultant 
needed to be highlighted and steps needed to be taken to ensure it did not create any 
bias on my part or lead me to ignore the biases of other participants in the assess­
ment. 
The inherent strengths and weaknesses of both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods complement each other. When effectively combined, as was the case in the 
research study of the 1 00 individual company security-risk assessments, they pro­
vide a better examination and evaluation than either method on its own. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH PROJECT 
To examine if it i s  essential to understand the security risks to protect an 
organisation's assets to discover if the only way to determine the threats, hazards 
and vulnerabilities faced is through a systematic risk assessment process. 
Consideration needs to be given into how this effects individual sites across a 
variety of sectors and therefore, a research enquiry was conducted. 
One hundred individual surveys were analysed; these were carried out in equal 
proportion across five industry sectors during a three-year period. Each survey was 
conducted using the methodology outlined in Chapter 3, and the results were 
transferred to a statistical package for further collation and analysis. The surveys' 
results are presented in standard risk matrices and threat category tables, which 
illustrate the findings in mathematical and graphical terms, respectively. 
Each threat-category table consists of 1 0  threat categories and each category has a 
different number of subrelated threats (see Appendix I ). Each threat has been 
calculated in accordance with the described methodology; the probability and 
criticality levels were established from the statistical package, which enabled the 
individual risk ratings to be depicted across the entire area studied. The arithmetic 
mean and the high and low risk ranges were determined from the data sets for each 
threat category. 
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It was decided that the arithmetic mean would provide an acceptable approach to 
determine the averages and, while the median could equally have been used to 
provided a different midway calculation point, it was considered that using one 
method of summation, which could be considered as a baseline or normality for 
each sector, would sufficiently illustrate the research results. 
The intention of this research is to establish if and why doesn't security work?, and 
by creating the baseline (i .e. , normality levels) for each sector, evaluate a single site 
to determine, how the effects of an integrated security solutions program works 
based on risk assessment and security auditing techniques and how this effects the 
risk equation. A pre- and post-case study risk analyses was conducted, analyzing 
the results against the relevant sectors to determine the variants (see chapter 5). 
Methodology 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the primary techniques are a combination of the inherent 
strengths of both qualitative and quantitative research methods. The interview 
techniques and questionnaires helped to establish the probability and criticality 
levels for the 1 00 organisations surveyed. 
Five industry sectors were investigated: i.e. retail ,  finance, manufacturing, 
corporate, storage and distribution. For each area, 20 individual sites were surveyed 
and the results correlated using a statistical package. One of the simplest ways to 
display the results, once they have been identified, is in the form of a table; the 
probability and criticality columns were individually calculated from the surveyed 
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sample data sets (see appendix 1 ). The arithmetic mean was calculated from the 
subrelated threats to determine the results for each threat category, which was then 
used to populate the relevant risk matrices and used to determine the normality levels. 
The threat category tables denote the probability and criticality levels to measure the 
identified risks. These results were calculated by allocating each subrelated threat with 
a high, medium or low rating, as most organisations are familiar with this principle. In 
terms of the calculations I used both the probability and criticality ratings were 
allocated scores of 3, 2, or 1 ,  respectively. 
To assist with explaining the calculations the major disaster threat category, with the 
subrelated threats of fire, flood, and collapse was utilised. In terms of the corporate 
sector, the 20 surveys revealed that the probability is 1 .68 and the criticality (i.e., its 
impact) to the sites studied is 1 .62, which, when multiplied together, gives a risk rating 
of2.72.  
To arrive at these figures, the sample data showed that the probability ratings were 
identical for fire and flood with 7 low, 1 1  medium and 2 high, when divided by the 
number of surveys, in this case 20, this provided a score of 1 .  7 5 .  With the probability 
of collapse showing as 1 1  low, 7 medium, and 2 high, providing a score of 1 .55. Then 
by simply adding these results together and dividing them by the number of subrelated 
threats (i.e. 1 .75 + 1 .75 + 1 .55 I 3 = 1 .68) this provided the arithmetic mean result. 
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The criticality ratings were calculated the same way, and the sample data showed that 
the scores for fire and flood to be 1 0  low, 7 medium, and 3 high, with collapse 
showing as 1 1  low, 7 medium, and 2 high and therefore, the calculation in this case, is 
( 1 .65 + 1 .65 + 1 .55 I 3 = 1 .62). The results were plotted onto a standard 3 x 3 risk 
matrix to provide a pictorial overview of the situation for each of the industries 
studied. 
To maximize the benefits of this research a direct comparison of each of the 
industry sectors was conducted and differences analysed. A traffic light colour 
coded system of red, yellow, and green was used along with the risk ratings to 
denote the high, medium, and low risk ratings respectively, providing a pictorial 
overview of the results (see table 4.8). 
Following the collation of the research results, an individual site survey was 
analyzed against its sector and the overall combined sector results to establish the 
differences and enable a direct comparison. The pre-case study and post-case study 
results were considered to illustrate the potential  benefits of adopting of this type of 
approach and provide the necessary analogical evidence (see Chapter 5). 
Data Collation 
Data collection was supported by used interviews, which included the use of 
questionnaires, to solicit staff feedback to understand their perception of company 
security issues and to understand how their specific duties and responsibilities were 
aligned within each company. 
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It was also necessary to evaluate site plans and technical specifications of security 
systems, security assignment instructions, security policies and procedures, and 
crisis and emergency management information to facilitate the data collection 
requirements. 
The focus of the data collection was centered on the following specific evidence: 
1. Control of access to site (who could enter at what time and when? what breaches 
of access had taken place? what was the impact?); 
2. Incursion of unauthorized persons or vehicles (what protection had been applied 
to ensure this was managed correctly: barriers, turnstiles, manguarding, policy 
and procedures, etc.?); 
3. Security policies and procedures (was there a policy in place? was it followed? 
what procedures had been put in place in line with the policy?); 
4. Security equipment (was there an alarm or CCTV system in place? was it 
effective? how was this measured? had it been designed around the operational 
requirement?); 
5. Safety of occupiers, visitors, and staff (had staff been briefed on security 
procedures? were visitors escorted when onsite? what would visitors do in the 
event of an incident?); 
6 .  Sociological issues (were staff aware of local issues that could impact on the 
company, e.g., drug dealing or local crime factors: vehicle theft, burglary, 
intimidation, etc.?); 
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7. Crisis and contingency (were there emergency plans in place? had they been 
tested? did they work?); 
8. Manning recommendations (were there security assignment instructions in place? 
if so, did they work? were they cost effective, and were they established based on 
risk?); and 
9. Training (had staff with security duties and responsibilities been trained? if not, 
why not, and what specific training had they had and why?). 
Following this process of data collection, each threat was noted and summarized 
within each category table to determine the overall security quality of each sector, 
as well as the normality. As each category can have a different number of specific 
threats, each category was summated by sector on the threat-category tables. 
Data Summary 
Once the threats had been summated for all applicable tested sites, it was then 
possible to summarize all topics to establish the result per category and the overall 
threat level by sector. Comparisons were then made by threat category and sector to 
identify the variations in the risk ratings. Likewise, the same methodology and 
objectives were applied by sector to determine where an individual survey sits in 
relation to its sectors normality levels. 
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Data Output 
Having summated and computed the relevant data, the threat-category positions 
were depicted for each sector and the risk positions evaluated, enabling the results 
from each sector to be correlated and a detailed overview of results provided. These 
result outputs also consider the information provided from an individual site survey 
to be directly compared against the normality levels for each sector and against the 
combined sectors results. This determines any increased or reduced exposure 
against the normality levels for any future assessment. Further analysis by category 
will allow further preventative action, in mitigating the risks facing an organisation 
and enables the organisation to prioritise their response. 
To further demonstrate how and why, this approach is directly applicable to 
managing organisational security risks and the reason why security doesn't work 
the case study (see chapter 5) demonstrates the approach adopted in the protection 
of organisational assets. 
The organisation chosen for the case study is an internationally renowned company 
that operates across all the sectors studied. Ideally, it would have proved beneficial 
to evaluate each of their sites and prioritise their risk reduction needs, but when 
working within the commercial environment, this is often unachievable because of 
budgetary and operational differences. In this case their corporate division was 
chosen as it was aligned with the customer's strategic needs. 
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Firstly, the survey was conducted, and the findings presented in graphical form as 
part of the pre-case study analysis. Following the completion of the integrated 
security program, the process was then repeated to evaluate how successful this 
approach was. The results are presented as the post-case study analysis. When 
comparing the results against the relevant sectors, one can observe a considerable 
risk reduction demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach for this particular 
organisation. 
Section Analysis 
Retail Sector 
The results in table 4. 1 and figure 4. 1 demonstrate the findings ofthe 20 sites 
surveyed within the retail sector. The threat category table denotes the arithmetic 
mean results in terms of the probability and criticality levels. This enabled the risk 
ratings to be calculated and the results plotted on the risk matrix. 
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TABLE 4.1.  Threat Category Results for the Retail Sector 
I 
5 . 1 6  j 3.68 I 
147 
FIGURE 4.1 .  Risk matrix for the retail sector. 
The results demonstrate that the risk range from 5 .29 to 2.25, with an arithmetic 
mean of 3.68.  The outputs reveal that there were 4 high, 6 medium, and 0 low risks, 
indicating an accumulative threat level of medium, which places the retail sector 
first on the risk ranking positioning table (see table 4. 1 3). The three highest risks 
identified within this category are harassment of staff (e.g., abuse by customers and 
youths congregating around the site) at 5 .29, illegal incursion at 5 . 1 ,  and computer 
crime at 4.63. Out of the 20 surveys conducted, the evaluation of 30 subrelated 
threats established that the top five threats facing this sector were from personal 
crime (theft) at 6. 1 3 ,  harassment (bomb hoax) at 5 .8 1 ,  personal crime (assault) at 
5 .76, harassment at 5 .74, and computer crime (theft) at 5 .52. Eighteen of the 20 
sites surveyed were retail parks, and the assessments were conducted on behalf of 
the landlord and not each individual tenanted unit. 
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Financial Sector 
Table 4.2 and figure 4.2 demonstrate the findings of the 20 sites surveyed within 
the financial sector. The threat-category table denotes the average results in terms 
of the probability and criticality levels. This has enabled the risk ratings to be 
calculated and the results plotted on the risk matrix. 
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FIGURE 4.2. Risk matrix for the financial sector. 
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The results demonstrate that the risk ranges from 5 .54 to 2. 1 4, with an arithmetic 
mean of 3 .29. The outputs reveal that there were 2 high, 8 medium, and 0 low risks, 
indicating an accumulative threat level of medium, which places the financial 
sector second on the risk ranking positioning table (see table 4. 1 3  ). The three 
highest risks identified within this category are computer crime at 5 .54, harassment 
at 4.24, and political threat (e.g. ,  bomb threats and heightened government threat 
levels against the UK national infrastructure) at 3 .79. 
Out of the 20 surveys conducted, the evaluation of 30 subrelated threats established 
that the top five threats facing this sector were from computer crime (espionage) at 
6.30, computer crime (sabotage) at 5 .70, harassment (staff harassment) at 5 .27, 
personal crime (assault) at 5 .00, and computer crime (theft) at 4.68. Interestingly, 
three of the top five threats are computer related crime, and the majority of 
individuals interviewed within this sector regarded protecting the organisation from 
cybercrime as the biggest challenge they faced. 
Storage and Distribution Sector 
Table 4.3 and figure 4.3 demonstrate the findings ofthe 20 sites surveyed within 
the storage and distribution sector. The threat-category table denotes the average 
results in terms of the probability and criticality levels. This has enabled the risk 
ratings to be calculated and the results plotted on the risk matrix. 
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TABLE 4.3. Threat Category Results for the Storage and Distribution Sector 
FIGURE 4.3. Risk matrix for the storage and distribution sector. 
The results demonstrate that the risk ranges from 4.22 to 2.00, with an arithmetic 
mean of 3 .07. The output reveals that there were 1 high, 8 medium, and l low risks, 
indicating an accumulative threat level of medium, which places the storage and 
distribution sector fourth on the risk ranking position table (see table 4. 1 3). 
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The three highest risks within this category were identified as political threat at 
4.22, illegal incursion at 4.00, and property crime at 3 .67. Out of the 20 surveys 
conducted, the evaluation of 30 subrelated threats established that the top five 
threats facing this sector were from property crime (theft) at 5 .88,  political threat 
(terrorism) at 4 .87, computer crime (sabotage) at 4.26, illegal incursion (travellers) 
at 4.00, and major disaster (fire) at 3 .83 .  
Manufacturing Sector 
Table 4.4 and figure 4.4 demonstrate the findings of the 20 sites surveyed within 
the manufacturing sector. The threat-category table denotes the average results in 
terms of the probability and criticality levels. This has enabled the risk ratings to be 
calculated and the results plotted on the risk matrix. 
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FIGURE 4.4. Risk matrix for the manufacturing sector. 
The results demonstrate that the risk ranges from 4.8 1 to 1 .69, with an arithmetic 
mean of 2.80. The output reveals that there were 1 high, 8 medium, and 1 low risks, 
indicating an accumulative threat level of medium, which places the manufacturing 
sector fifth on the risk ranking position table (see table 4. 1 3).  
The three highest risks within this category were identified as computer crime 
(4.8 1 ), property crime (3 .4 1 ), and major disaster (3 .05). Out of the 20 su��ys 
conducted, the evaluation of 30 subrelated threats established that the top five 
threats facing this sector were from computer crime (theft) at 5 . 1 8, computer crime 
(espionage) at 4.93, property crime (vandalism) at 4. 1 1 , major disaster (fire) at 
3 .90, and computer crime (sabotage) at 3 .90. In this case the majority of individuals 
interviewed in this sector saw protecting their organisation's intellectual-property 
rights as the biggest challenge they faced. 
153  
Corporate Sector 
Table 4.5 and figure 4.5 demonstrate the findings of the 20 sites surveyed within 
the corporate sector. The threat-category table denotes the average results in terms 
of the probability and criticality levels. This has enabled the risk ratings to be 
calculated and the results plotted on the risk matrix. 
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TABLE 4.5. Threat Category Results for the Corporate Sector 
FIGURE 4.5. Risk matrix for corporate sector. 
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The results demonstrate that the risk ranges from 5 . 1 6  to 2 .50, with an arithmetic 
mean of 3 . 1 9. The output reveals that there were 1 high, 9 medium, and 0 low risks, 
indicating an accumulative threat level of medium, which places the corporate 
sector third on the risk ranking position table (see table 4. 1 3) .  The three highest 
risks within this category were identified as political threats at 5 . 1 6, personal crime 
at 3 .67, and illegal incursion at 3 .42. Out of the 20 surveys conducted, the 
evaluation of 30  subrelated threats established that the top five threats facing this 
sector were from personal crime (theft) at 5 .  76, political threat (terrorism) at 5 . 1 6, 
political threat (civil unrest) at 5 . 1 6, property damage at 3 .99, and computer crime 
(sabotage) at 3 .66. 
Combined Sectors Results 
Table 4.6 and figure 4.6 demonstrate the findings ofthe 1 00 sites surveyed, which 
span the whole of the combined sectors. The threat-category table denotes the 
average results in terms of the probability and criticality levels. This has enabled 
the risk ratings to be calculated and the results plotted. 
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FIGURE 4.6. Risk matrix for the combined sectors. 
Differentiation 
... .. ...,. .HIIflt 
The purpose of the differentiation tables (Tables 4.7 and 4.8) is to identify any 
positional similarities from the categories in the sectors studied to enable a direct 
comparison of each of the specific threats. 
Sector Arithmetic Mean H!gh Low 
Retail 3 .68 5 .29 2 .25 
Financial 3 .29 5 .54 2 . 1 4  
Storage and distribution 3 .07 4.22 2 .00 
Manufacturing 2.80 4.8 1 1 .69 
lrorporate 3 . 1 9  5 . 1 6  2.50 
Combined 3.19 5.16 2.50 
TABLE 4. 7. Sector Risk Overview 
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TABLE 4.8. Sector Risk and Threat Category Overview 
These tables identify the differences within each sector and they distinguish the 
variant risk levels. With the majority of threat categories measuring medium, the 
surveyed companies seem to have failed to understand the fundamental process of 
effectively managing their security risks and threats. 
Individual Site Survey 
To further substantiate the research findings, the results of an individual site 
surveyed have been included to assess the impact of poorly managed risks in a live, 
operational context. The pre-case study and post-case study results were examined 
and compared with the corporate sector and the combined sectors to distinguish the 
effects described within the case study. 
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Pre-Case Study Results 
Figure 4. 7 demonstrates the findings of a single corporate-sector site. The survey 
results were taken from a risk assessment and security audit that was carried out 
before the introduction of an integrated security solution. The threat category table 
(Table 4.9) denotes the average results in terms of the probability and criticality 
levels. 
Low ... .......... . ... "' 
FIGURE 4.7. Risk matrix, pre-case study. 
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TABLE 4.9. Threat Category Results, Pre---Case Study 
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The results demonstrate that the risk range from 6.99 to 2.24, with an arithmetic 
mean of 3 .89. The output reveals that there were 2 high, 8 medium, and 0 low risks, 
indicating that an accumulative threat level of medium. 
Post-Case Study Results 
Figure 4.8 demonstrates the findings of a single site surveyed within the corporate 
sector after the introduction of an integrated security solution. The threat category 
table (Table 4. 1 0) denotes the arithmetic mean results. 
FIGURE 4.8. Risk matrix, post-case study. 
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TABLE 4.10. Threat Category Results, Post-Case Study 
The results demonstrate that the risk ranges from 3 .00 to 1 .40, with an arithmetic 
mean of 2.23. The output reveals that there were 0 high, 4 medium, and 6 low risks, 
indicating an accumulative threat level of medium, but, interestingly, the risk 
matrix shows a degree of threat category grouping to denote a managed process. 
Comparisons 
Tables 4. 1 1  and 4 . 1 2  show a direct comparison before and after the case study. 
These are then compared against the relevant sector and combined levels to identify 
any potential similarities. 
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Corporate Combined 
TABLE 4. 1 1 .  Case Study Comparison Low 
!Variable Arithmetic Mean Hie:h Low 
IPre-case study 3 .89 6.99 2.24 
Corporate sector 3 . 1 9  5 . 1 6  2.50 
Combined sector 3 . 1 9  5 . 1 6  2.50 
Post-case study 2.23 3.00 1 .40 
TABLE 4.12 .  Case Study Risk and Sector Threat Overview 
These tables identify the differences within the areas studied and illustrate the 
variant risk levels. With the majority of threat categories measuring medium, the 
surveyed companies seemed to have failed to understand the fundamental process 
of managing their security risks and threats effectively. However, following the 
introduction of the integrated security solution the process's positive affect was 
highlighted. 
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Statistical Conclusion 
The research used a quantitative and qualitative scientific approach to examine 1 00 
surveys across five different industry sectors, collated over a three-year period. The 
analysis covered five different industry sectors and compared 30  individual threats 
across 1 0  categories. 
This evaluation enabled the direct comparison of specific industry sectors and 
individual threat categories. Future organisational-risk surveys can be assessed 
against their relevant sector and judged against the combined sectors' arithmetic 
mean to ascertain their vulnerability across the organisation. For every organisation 
that took part in this study, it became apparent that there was lack of coordination in 
terms of the identification and the subsequent management of their organisational 
security risk. This was supported by the interviews and the fact that none of the 
organisations in question had previously used this type of approach to reduce their 
vulnerabiliti es. 
The research provides the arithmetic mean and the risk ratings for each threat and 
for each sector. To evaluate these findings it has been necessary to rank each of the 
three areas covered in terms of highest being allocated as first and the lowest being 
graded as fifth. Following each area being given a ranking, the rankings were 
evaluated to provide a 1-5 rating, which shows the sector that is inherently at the 
highest risk. Table 4. 1 3  provides the necessary overview and demonstrates that the 
sector with the highest risk rating is retail, with corporate being third with 
manufacturing being at exposed to lowest levels of risk. 
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Sector Risk Rating 
Retail pt 
Financial 2nd 
Corporate 3rd 
Storage & Distribution 4th 
�anufacturing 5th 
TABLE 4.13. Sector Research Results by Positional Rating 
In detennining the risk rating for each sector studied, I have ranked them according 
to there position i.e the arithmetic mean results (see table 4.8). The resultant study 
has allowed each of the subrelated threat categories (see appendix 1 ), to be 
calculated and correlated within its associated threat category. By analysing the 
statistical data it has been possible to identify the threat categories, which were 
deemed to be inherently more risky from the other areas studied. In turn this has 
enabled each of the threat categories to be evaluated separately and provides an 
overview of each of these categories by sector, which makes quite interesting 
reading and allows specific distinctions to be made and conclusions drawn. When 
analysing the data sets, it became apparent that computer crime within the financial 
sector was considered as being the highest risk with an arithmetic mean of 5 .54. 
However, when comparing the overall results, with those of the retail sector, which 
had four of the ten threat categories receiving a high risk rating, the data sets 
revealed that the retail sector had a higher accumulative risk. However, an 
important point to make here is that although manufacturing has the lowest risk, 
when comparing these results against the post-case study results, this sector 
remains at significant risk, demonstrating that, in this case, security doesn't work-
and risk will always remain. 
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There are a number of obvious issues with this research in terms of the size of the 
sample data and the fact that a the 3x3 matrix is very broad when displaying results. 
However. every effort will be made to follow up this work in later research and 
resolve these unavoidable issues. 
This will be achieved by introducing a risk-management comparison tool to handle 
much larger data sets and creating a secure comparison database where security 
professionals can use a powerful risk comparison tool to compare an initial 
individual survey and benchmark the results and review the vulnerabilities across a 
wider range of threats and sectors. 
The next stage of this project is in progress, and it has been identified that once the 
manual data-collection process has concluded, it is possible to fully automate the 
delivery of necessary risk comparisons. It is also imperative to expand the risk 
matrix, to enable users to choose either a 4 x 4 or a 5 x 5 matrix, not only to 
improve the degrees of separation, but also to appeal to a wider user market. This 
form of analysis could have positive outcomes for businesses and the insurance 
market, as the ever changing need to reduce business security risk exposure has 
never been higher. 
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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY 
Introduction 
The case study discussed in this chapter highlights the objective processes of how a 
security and crisis strategy is implemented and illustrates how the subjective issues 
of corporate culture, negative security awareness, risk blindness, and general 
ignorance by the company, as well as integration of disparate security functions, 
must be tackled before the implementation of any security strategy can have a 
chance of survival. Others argue that such a vision of security is a source of 
insecurity, hence the need for "securing security" (Dillon, 1 996). 
In the absence of a clear definition of what "security" is, and what it is for, one 
cannot explain the reasons for the assessment, cannot be sure of the causes of the 
situation and one cannot say what he or she has done or if he or she has improved 
security (Manunta, 1 996). With this in mind, the introduction included clear 
definitions of security; academic, formulaic, and from an operational perspective. 
However, before embarking on a discourse about the case study, one must assess as 
to its suitability as a specific choice to support the thesis question. 
Judgement of its suitability must examine any security failure identified before the 
risk-informed operational review and the subsequent corrective measures, mapping 
this evidence against the list of defined security failures outlined in Chapter 1 .  
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In essence. one needs ''before and after" measurable evidence that the negative 
security conditions identified before the range of recommended changes were 
implemented and that the exercise had a transformational affect for the better of not 
only the organisation's security, but also the contractual relationship with the 
security provider-both key requirements being achieved within the confines of a 
substantially reduced fiscal spend on the security effort. 
The organisation in the case study is a successful international company that 
manufactures and distributes high-value, quality motor vehicles, with the principal 
operating unit situated in Berkshire, England. This unit is the UK head office and 
houses marketing, finance, and facilities-management departments, with overall 
responsibility for the management of the sales and distribution network of imported 
high-value vehicles. Although this study does not involve the company's two 
manufacturing units, it does include other operating units under the company 
umbrella, such as the vehicle storage areas. 
The company's focus is unquestionably external. It is marketing oriented, and brand 
image is paramount. The various business functions serve to support the sales and 
marketing processes. Although the business is very professionally managed, it 
almost actively seeks to ignore issues not seen as essential to supporting the 
principal operations or diverting time and finances away from these aims. 
Accordingly, the organisation had given security little attention, transferring 
responsibility for risk management around various departments. The company's 
management would not, at a basic level, disagree that a secure site is a required 
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goal, but have, over the years, simply been satisfied with the illusion that the visible 
elements of security are achieving that aim when the opposite has been the case. 
For Kovacich and Halibozek (2003), much corporate security management work is 
purely responsive to day-to-day issues. Kovacich and Halibozek (2003) call 
security "a necessary evil ." You are there because they really have no choice. 
The company commissioned a contractor to lead investigations into their security 
delivery and recommend improvements. The systematic risk-management approach 
was applied described in Chapter 1 to researching and protecting the resources and 
income of the business against losses. This work was set against agreed terms and 
conditions to ensure that the aims of the company could be achieved without 
interruption. The company had not carried out any previous security-risk assessments, 
and, as a result, they had invested heavily in physical security measures and 
procedures, including CCTV systems, electronic access control, and manguarding. 
These applications were not supported by any risk methodology, and none of the 
procedures implemented were effective. There were no identified and written 
operational requirements (OR) and implemented procedures did not meet the 
objectives of the company security policy, "to protect people, property, and assets 
with an integrated security solutions approach based on risk." The various security 
elements were procured separately and there was no evidence of an overarching 
security strategy. The senior management and the procurement team acknowledged 
the problem, both parties accepting that there was a lack of joined-up thinking and 
scope for considerable improvement. 
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At this juncture, it is appropriate to produce some key evidence for the proposition 
that security was not working in this organisation, and a list of issues can be set 
against Chapter 1 's proposition of the "main reasons why doesn't security work." 
1. Theft of corporate equipment by both external parties and internal pilfering. 
2. Internal pilfering of staff property. 
3. Deteriorating morale of the contracted security force, operating in a "blame 
culture" and increasingly used for demeaning nonsecurity functions, evidenced by 
an unacceptable turnover of security staff. 
4. Deteriorating relations between the client company and the security contractor. 
5. Consistent breaches of mandated security procedures by staff; failure to adhere to 
access controls, nonwearing of identification (ID) badges, wedging open of fire 
and emergency exits. 
6. Incursions onto the premises of unauthorised personnel. 
7. Senior management apathy to security losses and haphazard nature of emergency 
management procedures exacerbated by having no high level (board-approved) 
security policy and mandated procedures. 
8. Absence of any crisis and contingency plans, crisis management team, and 
incident management plans, resulting in confusion as to departmental primacy 
over the management of incidents and deployment of resources when these had 
occurred. 
9. A physical penetration testing exercise had succeeded in access being gained to 
the managing director's office and his personal information. 
10. An excessive spend on security manpower. 
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11. Disparate and inappropriate purchase of technical security equipment, with 
subsequent ineffective management of signals and required manpower response. 
12. An absence of security-awareness programs, thereby alienating staff at all levels 
from the corporate and individual benefits of adherence to security procedures 
and reducing in the minds of staff members both the credibility and appreciation 
of the work carried out by the security force. In fact, instances of animosity were 
common between the two parties. 
13. No computerised incident capture database program, resulting in an inability to 
determine past incident history and predict future loss scenarios-both from a 
probability and consequence perspective. 
14. No risk-informed security training being delivered. 
Although a large, prestigious contractor supplied security personnel for 
approximately 1 0  years, a combination of internal client disregard and contractor 
complacency caused security personnel to become ineffective in their role. 
Compounding matters, the company had started assigning security personnel a 
variety of duties not related to the core security assignment. There was a growing 
awareness that the security personnel did not reflect the brand image of the 
company and, as a consequence, came to be viewed poorly within the organisation. 
The result was that staff in general would not respond to security directives or 
instructions, and consequent breaches of access management and disregard of 
policy placed the business's assets, the safety of staff, and brand image at risk. 
However, the combination of previous failed strategies, personnel appointments, 
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frustrations over existing security-service delivery, concerns about brand image, 
interest in modern technology, and the issues of international terrorist activity had 
all fortuitously conspired to create a fertile opportunity for change. 
The review highlighted a number of security concerns and the security audit 
addressed the lack of protective measures, while also looking at the broader issues 
of security management and security culture. The review made it clear that more 
detailed information was required about the current level of potential threats and 
vulnerabilities in the protection of the company's assets. The objective of this 
exercise, therefore, was to ensure that all potentialities for hazard were recognised 
and that systems, procedures, documentation, manpower, and training were in place 
and coordinated so as to adequately manage the risk profiles. 
Risk Overview 
The survey served as a template for the risk assessment and security audit, which 
would inform the development of the security strategy and its operational plan. 
Access controls, intrusion detection, and CCTV all have their place as security 
tools, but unless the company designs and implements complete systems based on a 
proper risk analysis, they will result in little more than an illusion of protection. 
Real security can be achieved only when resources are correctly allocated to 
security's most pressing needs. Systems and even manpower allocation should be 
informed by understanding both the organisation's risks and the OR for resource 
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allocation. The organisation in the case study failed to do this. For example, the 
CCTV installation was a substantial resource allocation that neither was tested by 
its contribution to risk management nor subjected to an OR and, as a consequence, 
achieved little. 
For this operation, the process's ultimate goal was to produce a security-strategy 
document. This process starts with understanding the threats and hazards an 
organisation faces, be they external, internal, man-made, natural, or technical. 
Then, at-risk assets are identified and their vulnerability to threats assessed so as to 
arrive at a risk overview. Criticality and probability are estimated, providing a risk 
rating and the risk profile; the latter is illustrated in a risk matrix. 
The next stage of the process is to assess how the management of the four areas of 
security (i.e. , manpower, technical systems, physical security, and security 
procedures) help or hinder the management of the identified risks. The security 
audit exposes further vulnerabilities and produces a summary of recommendations. 
The final stage is developing the security strategy, which is essentially a policy 
statement; that is, a set of security objectives, each with its own strategies designed 
to achieve a cost-effective security program, supported by continuity strategies, 
recognizing the recommendations of the audit program. 
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The initial risk assessment showed the risks ranged from 6.99 to 2.24, with an 
arithmetic mean of 3 .89. The output revealed that there were 2 high, 8 medium, and 
0 low risk rated threat categories, indicating that the accumulative threat level was 
medium. When comparing these results against all the studied sectors the 
characteristics were similar to that of the financial sector, but with an arithmetic 
mean of 3 .89, was higher than the accumulative threat experienced by the top 
ranked retail sector at 3 .68.  
FIGURE 5.1. Risk matrix for company, pre-case study. 
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FIGURE 5.2. Risk matrix post case study. 
Following the implementation of the integrated security solutions program the 
results of the risk assessment demonstrated that the risks range from 3 .00 to 1 .40, 
with an arithmetic mean of 2 .23 . The output reveals that there were 0 high, 4 
medium, and 6 low risks, indicating an accumulative threat level of medium, but, 
interestingly, the risk matrix shows a degree of threat category grouping, which 
shows the positive affects derived from the process. 
Figures 5 . 1 and 5 .2  provide a comprehensive illustration ofthe "before and after" 
results of the risk assessment and security audit. These matrices include the original 
results from the risk assessment and the results following the implementation of the 
integrated security program. The post-case study data is significantly lower than 
the average risks found in the corporate and combined sectors, hence providing 
evidence supporting the proposition that without conducting a risk assessment and 
security audit program then security doesn't work. 
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Study Overview 
Because the study's aim was to provide a professional security strategy for the 
company, all parties had to understand the security operational requirements. The 
service had to operate using risk-management principles, which should include a 
system evaluation and company security policy and procedures. The key to 
providing a comprehensive security service to a company must be based on the 
findings of security-risk assessments and security audits. The security-risk 
assessment covers risk identification, risk analysis, risk planning, and risk 
management. The audit methodology in this evidence-led process is discussed in 
detail in the Data Collection section of Chapter 4.  
Use was made of site plans and technical specifications of security systems, 
security assignment instructions, security policies and procedures, and crisis and 
emergency management information to facilitate the risk assessment. 
In the light of the list of evidenced security failures, the focus of the assessment and 
audit centered on the following specific issues: 
1. control of access to site; 
2. incursion of unauthorized persons or vehicles; 
3. security policies and procedures; 
4. security equipment; 
5 .  safety of  occupiers, visitors, and staff; 
6. sociological issues; 
7. crisis and contingency; 
8. manning recommendations; and 
9. training. 
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The actual losses and range of negative issues act as sufficient evidence not only of 
the need for a thorough risk and security review and corrective strategy, centered 
around the "focus list," but also of the applicability of this case study to the thesis 
question. Clearly, the audit needed to establish a causal link between the security 
failures and the absence of necessary documentation, operationally informed 
security procedures and equipment, training, and staff security awareness, in 
addition to establishing the range of threats, risks vulnerabilities and security 
practices. 
It was important to clearly arrive at terms of reference that would lead to achievable 
goals compatible with the company's culture and its external focus on marketing 
and sales. The goals were: 
1. To identify the appropriate security solution for the UK operation based on 
the company's international security policy, which emanates from their 
corporate security department based in continental Europe. 
2. To identify opportunities to improve security effectiveness through the 
implementation of technology and innovation where appropriate. 
3 .  To ensure that practical agreements are in  place for the exchange of  internal 
information regarding security measures and requirements. 
The synopsis and review first highlighted the various on-site departments and then 
outlined the identified threats. 
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The Company s Complex and Operation 
The company's complex is located on a prestigious industrial estate, set among 
similar businesses. The complex consists of head-office accommodation and 
facilities, a sales showroom, a workshop, a warehouse, and parts distribution for all 
the dealerships in the United Kingdom. Approximately 520 people work at either 
the main site or the adjoining training center. The majority of these are company 
employees, but a fairly large number are contractor staff employed on a 
semipermanent basis. The complex operates 24-7 with the greatest number of 
people on site between 8 :00 a.m. and 5 :00 p.m., Monday to Friday. 
Threats 
The following threats to the company were identified: property crime, property 
damage, major disaster, terrorist threats, personal crime, personal injury, 
harassment, public disorder, computer and proprietary crime, and illegal incursion. 
The probability of such threats occurring, based on experience and an assessment of 
external and internal influences, was rated to be medium to low. 
The site risk assessment and security audit highlighted a whole range of action 
points that needed to be addressed to derive maximum benefit and deliver the 
utmost efficiency. These included integration all of the physical security measures 
with the manned guarding operation and improvements to electronic security 
systems, such as CCTV, alarms, and access control. 
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Results of the Security Audit 
The audit assessed the suitability of the existing access-control system and the 
security control room and found that the security measures currently in place 
needed to be improved by upgrading the current CCTV system, installing a more 
comprehensive monitoring system supported by detection and audio equipment, 
and adding the support of remote management. It also uncovered opportunities for 
improving the effectiveness of the current security service by combining elements 
of the integrated security requirements with raised security awareness within the 
workforce. 
The recommendations were highlighted and served as key objectives, around which 
more specific strategies and projects could be developed. The suitability of this case 
study is addressed by examining the eventual outcomes of the implementation of all 
the specific projects that flowed from these recommendations, evidence for which 
has been outlined in the conclusion of this chapter. 
These include the effective implementation of the company's security policy, with 
established key performance indicators for the overall management of security, with 
regular reviews and an agreement on the appropriate responses. To ensure effective 
arrangements are in place for the exchange of information about the site security 
measures, with a thorough review of procedures, working practices and 
instructions. It is important to work in partnership with the local police authority to 
define and manage the risk within the surrounding area and develop crisis and 
continuity plans. 
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In more specific terms, the report also recommended: 
1. Minimizing the number of entrance points to the buildings; 
2. Exercising stringent restrictions on staff and visitors (e.g. ,  ID card wearing 
should be enforced, visitors should not be allowed to enter unauthorized areas); 
3. Using the benefits offered by the sophisticated access-control system 
technology; 
4. Openly using the CCTV and access-control systems on site to act as deterrents 
against crime and malicious acts; 
5. Introducing remote-management techniques that allow senior company 
personnel access to security devices via Web technology; 
6. Taking particular care to employ well-paid, high-caliber security officers who are 
trained to deliver the expected level of service required; and 
7. Employing a minimum number of officers of this quality but being able to 
increase their numbers at high-risk times. 
8. Controlling perimeter security arrangements and the company's UK buildings as 
stringently as possible, consistent with the operational requirements of those 
buildings was established (see Access Control). 
9.  Accruing security and economic benefits from the use of  a nationwide company 
smart ID card and access-control system were maximized and realized to their 
full potentiaL 
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10 .  Introducing of the access-control system into internal areas of larger buildings in 
a prioritized and phased fashion, starting with high-risk areas. 
1 1. Introducing secure but unmanned staff entrance points to buildings supported by 
CCTV (and intercoms where necessary). 
12. Introducing and bolstering a culture in which it is more convenient to wear ID 
cards than to not wear them. 
1 3 .  Implementing efforts to reduce the number of security control room facilities 
across the company's UK sites. 
14. Using technologically advanced security systems wherever appropriate to deliver 
high-quality, responsive, and value-for-money security arrangements. 
15. Encouraging the participation and willing involvement of all company staff, 
contractors, and visitors, in highly effective security arrangements. 
16. Providing remote security solutions from the company's preferred monitoring 
center, including CCTV management, access control, incident management, and 
crisis and contingency support. 
17.  Full integration of the security systems has had many benefits from the 
standpoint of both security and health and safety. 
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Integrated Security Solutions 
The two specific areas that required attention were their physical security 
infrastructure and their manned guarding and security policy. 
The company implemented a feasibility study to examine and recommend 
improvements to the site security infrastructure in these two areas. The assessment, 
the audit, and this study helped to develop the physical security plan for the 
company's UK operation. 
For the study to proceed, the company's management team and consultant put 
together a program for the operational delivery and management of manned 
guarding. To make this program a success, both the manned guarding delivery and 
the need to systematically implement sufficient numbers of security officers was 
evaluated, as was the training, to ensure an overall increase in quality. 
The company formed a project team with wide experience of best commercial 
practice in managing security manned guarding and developing security 
infrastructures to manage these processes. Its role had three basic strands: guarding, 
access controls, and physical security systems. 
Access Control 
Controlling access to any site is a fundamental requirement for effective security. In 
this instance, and before specific devices were considered appropriate, the 
management team and the consultant researched and selected software, because a 
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software package that was compatible company-wide would mean that only 
persons with the relevant authority could access either the parking facilities or 
buildings in any of the company's UK properties. 
The devices that were considered included internal and external turnstiles, vehicle 
barriers, road blockers, electrically operated gates, doors, Automatic Number-Plate 
Recognition (ANPR), and controlled entry to restricted areas. This has meant that 
any authorized person using any of the automated access devices anywhere on the 
company's UK property could be timed in and out, tracked while on site, and 
accounted for in the case of evacuation. 
The company decided that the system should be programmed to allow entry 
through certain points for only certain personnel; this enabled management to direct 
employees to the nearest point of entry to their workplace. This would also affect 
where people parked their vehicles, with the system recording details on vehicles 
parked in every company lot. 
The project team recommended installing the relevant access-control devices at all 
the entry and exit points in the perimeter, supported by a two-way intercom system 
linked back to a security-control room. This system facilitates the automatic entry 
of authorized personnel and allows access by communicated approval and visual 
verification for those not in possession of the appropriate device authorization. 
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In addition to CCTV cameras located to offer coverage of the remote and sensitive 
parts of the complex, cameras were installed to view and monitor the operation of 
the access-control devices. Where appropriate, the CCTV system is remotely 
managed. 
Incident-Management System 
The company installed a recommended, effective incident-management system that 
offered the opportunity to measure trends and any potential threats to the 
company's business. When incidents occurred and were entered into the system, the 
security team could then take appropriate countermeasures, thereby constantly 
reviewing and adjusting the security service to meet the demand. 
Web-Enabled Access 
The audit recommended that all policies, procedures, manuals, and devices should 
be Web enabled. This means that personnel with the relevant authority to access the 
system can interrogate, view, authorize, update, and grant or deny access to the 
system. Infonnation on the Web would also provide a valuable tool for sharing best 
practice. 
Remote Management 
With the installation of the relevant detection, audio, and data-management 
systems, there would be the opportunity to provide security to the complex using a 
remotely controlled and managed approach. 
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Rather than monitoring the CCTV on site, it was carried out remotely, with the 
assurance that a contracted rapid response would be accessible. The implementation 
of remote monitoring had the additional benefit of reducing manned-guarding costs. 
Maintenance and Support 
After the investment in the recommended technology, it was imperative to ensure 
that it is kept in a state of operational repair and maintained. Many organisations 
make these investments, but over time, the systems become unworkable because of 
the lack of repair and maintenance. 
Guarding and Operational Requirements 
This section of the overall proposed security strategy focused on seven key 
guarding and operational functions: 
1 .  revised staffing levels; 
2. recruitment and retention of staff; 
3 .  ability of staff; 
4. training standards; 
5 .  supervision and management; 
6. development of the UK security policy; and 
7. manpower implementation plan. 
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Staffing levels. The risk assessment and security audit clearly highlighted the 
numbers of security officers required to execute those professional duties outlined 
in the site assignment instructions. However, to make progress, it was necessary to 
strip out nonsecurity tasks that were being performed by the security team, which, 
as outlined in this case study, had developed over a number of years. Such duties 
included delivering bread and milk to the training facility, portering, reception 
cover, and other nonsecurity related tasks. Only then would it be possible to embark 
on providing the company with the appropriate level of professional security. 
As part of the strategy, the project team decided that a new corporate uniform 
needed to be introduced; this was done with the understanding that a new visual 
image in itself would not be sufficient to change the perception of the security 
service that was held by staff and management. It would only be with the 
implementation of the security policies and procedures and new access controls 
together with a strong, efficient, motivated, and focused security team that a first 
step toward changing attitudes could be taken, together with improved training and 
better staff security awareness. 
The security audit identified that the security officers should perform duties such 
as : access and egress control, patrolling, issuing ID passes, locking and unlocking 
of doors, control of key issue, traffic management and car parks, and emergency 
management. 
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At the time of the case study, the background threat of international and domestic 
terrorism exposed security implications for the post room and portering functions. 
The security management team and the consultant recommended that all the postal 
deliveries would be subject to x-ray scanning, and any suspect packages would be 
dealt with appropriately, therefore falling within the security function. 
The post room and portering staff, due to the nature of their tasks, have no 
restrictions imposed on them regarding where they may go on site. It was therefore 
imperative for security reasons that personnel employed in these posts were 
properly trained and vetted. 
The security management team determined how best to manage other activities that 
took place in the reception area. This included the delivery of small parcels, access 
for contractors working within the building, ID card processing, issuing of keys and 
the control and management of the electrically operated vehicle gate into the 
warehouse yard. All visitors would need to be processed through the main 
reception, from where the host could be contacted to accompany visitors. 
The management of the fully integrated site access system should be operated from 
the security reception area. If there was to be an holistic approach to the new 
security strategy, then the previously discussed disparate functions would need to 
be reclassified as security tasks and thus managed as specified within the security 
contract. 
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As the risk assessment recommended, the introduction of the technologically 
advanced security systems did require the recruitment of a specialist site-security 
manager. The company accepted this recommendation, and the appropriate 
individual was recruited as part of the security improvement strategy. 
Recruitment and retention of staff Implementation of the security strategy required 
the development of a security-project team that would manage the operational 
delivery of the service contract. They would need, among other issues, to identify 
any local problems, both current and historic, that could have an impact on 
recruiting the correct calibre of security officer. 
The company and the security contractor agreed to formulate a recruitment plan to 
attract staff using the clients' and contractors' corporate identities. However, there 
were many reasons why recruitment could be potentially difficult: the location of 
the site, pay rates, terms and conditions, unsociable hours, unemployment figures, 
and the negative perception of careers in the security industry. The company and 
the contractor proposed several actions, including: reevaluating pay rates, 
developing training programs, reevaluating the working condition and hours, 
maximizing status, and identifying and developing the security-officer career path. 
In addition to improved pay structures, the project team implemented a 42-hour 
rolling shift pattern with annualized pay. To complement this, the recruitment 
approach started using joint brands to emphasize the benefits of working at the 
company sites, including catering facilities, club membership, varied 
responsibilities, good accommodation, teamwork, and a sense of belonging. 
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Calibre of staff. The challenges in recruitment and retention meant that to supply 
the number of security officers, the security contractor needed to take a partnership 
approach with the client management. To attract-but more important, to retain­
the correct calibre of person required to work on such a high-profile site, the 
security contractor had to offer a good remuneration package, combined with high 
levels of job satisfaction and job security. 
External advertising was focused on the diversity of the roles and the career 
opportunities that exist within the security contract for professional, customer­
focused individuals. 
One of the recommendations from the security audit was to increase security officer 
pay, develop the personnel assessment and appraisal criteria, establish professional 
development opportunities, continuously review the deployment of security 
personnel to ensure they man challenging posts, and train security staff to provide 
the correct level of service (e.g., main reception key skills, site knowledge, close 
protection, car park management, organisational skills, communication, customer­
service training). 
The project team would need to identify and monitor security staff during their 
probationary period to ensure they meet the required standards. This was done 
using on-the-job training and testing in conjunction with individual appraisals and 
assessments. 
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Training standards. Training standards are the backbone of any security contract. 
Currently the United Kingdom's national requirement for security operations is that 
determined by the Private Security Industry Act (200 1 ) .  The project team's training 
package would go beyond those requirements to provide the levels of service a 
contract of this importance demands. 
The project team developed a comprehensive training package, including roles and 
responsibilities of a security officer, customer service, safety overview, searching, 
patrolling, personal security, communication, reporting, health and safety, criminal 
and civil law, access management, loss prevention, bombs and awareness, and 
giving evidence. 
On completion of this initial training course, selected individuals would be 
identified to receive more advanced training. This course would cover the following 
subjects: crisis management, personnel management skills, threat assessment, 
violence in the workplace, advanced search procedures, use of force and the law, 
control and restraint, surveillance and countersurveillance, protection of 
information, introduction to event security, aspects of security management, public 
relations, introduction to stalking issues, close protection, electronic systems, and 
CCTV and control room operations. 
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Creating Security Awareness 
The project team undertook an internal security awareness campaign, which 
provided employees with the necessary information relating to the security 
requirement onsite. Examples of the initiatives include improving the security 
awareness of staff by creating a security induction CD-ROM that was produced in 
conjunction with the safety and training department and establishing a structured 
and consistent approach to the production and circulation of security information 
and bulletins to the company's personnel. 
Continuous Improvement 
Continuous improvement should be the foundation of any contract security 
provider. Through all the operational, management, and communication systems, a 
refined range of tools measuring the performance in both objective and subjective 
areas should be established to determine the quality of the contractor's operation. 
This enables the customer to determine the level of value they receive and set it 
against the security costs, in turn helping benchmark performance against levels 
achieved both inside and outside the security industry. 
Objective Measures 
The security performance of the contractor should be determined by key objectives. 
These are derived not only from the provisions of the written contract, but also 
from the issues and standards that companies judge to be relevant. The security­
performance assessment should be continually refined and reviewed, on a weekly 
or monthly basis, for example. Operational targets should be benchmarked and 
results published to encourage ownership of team performance. 
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Operational Management Issues (Supervision and Management) 
To ensure the effective development, implementation, and management of the 
company's new security policy, it was essential for the organisation to develop a 
coherent strategy and monitor results. It was only by clearly determining the 
success or failure of the security initiatives that the benefits could be sufficiently 
understood and then integrated into the mainstream management processes. This 
whole process was then easily "sold" to the company on the basis of brand 
protection. 
The security management team and myself determined that the company's UK 
security policy should have five principal objectives: 
I. To create an environment in which people, contributors, contractors, and 
visitors feel comfortable, secure, and safe; 
2. To implement security measures that are appropriate to the company's needs, 
minimize losses from theft, fraud, and other criminal acts, and reflect 
positively on the company's brand image; 
3 .  To use technologically advanced security systems wherever appropriate to 
help deliver high-quality, responsive, and value-for-money security 
arrangements. 
4. To encourage the participation and willing involvement of all company staff, 
contributors, contractors, and visitors in the highly effective security 
arrangements; and 
5 .  To ensure an effective crisis and contingency capabi lity. 
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The policy set out clear standards for the management of security and provided a 
single source of advice on security issues. It also provided guidance toward 
effective implementation and established the requirement for regular appraisal of 
security and risk issues. 
Security Manual 
The project team developed a comprehensive site-security manual that included all 
of the duties and responsibilities for all positions. They then consolidated it into one 
standard document produced by the project team. Senior management holds a copy 
of the manual for reference purposes. The manual is issued and controlled to ensure 
that any changes can be managed efficiently. 
The security manual objectives were: 
1. to define the security organisation, the responsibilities, job descriptions, and the 
tasks of corporate security, security managers, and site security officers; 
2 .  to define security standards; 
3 .  to  define parameters for the application of  consistent security standards; and 
4. to ensure that the codes of conduct and expectations of standards are met. 
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The manual contains detailed assignment instructions, the codes of conduct and a 
range of other subjects, which outline the expectations and standards, which the 
security department are required to meet. 
Incident Reporting 
Security-incident reporting throughout the site required consolidation, which was 
achieved using a Web-enabled security-incident management software package. 
The software provides a fully customized reporting facility, ensuring consistency, 
and also a full  audit trail and measurement device. Using one reporting tool makes 
operational sense and is cost effective. 
The security software package provides the following functions: 
1. standardizes incident tracking; 
2. manages investigations; 
3. generates reports; 
4. performs analysis; 
5. highlights trends; and 
6. enables all company sites to post incidents. 
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Case Study Conclusion 
In real life, the concepts of security and nonsecurity are not neatly separated, but 
coexist in a grey area, which is the normal state of nature (Adams, 1 995; Beck, 
1 992). 
Although it was difficult to set a definitive date for the implementation because of 
the complex issues involved and the inevitable challenges to be encountered along 
the way, the project team estimated that the whole process would be achieved over 
a six-month period. It was extremely important that communication at every stage 
of the implementation plan be part of the process. The team required weekly c lient 
meetings to ensure regular feedback on progress and also so that any unforeseen 
variations were agreed to and communicated to the appropriate personnel, in a 
timely manner. 
As a consequence of the regular meetings, senior company management realized 
that brand reputation had survived despite many years of neglecting the security 
contract. They also recognised the need for security policy, guard-force operation, 
and integrated systems across the whole site. Additionally, the question of 
management culture, specifically that of openness to the flow of people, thoughts, 
and process, should not be allowed to conflict with the issues of site and building 
security access. This conflict is one that places assets such as proprietary 
information and the security and safety of staff and visitors most at risk. 
1 93 
Parallel with the implementation of the security strategy was a separate but 
complementary project: establishing a range of emergency procedures and crisis 
and contingency plans. This required detailed presentations to various management 
groups, analysis of existing emergency procedures, and the construction of detailed 
crisis-management plans. 
This process reinvigorated the company's previous failed attempts at establishing 
an organisation-wide business continuity strategy. This wider process is now 
ongoing and is illustrative of the company's senior management's acceptance that 
maintenance ofbrand image and reputation is not solely a product of marketing and 
commercial operations, but equally secured by the sound foundation of crisis and 
security risk management. 
As to evidence of the effectiveness of the recommendations and corrective 
measures, the following are some of the outcomes of the exercise-that is, the 
"after" picture. 
1. The annual spending on security manpower reduced from some £3 . 1  million per 
annum, to £2.3 million. 
2. Establishment of crisis- and incident-management plans, which determined and 
integrated the roles and resources of the various departments that would have a 
part to play in emergency management. 
3 .  Development of  a detailed security manual, risk-informed assignment instructions 
and task-oriented procedures. 
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1 .  Suitable guidance and briefings at departmental level restarted the company's 
Business Impact Analysis process as a precursor to establishing workable business 
continuity plans. 
2. Reciprocal accommodation arrangements made with a substantial organisation 
operating in the same locale for temporarily housing staff during emergency 
evacuation. 
3.  Improved security staff morale as evidenced by reduced turnover. 
4. The security-training program that was put in place further contributed to a 
motivated security force, strengthened by task driven roles. 
5. A new service-level agreement and continuous improvement program, managed 
through attainment of Key Performance Indicators (KPis ), which were regularly 
achieved to a high degree. 
6. The realignment of all security equipment, based on OR with all equipment 
signals being remotely managed from the complex. 
7. Due to the improved relationship, the security contractor's specialist services were 
requested by the client for event security management and two, high level close 
protection contracts. 
8. Implementation of a customized incident database system. 
Apart from this case study being a suitable principle subject to test the proposition 
of this thesis, the results from the 1 00 security-risk assessments, as presented within 
Chapter 4, support this singular but detailed case study. It is argued that the detail, 
complexity, and findings from this case study provide a suitable conclusion and 
answers the question why doesn't security work. As confirmation from an external 
perspective as to its validity and efficacy, this case study project won the best­
integrated solution at the prestigious Security Management Today awards. 
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6.0 DISCUSSIONS, FINDINGS & THESIS CONCLUSION 
The fol lowing is an overview of the preceding chapters in the format of 
discussions & findings: 
In the first chapter, clarification is presented on the theoretical side of security 
risk and the establishment of a security infrastructure as a prerequisite within an 
organisation is advocated. The issue of cost versus effectiveness is addressed 
and the subject of organisational risk blindness is considered. The findings of 
this chapter are that, often, the illusion of security is created by those visible 
physical elements of the security matrix such as fences, cameras and manpower. 
However, in reality we propose that if threats and hazards remain unidentified 
then these costly assets and services often serve only as a fallible continuation 
of inherited practices, far removed from the very necessary requirement of the 
management of a risk-informed, operationally determined security strategy. 
Chapter 2 discusses the subject of Business Continuity Management and 
illustrates how an organisational culture of safety can directly affect its ability to 
recover from a crisis situation. We provide evidence of specific disasters, how 
they occurred, and how some of these disasters could have been avoided if the 
appropriate security risk planning and approaches had been in place. The 
chapter concludes that employees need the psychological and practical support 
of a well-known and structured crisis management policy for any security 
strategy to be effective. This subsequent failure to identify the foreseeable risks 
and adopt the appropriate risk mitigation strategies has resulted in many 
organisations increasing their exposure and vulnerability under the false 
assertion that they have sufficient resources to deal with any eventuality. 
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Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology of this thesis, identifying the major 
research designs and techniques associated with a variety of risk-management 
strategies and providing an exposition of the views about the nature of 
knowledge (i .e. , epistemology) and the nature of reality (i.e., ontology) 
underlying these perspectives. This chapter also justifies the particular strategic 
approach to best practice that is advocated and explains why both a qualitative 
and a quantitative approach to data evaluation is required. The conclusion of 
this chapter is that when implementing the two outlined approaches to risk 
assessment that a systematic approach is fundamental and that a combining of 
the two research methodologies is also a requirement to ensure that the 
weaknesses of each process is avoided and full advantage taken of their 
respective strengths. 
Chapter 4 describes the specific research project. There are two distinct parts to 
this research: ( 1 )  the measurement of the actual security risks to an organisation 
(i .e. ,  the security-risk assessment) and (2) the concept of a security audit, that is, 
the measurement and assessment of the steps that an organisation has or has not 
taken to meet and nullify the identified security risks. The findings are analyzed 
and the outcomes presented in tables and matrices. The research demonstrates 
that none of the organisations surveyed had the proper security-risk mitigation 
strategy in place because none of them conducted a security-risk assessment 
before implementing their security policy. In almost all cases, the organisations 
had instituted prevention measures that addressed only unspecified or generic 
risk. These strategies for security failed to address the specific risks encountered 
by the organisations-risks that could have been appropriately identified and 
addressed in advance-therefore, their security did not work. 
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Chapter 5 is the detailed research study of a multi-national manufacturing 
company and a major client of a security contractor, the relationship between 
them suffering from the acknowledgement that major dissatisfaction existed 
with the levels of service and clearly identifiable security failures. The chapter 
follows the highly successful re-alignment of the service by means of the 
application of risk and security audits, vulnerability assessment, operational 
requirements for electronic security systems, physical security assets aligned to 
revised manpower provision and amended procedures. This case study in which 
the organisation is examined and analyzed the changes that were implemented 
after a security-risk assessment and security audit took place are discussed. This 
provides a real-world example of the methodology for risk assessment and 
evaluates its effectiveness in practice. 
Thesis Conclusion 
Button (2008 :2 1 )  argues . . .  the success (or failure) of a security system is linked 
to the efficient (or inefficient) working ofboth social and technical elements. 
These tend to be mutually reliant. For example, an intruder alarm will  only 
work effectively if it is the right tool in the right place, if it is installed correctly, 
maintained regularly, switched on and responded to when activated. All these 
actions rely upon human intervention. Thus it is important to stress that any 
security system is a 'socio-technical' system. 
Failures in security are taking place all the time. By the very nature of security 
failure it is difficult to gauge its extent, although in some sectors there are 
statistics that provide a barometer of the success or failure of security in certain 
contexts (Button, 2008 p.29). 
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Button concludes that there are a multiplicity of different parts of the system 
that can fail  and although on the face of it a failure might seem either a technical 
or human failure, usually there is some kind of link (Button, 2008 p.50). 
However, as Zedner (2003a: 1 58) argues . . .  absolute security . . . is a chimera, 
perpetually beyond reach. Even if security were today obtainable . . .  the 
potentiality for new threats means the pursuit can never be said to be over . . .  
Just as the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries are unknowable, 
so there may be unknown vulnerabilities, revealed only when they are 
exploited. The central issue here is that security is not and can never be an 
absolute state. Rather it is a relational concept whose invisibility must be 
continually tested against threats as yet unknown (Button, 2008 p.27). 
Therefore, it is important for security risk managers to engage more in research 
and to learn from the experience of peers. They need to be aware of what works, 
to monitor research on the latest security (and other relevant) strategies, to 
conduct isomorphic learning and to share experiences at appropriate 
professional events. They also need to be more willing to embrace research in 
order to assess the effectiveness of their strategies (Button, 2008 p.207). 
It would seem self-evident that if threats and hazards remain unidentified, 
vulnerabilities unacknowledged, incidents unrecorded, and risks unqualified, 
security will fail. In reality, however, it often succeeds, albeit more by good 
fortune than sound, strategic planning. It succeeds at one specific level, in that 
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the most common threats can be guarded by the most common defenses-the 
protection provided by physical security assets. This creates an illusion that 
security is visible (e.g., CCTV cameras and access controls), operational, and 
effective. This illusion is both objective and subjective-objective in that a 
seeming strong physical feature is a defense against all vulnerabilities and 
subjective in that the resultant complacency arises as a by-product of this visual 
security. 
The illusion of security at work satisfies a variety of demanding issues; 
corporate management's requirement to discharge (mistakenly, as it often 
transpires) best practice, deterrence by means of the visual existence of security 
assets, and the comfort and morale of staff. Providing security manpower, with 
the hours of deployment of staff, may further enhance the deterrence factor in a 
positive way, but more often, it only further compounds the illusion that security 
is working. The test of manpower's efficacy is the extent to which a deployed 
security officer's duties morph into pseudosecurity and facilities management. 
The more noncore duties that security personnel are forced to adopt, the more 
obvious it is that security is failing. 
Incident recording is the bedrock of probability analysis and is completely 
absent at many companies. This leaves individuals responsible for security 
seeking the dubious and often conflicting accounts of losses from the corporate 
memory bank. The lack of an incident-management system database 
undermines the validity of any security-risk management process. However, 
despite being a prerequisite and starting point for some future risk-informed 
security strategy, these systems remain rare in most sectors. 
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The question as to whether security fails is not absolute; although it may fail the 
risk assessment test (as a substantial proportion of those organisations that have 
contributed to this thesis's analysis did), and lack a value-sensitive, risk-driven, 
and strategically thought-out process, it often succeeds, albeit against only the 
most common threats. Security, as practiced by many organisations, works 
against what may be considered the lowest common denominators of threats 
and hazards: break-ins and fire. Subsequently, creating the illusion of security 
and failing to recognise the wider benefits that a risk driven integrated security 
program can derive. 
Hazard prevention and response, within health and safety legislation-meaning 
legal action can be taken against companies and individuals that do not comply 
with the laws on the statute books or when accidents occur-works for 
simplistic objectives and solutions. "Recently proposed physical security 
performance criteria appear to be a significant step . . . .  The 'cookbook' 
approach to regulations should be replaced with system performance 
requirements" (Bishop, Wilson, & Shaver, 1 976: p. 72), [security] based on 
performance criteria can provide a more direct measure of effectiveness than the 
traditional approach of [security] by regulation (Hansen, Nilson, & Schneider, 
1 977: p. 277). However, the ever-increasing sophistication of corporate crime 
and protection against terrorism has no such simplistic, one-dimensional 
solution. 'Most significantly, many failures do not represent isolated incidents 
but follow similar or comparable incidents that have not been dealt with. There 
is much to be learned from examples of security failure by other organisations 
and it is therefore essential that structures should be established to enable 
informed analysis and debate of security failure to take place outside the glare 
of publicity' (Button, 2008 p.52). 
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Security does fail the test of value, and nowhere is this more obvious than in the 
provision of security manpower and CCTV in the organisations surveyed. 
Manpower deployment schedules are often accompanied by the narrowest of 
site-assignment instructions, predicated and mandated in ignorance of the wide 
range of potential security weaknesses that, in the absence of risk analysis and 
assessment, remain unexposed. The tasks and duties of the manpower equation 
of the overall security jigsaw operates at one speed, taking no cognizance of the 
rise and fall of the macro, environmental and national risks, that may be present 
in the socio-technical system. When the nation's threat level increases, it can be 
observed from the assignment instructions that the tasks and aims of security 
personnel will invariably remain unaffected and not mirror the necessity for 
increased vigilance and tasks appropriate to reflect the heightened risk. 
Technological solutions fare little better in the value test, and despite corporate 
managers' belief that sophisticated security systems may be a solution to 
manpower costs, most substitutions are driven by the suppliers' sales efforts and 
emphasize equipment complexity, not operational functionality, or even 
necessity. The absence of an OR, carried out to assess the operational needs and 
functionality of security systems before installation (be they CCTV, access 
management, or alarms and signaling), further tilts a lance at the value test in 
terms of success or failure of the security operation. 
Enterprise risk management is now an established element of corporate culture, 
driven in the main, especially within those "main board"-listed companies, by 
the need to comply with the risk-specified issues outlined in the Combined 
Code of Corporate Governance to qualify annual accounts accordingly and face 
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the potential ire of the markets (Turn bull, 1 999). There is an evident disconnect, 
or "firebreak," past which the enterprise risk matrix stops in most organisations 
investigated-the "downside" risks from security threats of man and the hazards 
of the environment. However, the Combined Code of Corporate Governance 
makes no distinction and expects a company to approach risk in a top-to-toe 
manner, not distinguishing between the potential upside risks of the company 
enterprises and the downside risks of security threats. 
There is consistent evidence of what can be termed management snobbery (the 
tendency to ignore those singularly downside security issues perceived as below 
the water line) when compiling what may be a very sophisticated enterprise­
wide risk register. This disconnect is often subjective, not simply a function of 
the fact that systems are not in place within the security division to produce 
their threat narrative. Rather, this tendency is symptomatic of the way 
management perceives the role of security as a corporate department i.e. the 
man on the gate and the camera on the wall have become a visual metaphor for 
how unsophisticatedly management perceives security. However, according to 
Davidson ( 1 989: 1 )  security management has developed to the point where it 
deserves recognition as a free-standing management science. To that end, it 
clearly needs specialised professional training and universal recognition as an 
academic discipline. 
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The objective of security is to protect against criminal and malicious acts. 
However, this can become secondary to the imperative for it to be able to face 
the day-to-day challenges of operating within the organisational culture. Entities 
operating within certain industries in which ideas and the flow of information 
are key, can develop a culture of laboring under the mistaken impression that 
locking a door and strictly managing access to sensitive information restrict the 
intellectual flow of information, thereby becoming an impediment to core 
business processes. Where a higher-than-average staff intellect is added to the 
mix, then resistance to these apparent and inconvenient restrictions on the 
individual, even for the benefit of the many, is likely to further challenge even 
the simplest of security practices and procedures. The security department will 
be continuously dealing with a variety of arguments against its mandated 
procedures, however specious the argument may be. 
Resistance to wearing identification badges, lack of compliance with access 
management procedures and clean desk policies, and opposition to security 
personnel are all indicators that security systems and procedures may have been 
implemented in the absence of preinstalled security awareness training and 
orientation. Under such a cultural cloud, a security department's role becomes 
one of fighting small bush fires, seldom rising to the far more critical challenge 
of implementing a risk-informed, solutions-based security strategy and instead 
remains a battle of maintaining some dignity, authority, and credence within the 
organisation often while receiving little support from senior management, who 
themselves are likely to be experiencing issues with a broadly noncompliant 
staff. 
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Without a mandate from the very top of an organisation-in the absence of a 
simple but clear security policy signed off by the most senior executive­
empowering the security department to execute enterprise-wide protective 
procedures, little will ever be achieved. Having a clear, written mandate, 
although essential, will still achieve little for effective security if contentious 
staff issues are not supported by senior personnel's actions to demonstrate 
support for security efforts. Perception management is fundamental, and a 
department that handles risk, as distinct from security, can be more 
intellectually acceptable to staff; security requirements then become a by­
product of complex risk management, a proposition far harder for staff to argue 
against. 
In the United Kingdom, security as an operational function is often passed 
around between departments such as : human resources, health and safety, 
facilities management, or even the mechanical and electrical department if the 
security solution on a site leans more toward systems. With the changing 
parentage comes inconsistency, a preference to emphasize the parent 
department's own specific expertise, and a resounding lack of security 
knowledge. Security fails in these hands because it is not solutions-based. 
Purpose and strategy lose any primacy over administrative function while the 
illusion of effectiveness remains, tested by whether security personnel are fully 
occupied, regardless of duties. 
This thesis defines security failure, both in its primary role of deterrence, 
protection, detection, and response and in its wider responsibility within an 
organisation (e.g. ,  the aspect of failure to provide value, best practice, 
legislative compliance, and its questionable contribution to the evinced), wider 
organisational goals through the risk-assessment process. Security can 
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accidentally work when an organisation deploys unsophisticated defenses 
against unsophisticated threats, aimed at exploiting the most patently obvious 
weaknesses, but security more often operates in ignorance of an increasingly 
wide range of other weaknesses that can be exploited, some even from many 
miles away. 
Security predominantly fails in the test of value and best practice, when the 
deployment of the four elements of the security jigsaw-manpower, systems, 
physical assets, and procedures-are often no more sophisticated than as a 
consequence of the personal preferences of the individual who has, often 
unwillingly, become the unwelcome parent of the security department. As Yates 
(2003 : p. 1 0) puts it, "the key to making security sustainable is to ensure that all 
stakeholders get a dividend for their security investment." However, there is a 
certain point at which monetary value may not have much meaning, such as the 
attacks of September 1 1 ,  200 1 .  The loss of so many lives can be represented by 
dollars (U.S.  Department of Justice, 2002), but the cost of rebuilding property 
cannot be compared to the cost of 3,000 lost lives. 
If corporate security remains as the department within the organisation charged 
with minimising losses to the corporation as a whole, then it cannot operate as a 
profit center. In strict terms, it remains a cost center, but, as Millwee ( 1 999: p.  
1 22) points out, "what was once considered by some to be a cost centre has 
become a business benefit centre, as the safety and security of our eo-workers 
has redefined the mission of security practitioners all over the world." 
Security fails because organisations seldom take account of the macro 
environmental sociopolitical threats and hazards. No business is an island, but 
the security-risk assessments traditionally featured the security planning, if used 
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at all, are often woefully lacking in information about the wider risk issues. 
Addressing the background environment in which an enterprise risk and 
security audit is being prepared is what makes a security plan truly strategic by 
focusing on the most relevant audiences and activities, avoiding unnecessary 
expenditure, and ensuring a better chance of project success. Overall, corporate 
security must gain recognition for its contribution to the bottom line. It can do 
that if it can "convince employees and executives that security matters to them, 
to the company, and to the community; that it helps to protect the bottom line 
and, thus, their jobs" (Somerson, 2003 : 1 78). 
Although no individual organisation can do much to reduce specific threats, 
enforcing the traditional, often mundane security rules and procedures-sound 
and consistent access management; identification of the groups ofusers; CCTV; 
contract guard force practices-contribute to making the operation safe from 
most potential threats. Sound emergency management and crisis and continuity 
plans also play a part in any post incident recovery, even a major disaster and 
are certainly within the capabilities of most organisations. 
Security is always at risk of becoming habituated with the mundane, often as a 
consequence of a non dynamic risk-assessment process. If corporate security 
becomes an arms-length supplier of security advice to the corporation, it would 
cease to be part of, or tied to, the corporation. The risk is that business units in 
the corporation might go elsewhere or decline to use its-or anyone else's­
services (Falk, 1 996: p. 47). It is not untypical for a security department, having 
gone to the trouble of producing the risk matrix and acting on the 
recommendations in producing a strategy, to then file the document and forget 
about it. Continued assessment of ongoing risk, also called issues monitoring, is 
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essentiaL as any type of risk events that happen potentially raise the level of 
risk. The proper design and effective use of the built environment can lead to a 
reduction in the fear of crime and the the incidence of crime, and to an 
improvement in the quality of life (Crowe, 2000, 1 997). In this respect, one of 
the most important issues is to identify triggers--events that could lead an 
organisation to take further defensive measures should the level of risk increase. 
Scanning 1he environment for these triggers is an essential part of ongoing risk 
management, but it seldom happens. 
Political, academic, public debates, and operations are daily proof that security 
risk, means "different things to different people and different things in different 
contexts" (Royal Society, 1992: 7). 
Security can and does fail in the face of a plethora of tests, as this thesis has 
demonstrated. Fiscal balance is not the primary test, although value for money 
will dominate when the interdepartmental bids for funds take place. There is 
clear evidence from the 1 00 risk assessments conducted, carried out across five 
sectors, that many companies have not implemented the correct security 
solutions to manage the identified risks, and, as a result, their security does not 
work. Alas, many confuse means with ends, and equate security with 
deterrence, threat of mutual destruction, retaliation, war-readiness and 
restriction (Clutterbuck, 1 993). However, with proper use of risk assessments 
conducted on a regular basis and organisation compliance with the 
recommendations of these assessments, security will and can succeed across the 
wider threat spectrum supporting the business objectives. 
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APPENDIX. 1 - Threat Categories Table 
Category Probability Criticality 
Topic [ropic 
!Property crime Vandalism Vandalism 
Graffiti Graffiti 
Arson k\rson 
ifheft ifheft 
!Vehicle Vehicle 
Property Damage fire Fire 
Smoke Smoke 
Water !Water 
Collapse Collapse 
Road Traffic Accident !Road Traffic Accident 
Major disaster Fire Fire 
!Flood Flood 
Collapse Collapse 
Political Threats iferrorism iferrorism 
Civil Unrest tivil Unrest 
Personal crime Assault Assault 
Theft Theft 
Kidnapping �idnapping 
Murder !Murder 
Personal injury !Accident �ccident 
�TA RTA 
Harassment !Bomb hoax Bomb hoax 
Hoax emergency Hoax emergency 
Staff harassment Staff harassment 
!Public disorder Threatening behavior ifhreatening behavior 
Trespass Trespass 
Computer crime Espionage Espionage 
Sabotage Sabotage 
ifheft ifheft 
Traveller �ncursions [ncursions 
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STUDENT PAPER 
Dislocated Security 
PETER SPEIGHT 
Halifax, West Yorkshire, England 
1l1is article examines the current position of c01porate security risk 
assessment focusing on how effectively and extensively the guidance 
ofTurnbull, Sarbanes Oxley, and the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance has been incorporated into practice. It examines the 
importance of an integrated approach and aims to set out the 
case for a more centralized role for the security management team 
ZDithin the corporate domain. It does this by presenting evidence 
j/'om the literature and through discussion of the author's twenty 
years ' practical experience of security management and academic 
study of crisis risk and security management in such environments. 
KEYWORDS Turnbull, Sarbanes Oxley, Combined Code on Cor­
porate Governance, integration, security management 
INTRODUCTION 
The Combined Code on Corporate Governance (2006: 3) requires board 
members of listed companies in Britain to ensure that their risk management 
systems are "robust" and "defensible. "  This article will provide an overview 
of the Code and the background to its development, and discuss its impact 
on the security risk assessment function within British businesses. 
In recent years there has been an outpouring of articles charting the 
increasing importance of "corporate governance,"  such as the Smith and 
Turnbull reports, which have laid the foundations in the United Kingdom for 
what we now know as the "Combined Code."  Both reports could be used 
as "levers" to support the argument why a security-inclined risk assessment 
should be an integral part of a "top to toe" audit in the traditional area of 
internal control and in the assessment of the risks involved in embarking on 
Address correspondence to Peter Speight, 50 Rowan Way, Northowram, Halifax HX3 
7WF, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom. E-mail: peter.speight@reliancesecurity.co.uk 
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commercial ventures. Unfortunately, however, a board often stmggles with 
combining their commercial aims and controls with the work of the security 
department, however complex. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) was borne out of the major ac­
counting scandals such as Enron and W orldCom; the legislation calls for 
tighter internal controls and CEOs having to sign off (certifying) all financial 
statements and mandating real time disclosure of any details of impact. The 
controller of compliance is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
and, overall, the objective is to protect investors. Section 404, one of the 
most important parts, deals with potential breaches and internal controls on 
financial disclosures. 
There has been an increasing tendency for renewed focus on effec­
tive and auditable corporate management. Following the introduction of 
Turnbull, Sarbanes Oxley, and the Combined Code on Corporate Gover­
nance within security risk assessment, board members have been instmcted 
to invoke corporate-wide risk assessment as part of their company's atten­
dance to governance issues, thereby avoiding any personal repercussions. 
As Challinger (2006: 586) states, "Any organisation that employs a number of 
people to achieve a common purpose, whether as a commercial company or 
government instmmentality while quite different in output, all must operate 
in a financially responsible way including protecting their assets . "  
THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
The dislocation in many organizations between the outward facing, commer­
cial activities of a company and its inward-looking security/risk department 
undermine the standing and credibility of the security department. This leads 
to a situation where the security department is perceived by the board and 
senior management to be engaging in needlessly complicated issues, which 
is due in part to a veil of secrecy surrounding security departments (Borodz­
icz 2005; Briggs and Edwards 2006a). 
Unfortunately, in many companies, the security personnel's work is not 
weighted with equal status or gravity as those who are perceived to be 
carrying out the more important business of the company. 
The overriding lesson to be learned by the Corporate Security Director 
or Manager is a simple one. Their role is not to enforce security. Rather, 
it is to use their specialist skills and experience to assist all members of 
the organisation in making the company's security regime work. Security 
is a partnership activity. The need to protect the organisation's assets, 
people and operations leaves no room for stovepipe communications or 
internal empire-building. (SMT May 2006: 56) 
The role of the Corporate Security Director when working on risk and strat­
egy issues in an organization is to ensure that the project engages senior 
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management and board members . This elevates the status of security per­
sonnel and places them firmly on the radar as a department that is not only 
fundamental to the well being of the company, but a department that is more 
attuned to the management of risk than many board members and one that 
has the skills, experience, and professionalism to be handling such matters. 
Although inserting the security department at the right level in the com­
pany hierarchy can be problematic, there are many ways of engaging a 
board-and therefore convincing them of their importance-in the more 
"conceptual" issues of risk and security management. However, the impli­
cations of security for corporate governance issues vary from company to 
company, and so need to be integrated within the areas of operation of a 
security department. While it has taken years for this area to be accepted 
as necessary for effective practice following various publications on risk and 
internal controls and the conclusions drawn by focus and interest groups, 
responses to these proposals have emerged in terms of clearly defined stan­
dards and responsibilities for company directors with respect to corporate 
governance. As Borodzicz states, "security is a rapidly expanding and es­
sential feature of corporate activity. There is virtually no major organisation, 
public or private, without a team dedicated to managing issues of security" 
(2005: 49) . 
While Turnbull concerns itself with the methodology of management 
risk and embeds internal controls in the business processes, it also touches 
on a variety of common security risk issues. It is also important that managers 
realize that risk can be conceptualized not only negatively as "bad things 
happening," but also positively as "good things not happening. "  Companies 
would benefit from seeing the opportunities that arise from a focus on risk 
and control, rather than a focus on controls per se. 
A variety of corporate legislation now exists, affecting the behaviour, per­
formance and governance of organisational activities. How organisations 
should be governed, who should be responsible for this, and how they 
might be made more accountable are key issues of corporate governance.  
(Borodzicz, 2005: 8) 
In the United Kingdom over the last ten years, three reports have been highly 
influential in shaping corporate governance: Cadbury (1992), Hampel (1998) , 
and Turnbull 0999). Each of these reports can be seen, fundamentally, as 
a reaction to a number of high-profile corporate disasters in the last two 
decades (Borodzicz 2005:  8) . Therefore we now turn to what historically 
and frequently blocks the successful implementation and integration of risk 
management within large corporate bodies. 
The catastrophic failures of corporate governance within Enron and 
Barings, together with security failures post-9/1 1 and recent environmental 
disasters such as widespread flooding in Britain in summer 2007 have all 
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highlighted the case for rigorous risk management procedures.  Necessary 
forms of regulation have been brought in as a result of some of these inci­
dences, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Turnbull Report, and Base! II ,  
to mention just three. Industries are now starting to recognize that security 
departments have a larger part to play within the successful operation of the 
company; this is leading to security departments implementing their own risk 
management to cover areas such as internal and external fraud, workplace 
safety, and business continuity planning. 
Despite their high importance and significant implementation costs, 
security projects have often been described as "disjointed," "haphazard," 
"piecemeal , "  and "ill thought out . "  This often stems from the disparate sys­
tems involved in the project. A project installing closed circuit television 
(CCTV) without the benefit of an Operational Requirement (OR) would be 
an example of such a project. Organizations are often shocked by the as­
sessment of their current security and risk status and it is incumbent on 
the Corporate Security Director to be thorough in their detailing of require­
ments. Organizations often suffer from "empty wall syndrome":  if a wall has 
no camera on it then it needs one. There is much anecdotal evidence of 
inappropriate advice on and selling of security systems. It therefore follows 
that CCTV systems should be bound by similar legislation to that governing 
pensions and the misrepresentation of goods and needs. If such were to be 
introduced, many clients would be reimbursed for their security purchases. 
When considering the operational requirements of a security system 
such as CCTV, other issues, such as privacy laws, data protection, and the 
Human Rights Act ( 1998) also need to be considered. The blame, however, 
must fall squarely on the client's shoulders for not thoroughly investigating 
or defining their organizations and for making inappropriate purchases. In 
these terms, who the actual client is becomes an issue: there are cases 
from a number of organizations where the CCTV installation was taken 
completely out of the hands of security and was run by an Mechanical & 
Electrical department, because the issues were "too technical" for the security 
department. Disturbingly, access control systems are determined solely by 
human resources (HR) departments, and security managers, in order to fulfill 
their professional roles, must oppose this and insist on being involved in 
the decision- making process. This further highlights how security and the 
security team's role are perceived within the organization: security is seen as 
the department simply responsible for locking doors and recruiting people 
to stand or walk about in uniforms. 
So the blame falls firmly on the shoulders of security managers who 
must resist, absolutely, any installation of any system where the decision has 
been made as a consequence of the equipment's technical capabilities rather 
than being informed by operational needs. While recognizing that many 
decisions on these issues are made outside the security division, the time 
has never been better for security managers to make a stand and reclaim 
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the '·high ground" when it comes to operational issues . These, not technical 
attributes , should drive decision making. These needs should have been 
clearly identified through the risk and security audits. One must, though, 
be convinced that this cohesive, strategic approach is also required under 
the terms of corporate governance, for herein lies the Corporate Security 
Director's longest lever. 
Risk/security managers should take assurance from the fact that percep­
tions are changing, but they must also be very certain of the solidity of the 
changes: the dislocation between the board and corporate security needs 
attentive care . There is little indication to date that the drive for this will 
come from boards of directors who, in the main, believe that all is well with 
operations because of the cameras monitoring activity, the signing-in proce­
dures, and the identity badges. In reality, boards of directors tend to have no 
cognizance of the sheer breadth and depth of all the issues that "Security" 
now covers . Necessary change must be driven from the bottom up. 
Security operatives need, somehow, to be letting directors know that 
risk management does not stop at commercial decision making as to the 
feasibility of a new distributorship in Baghdad, or Bakino Fasso. As it was 
pointed out in a paper called "Implementing Turnbull , "  issued by The Centre 
for Business Performance, useful questions for members of the board are: 
• Do they feel comfortable that we could defend a risk decision after a 
"shock" or disaster? 
• What are there, by way of early warning mechanisms for identifying po­
tential disasters? 
• Have the more likely kinds of fraud been identified and are there controls 
in place? 
• What would we hate to see reported in the press? 
The paper also states that "a risk management policy document is to set out 
clearly for employees, the board's attitude to risk and the level of risk which 
it is prepared to accept. It is also an opportunity to demonstrate to all levels 
of the company that the board takes risk management seriously" (ICAEW 
1999: 9} 
The "ripple effect" of 9/1 1  has included a resurgence and reconsid­
eration of risk assessment, target hardening, and insurance. "While these 
measures are laudable in this new era of global risk, there is a definite need 
for the practice of risk mitigation (including insurance) to embrace a wider 
range of risks-particularly with regard to the effective management of risks 
to reputation" (SMT May 2002: 44). 
Major crises-from Challenger, Bhopal, Tylenol or Chernobyl to Exxon 
Valdez and Braer-are no longer exceptional events. Indeed, the risk 
of crisis is even becoming structural as large networks become more 
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complex, more vulnerable and more independent . . .  crises continue to 
become more frequent and destabilizing. (Lagadec 1993: 45) 
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The origins of the term "organizational safety culture" can be traced to lit­
erature relating to the Western nuclear industry's response to the Chernobyl 
disaster. In this case, a poor "safety culture" among employees in the Soviet 
nuclear industry was deemed to be a significant contributory factor to the 
accident (OECD 1987; Pidgeon 1991) .  For another theorist, Charles Perrow, 
organizational systems are the background precondition to most disasters. In 
his view, it is not the humans but the system itself that is to blame; he argues 
that catastrophic accidents are an inevitable feature of advanced technolog­
ical society (Perrow, 1984). Frequently, subsequent analyses of such events 
reveal that their underlying mechanisms invariably have organizational and 
social dimensions, while technological factors are sometimes, but not al­
ways, present. Utilizing the theoretical framework of systems theoty, and the 
concept of organizations as sociotechnical systems, allows technological dis­
asters to be more appropriately understood as a result of human actions and 
ineptitude. Similarly, this mode of analysis emphasizes that these events are 
more sociotechnical in nature than exclusively technical (Toft and Reynolds 
2005:  1 2) .  
So, corporate governance issues clearly descend t o  levels of operation 
that are not simply core, commercial business ones. Security managers must 
also reclaim business continuity from IT departments who, while they may 
have squared away the aspects of information continuity and, hopefully 
communications, are unlikely to have addressed the critical relationships and 
inter-dependencies of the company's various other departments. Despite this, 
a board may be convinced that all continuity elements are in place because 
IT have assured them that they are. This can be interpreted as mere territorial 
protectionism. 
The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and 
group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behav­
ior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an 
organization's health and safety management. Organizations with a posi­
tive safety culture are characterized by communications founded on mutual 
trust, by shared perceptions of the importance of safety, and by confidence 
in the efficacy of preventative measures. Many organizational systems by the 
very nature of their existence contribute toward increasing the likelihood 
of a high risk event occurring. Organizational structures that operate within 
"tightly coupled systems" (Perrow, 1984) generally strictly adhere to pre­
scribed rules and procedures that can limit the scope for innovation and flexi­
ble responses when operators are faced with a crisis situation. "The key issue 
here is in designing 'resilience"' (Home Office, 1997a) into the organizational 
structure without constraining the purpose for existing (Borodzicz 2005: 
89). 
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These are just two examples of the root causes of the "dislocation" 
from the mainstream of the company's operations suffered by security. Be­
fore examining the detail of corporate governance and internal controls, it 
is important to recognize corporate culture's contribution to the current sit­
uation and how a company's view of their core business functions often 
prejudices the adoption of a correct mindset in senior management-itself 
a pre-requisite for the adoption of a risk-based process for internal controls 
and reporting. Classic examples of "risk blindness" such as "it won't happen 
to us" or " its not the number one priority" and ''I'm just too busy" still infect 
many organizations, particularly when employees erroneously do not see 
their activities as being particularly high risk. 
One empirical example of such thinking can be found in the words 
of Dr. Brooke, who was a member of the in-house team that responded 
to a fire at the Allied Colloids chemical plant, Bradford, West Yorkshire in 
1992: "Never in my worst nightmare did I think that this sort of thing could 
happen, and I 'm sure you think that about your organisation. But there it 
was-happening" (Toft & Reynolds, 1994: 4). 
The most serious consequence that can be posed to any organization is 
that of survival . This area of increasing concern is referred to as "business 
continuity" or "contingency management. "  The need for business continuity 
management is increasingly accepted as sensible and pragmatic (Rolfe et al . ,  
1998). This includes the implementing o f  technology-based recovery plans to 
restore critical information, communication systems, and normal operations 
at the earliest opportunity. At an operational level it also establishes the inter­
dependencies between departments and the assets required and time-scales 
within which key business functions must be recovered. 
Organizations that are highly sales driven often simply "face outward" 
and directors have to be coerced into addressing non-core, internal matters. 
There are other organizations that adopt "openness" as a corporate culture 
so as to facilitate the free flow of people and, hopefully, ideas. But this also 
usually facilitates the free flow of people who have no legitimate purpose 
into the premises and the free flow of company assets, including proprietary 
information, out of the door. The value of losses attributed to staff in the 
United Kingdom alone in 2004 was estimated at £498 million with nine 
incidents per 1 ,000 staff. 
For many years universities and other academic institutions have vehe­
mently opposed exercising control over their own access, and the instigation 
of security regimes and mandated procedures on campus.  Many appear to 
be still opposed because these concepts, historically, have been perceived 
as being at odds with the principles of academic freedom. 
In generally benign environments such as the West, a company can 
probably survive while operating a policy of openness, but if such a culture 
is transplanted to a non-compliant geography, such as the former Soviet 
Union, the company could very soon lose millions. A detailed sociopolitical 
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risk assessment would, however, have highlighted the potential problems 
of exporting a certain corporate culture to one where business morality 
is in its infancy and where openness is seen as a sign of weakness and, 
thereby, legitimately open to exploitation. In the United Kingdom we capture 
crime statistics that are used to both manage and implement risk reduction 
strategies but "since the start of the decade, retailers have incurred losses of 
over £-9 billion from crime, with on average £.1 .51  billion lost each year. In 
2005,  the industry lost a total of £.1 .43 billion from crime-related incidents, 
a rise of one per cent from losses incurred in 2004, driven mainly by an 
increase in customer theft" (British Retail Consortium 2006: 3). 
To date, no adequate methodology for integrating these issues into 
risk management has been found, although a new Management Accounting 
Guideline, produced jointly by CMA Canada and the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), aims to fill this gap. 
A colleague has worked for many years in a company that, after only 
a few years of opening an operation there, found it had $12,000,000 adrift 
as a result of major "seams," many of which were operated with the collu­
sion of senior local management, distributors, and other employees. Despite 
security's warnings, the lure of new business prompted managers to ignore 
the developing problems resulting from inadequately vetted (often tempo­
rary) staff and crooked business partners. This is what corporate governance 
and internal controls are designed to identify and resolve and it is often 
the risk/security people who are best placed to carry out this preemptive 
exercise. 
While theorists argue that business continuity planning may in fact be 
defined as: "thinking the unthinkable" (Ginn 1992) and state that "business 
continuity planning is about achieving a balance between preparing for sit­
uations in which contingency plans will have to be used, while at the same 
time doing everything conceivable to stop them ever having to be used" 
(Borodzicz 2005: 87), a better understanding of the broad issues of gover­
nance is necessary for progress to be made. Corporate security operatives 
must be absolutely convinced that what they do and the issues they have 
responsibility for are as integral a part of the process as are the management 
of capital, execution of business strategy, change of management, takeover 
strategies, and the failure of major projects. 
This also affects any foreign owned companies, not just those listed 
in the United States and who fall under the auspice of the SEC, but also 
U.K. companies who trade with U.S .  firms. Public companies and their audi­
tors must now assume responsibility for their internal controls-no one any 
longer can use ignorance as a defense. Issues such as the maintenance of all 
business records, including the retention of e-mails for five years, have the 
potential to create an IT and security nightmare. 
The act contains some 60-plus pages on security-related issues, which 
tend to be good on principles but vague on execution. Cleary, though, 
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compliance means now that senior management must be very aware of 
what "Security" is doing and that their activities are auditable. We have seen 
some recent examples of the "one way street" of extradition of business 
people to the States, such as the three Nat West personnel and the arrests 
of the managers of the online gaming companies so the threats are clearly 
already in existence. What is very clear from the act is its requirement for the 
reporting on activity to be "holistic" and, essentially, risk driven-in other 
words , activity audits, processes, controls, and integrated, risk-driven security 
all need to be brought together. 
This specific accountability for those companies for whom U.S .  activities 
have placed at risk has also to be integrated with our domestic corporate gov­
ernance (CG) requirements. CG aims to protect shareholders' rights, enhance 
disclosure and transparency, facilitate effective functioning of the board, and 
provide an effective legal and regulatory enforcement framework. It is the 
key element in enforcing investor confidence. 
TURNBULL 
"Turnbull"  is now the accepted guidance on internal control and was issued 
by a working party chaired by Nigel Turnbull. The guidance is about a 
"risk-ba.-;ed" approach to establishing internal control and about reviewing 
its effectiveness. 
The consequence for a listed company not complying is severe. The 
Turnbull guidance is linked, via the Combined Code on Corporate Gov­
ernance, to the Listing Rule disclosure requirements of the London Stock 
Exchange. The result would be that a company's annual report must be 
qualified by means of disclosure of the non-compliance, thereby attracting 
the possible attention of the press, shareholder activists, and institutional 
investors. 
Turnbull guidance does not merely impact at the very top of corporate 
entities and should not be seen as some negative, time-consuming impo­
sition; risk-based commercial decisions help to protect against losses, to 
seize opportunities, to facilitate advantage over competitors, and to prepare 
for a range of unforeseen events. A risk-based culture, however, in even 
a small business also means better management focus on activities, better 
communication, and a good level of board involvement in all the company's 
activities-especially security. 
As outlined earlier, Turnbull, while it primarily concentrates on a risk­
based approach to commercial business objectives and activities, does not 
ignore company requirements to "safeguard its assets from inappropriate 
use loss, or fraud," words equally familiar to security people as to board 
members. The corporate-wide risk matrix that compliance with Turnbull 
demands would be organized under principal headings such as: Business, 
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Financial , Compliance, Operational, and Other. Under the latter, one would 
have such issues as "lack of business continuity, " "physical disaster" (includ­
ing fire and explosion) , "loss of physical and intangible assets,"  all of which 
engage the security department and with which it deals regularly. Also, un­
der the Compliance heading one would expect to find "health and safety 
risks . "  Finally, under the Financial heading there are items to be addressed 
such as "occurrence of types of fraud to which the business is susceptible" 
and "penetrations and attack of IT systems. "  So, clearly, Turnbull is a "top to 
toe" requirement and one that has to engage a risk-driven security depart­
ment. The aforementioned issues are only a sample of areas for attention 
that would fall within the remit of corporate security; Turnbull embraces 
security's work on every level. 
There are a high number of companies that have no written and man­
dated Security Policy. On a more positive note, having such a policy works 
as a type of "coat rack."  If it's in place, security has the means to "hang" a 
wide range of subsidiary policies and procedures (i .e . ,  " information security," 
"personal security,"  "travel security," etc). With no principal policy in place, 
though, getting other programs to be adopted is often a major task and man­
dating the procedures and requirements of a program to all staff, probably 
impossible, as the processes to implement it are simply not in place. By far 
the biggest headache of not having a board-approved main policy is that 
staff will attach little credibility to all programs and will therefore result in 
poor compliance. As a security manager, one should be more than able to 
write a simple Security Policy for the board to adopt. 
Returning to compliance issues and for any company with U.S.  con­
nections, or strong business links and for whom SOX could be a potential 
problem, the value of the Turn bull guidance is in its "framework" from which 
to address the requirements of Section 404 (S404) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
The SEC has actually identified Turnbull as a suitable base from which to 
judge "the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting" (FRC 
2005 : 1 ,  my italics). 
THE COMBINED CODE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The legal position on all this is to be found in The Companies (Audit, 
Investigations & Community Enterprise) Act 2004. This new act is the U.K. 
government's equivalent of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Code, however, 
is about reporting and became effective late in 2003. Stock Exchange listing 
rules impose a requirement for companies to report on how they apply the 
principles of the Code-or "explain" as to why not-known as the "comply 
or explain" approach. A company has to report in two parts, the first on 
how it is applying the principles of the Code and the second to confirm that 
it complies with the Code's provisions, or where it does not, provide the 
� 
0 
0 
N 
H 0 .a E 0 u 0 Q 
N N 
148 P. Speight 
explanation. The following is an extract from the Code under the heading 
of ·'Control Environment and Control Activities" :  
• Does the board have clear strategies for dealing with significant risks that 
have been identified? 
• Is there a policy on how to manage these risks? 
• Is there a clear understanding by management and others within the com­
pany of what risks are acceptable to the board? 
If you asked those questions of senior management of the company that 
suffered huge losses in Russia cited earlier, the answer would be "no" to 
all , despite their having been warned of the threats and likely risks that 
would be a result of such threats. Their corporate culture was not, sadly, 
"exportable" to high-risk geographies. One area the company did tackle well, 
however, was that of Crisis Management, particularly in adapting existing 
policies, emergency management, and contingency procedures to the new, 
very difficult environment. 
This is somewhat of a departure from the norm. Companies seldom 
have comprehensive, tested, and rehearsed crisis plans that also dovetail 
with continuity imperatives and, again, this is not just about information 
recovery and restoration. 
The commercial implications of employing experts to run crisis games 
raise serious ethical question regarding the "expertness" and "motivation" 
for running simulations. If simulations are to be used as a form of insurance 
against litigation, it is important to establish whether these exercises are ap­
propriately valid. Assessing the value of a crisis simulation is a key issue and 
should be considered from four perspectives: selecting an appropriate crisis 
team, purpose of training, a definition, and learning requirements (Borodzicz 
2005: 1 28). 
The selection of appropriate personnel for crisis management exercises 
is essential. Exercises can be used to select the types of people most suited 
to operating in a crisis environment. Most managers like to think that they 
can manage their departments better than anyone else, particularly in a crisis 
situation. However, this is an unfortunate fallacy. Some managers are indeed 
naturally good at working on crisis committees and generally have a flexible 
range of personnel skills necessary in order to facilitate crisis management. 
Others can also be trained to do this. Unfortunately, for some managers, it 
may be preferable that they concentrate on activities where they are already 
proven to be operationally effective (Borodzicz & Van Haperen, 2003). 
The purpose of the training must be clear to the exercise designers oth­
erwise it will be ambiguous to the players involved. Efforts should be made 
to ensure the purpose meets the organizational requirements. Exercises can 
be used to assess the capabilities of individuals, groups, or the organization 
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as a whole in responding to a crisis . Turner argues that the "clarity of goals" 
is an essential feature of good simulation design (Turner, 1996: 33). 
In order to focus on the exercise, the target group needs to understand 
the message that is being delivered from the exercise. The players need to 
understand the relevance of their participation if the learning experience is 
going to be productive. "Players need to attend crisis simulations, not to 
re-establish what they all ready know, but to learn something new; in other 
words. how to manage other people's crises as well as their own" (Borodzicz, 
2005 : 1 33-1 34).  
A number of theorists have argued that learning does not take place 
on its own. It is important to recognize that simulations are not self teach­
ing and that a good debriefing is required to reflect on purpose and actions 
(Gillespie, 1973; Petranek, 2000). From a simulation perspective, experience­
based learning is particularly useful in two ways. It enables the trainees to 
acquire knowledge, competence, and skills, and also to craft their own men­
tal models, to try them out and observe and evaluate the results (Thompson 
and Dass, 2000: 29) . 
The "spin off'' for a security manager driving crisis and contingency 
issues is that there is no better project with which to engage senior man­
agement. Resilience is a governance issue, but the most trying aspect when 
trying to capture a board's attention is that the board members themselves 
will be also be Crisis Management Team (CMT) members. They will have no 
alternative but to be engaged and should not be allowed to resist exercising 
the plans. By this means, the security department and its staff can make that 
move '·upward" and create a heightened awareness of the range of sophisti­
cated issues they deal with. However, crisis planning must be shown in the 
risk assessment as only one part of the overall management of risk and must 
also endeavor to force the issue about "presenting" to the board the findings 
and recommendations. We cannot simply rely on reports, however succinct, 
as these will seldom be read by all those who need to be better informed 
on the breadth and depth of issues assessed. 
Risk management is inevitably a tradeoff. Complete risk coverage or 
risk elimination is uneconomic. Zero tolerance of risk is an impractical and 
unprofitable policy objective for companies to pursue. A company must then 
decide what risk levels will be accepted on a cost/benefit analysis, and then 
identify and prioritize risk exposures against these benchmarks. 
One possible tactic is to use the cultural inclination of a board to one's 
advantage and to inform on how best to slant a presentation. A highly sales­
oriented brand- and image-conscious organization will respond well to any 
strategy that protects that brand. By contrast, a company with a technically 
competitive marketplace, for example, pharmaceuticals, will buy into a range 
of strategies on the basis that, while broadly protecting all assets including 
people within enhanced security procedures, they are specifically protecting 
proprietary information. 
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Com·incing a corporate board is no different from selling to an individual 
and the key is that selling to "need'' is often an uphill struggle, whereas selling 
to ··wants·· can turn the whole task around. Selling various security strategies 
to a board and the financial impact because they are "needed" is a hard sale; 
it is an ex:unple of "distressed purchase. '' In selling parlance, the "attributes" 
of a proposal need to be converted to "benefits" but Security often merely 
relays to management what a system does, or what its new strategy contains 
(i .e . ,  the attributes rather than emphasizing the benefits that derive from the 
specification) . 
Turnbull and the whole corporate governance issue is one of "need 
to do, ., so bearing in mind the aforementioned cautionary advice, security 
operatives have to work hard to find the benefits of compliance to make 
the purchase an easier one for the board. Only listed companies have an 
absolute need to comply anyway, so the "must do" argument will not help 
in a non-corporate environment or a non-listed company. One should be 
aware that Turnbull, as "best practice, "  is finding its way into central and 
local government and other nongovernment organizations . Clearly there are 
benefits for smaller companies to adopt the principles in order to demon­
strate that they are a well-governed company to an increasingly demanding 
marketplace. 
CONCLUSION 
The identification of appropriate measures for the protection of the firm's 
assets can be a complex task presenting different aspects in accordance with 
the particular organizational sector to which the assets belong. 
It is necessary for the company to develop a particular network of mea­
sures referring to its particular sector. These measures will be more effective 
compared to general applied rules and methods that may present weaknesses 
in covering particular organizational assets. As an example, Alexander (2005: 
3) refers to the financial risk management applications of econometrics and 
notices that this type of organizational management focuses "on the accurate 
assessment of individual market and credit risks with relatively little theoret­
ical or applied econometric research on other types of risk, aggregation risk, 
data incompleteness, and optimal risk control ."  From a similar point of view, 
Bielski (2003 : 59) refers to the "ideal" security policy in the financial market 
and mentions that this policy should incorporate the following elements: an 
Operational Risk Plan, including risk indicators across the entire corpora­
tion; a Business Continuity Plan, used to ensure that people, processes, and 
technology can be brought online in the event of a situation; and a Disaster 
Recovery Plan, to includes technological components and how they should 
be protected in an emergency. However, these plans have to be adaptive. In 
fact, each individual organization should select strategies for risk limitation 
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with regard to protecting its assets. The development of  appropriate risk 
management tools and methods should be just the first part of the relevant 
business strategy. In order for any security strategy to be effective, it is nec­
essary that it is related to and serves the organizational operations to provide 
the appropriate support in cases of crisis . Security needs to be relocated 
where it belongs-at the company core. This can only be achieved through 
a re-evaluation of security staff status and role within the organization, one 
that recognizes their contribution and seeks their total integration into the 
company infrastructure. 
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4.0 BUILDING INFORMATION 
Building Name: Customer - C ustomer 
Street Name: Confidential 
Town I City: 
Country: 
Zip I Postal Code: 
4.1 CONTACTS 
Contacts Position: Contact Name: Contact Details: 
Senior Building Officer: 
Property/ Facilities Manager: 
Security Manager: 
M&E Engineer: 
Building 24Hr Emergency Contact: 
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5.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Securitas Security Services Ltd were tasked to provide a strategic and operational security review (SOSR) in  
order to establish the key security requirements for Confidential . The (SOSR) evaluates the perceived 
threats/hazards to the commercial office building. We visited the site on the 22nd and 23rd March 201 0. We 
carried out surveys and interviews to assist with our understanding of the security requirements. The 
evaluation covers the physical ,  systems, technical and operational elements of the supplied security services 
and we have divided the report into three phases to assist with our explanation. 
The security risk assessment evaluates the six main threat categories as specified, within the Customers, 
'Physical Security Survey' - General Office V2.5 - Draft document. These areas include the natural , human 
and environmental threats and assesses the managerial ,  operational and technical control measures. Given 
the buildings location and the operational requirements, as specified within the Customer Guide for Design 
and Fit Out V3, information processing is seen as the primary concern and this is reflected in a 
'H igh' (arithmetic mean) risk rating with a score of 60.0%, The assessment indicates that four of the six threat 
categories have a 'High' risk rating with as an accumulative risk score of 42. 1 4%. 
The security audits purpose is to establish whether the current security arrangements help or hinder the 
management of the identified risks. Our key stakeholder interviews revealed that the participant perceived 
1 29 areas in need of improvement. The system evaluation identified the requirement to renew the majority of 
the security equipment, in l ine with the design guidelines, and our investigations revealed that the Customer 
is current only reasonably secure. We have suggested a number areas where improvements could be made 
and  would recommend that 18027001 :2005 is used as the guiding principle. 
The following are some of the issues, which will need to be addressed: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Lack of co-ordin;::zted security pol icy . 
Lack of co-ordinated security strategy . 
Lack of clarity as to what is expected from individual departments . 
Lack of co-ordination in relation to physical security measures . 
Poor use and management of security technologies . 
A culture of openness that influences basic security and safety issues . 
Inefficient use of security resources to meet policy objectives . 
Poor sharing of information about security threats, 
Insufficient record keeping of key assets, 
I nsufficient risk assessment measures I indicators, 
Poor dissemination of organisational risk acceptance levels, 
Lack of documented physical security measures, 
Lack of active employee involvement 
Poor internal security awareness programme 
Lack of crisis and contingency planning 
Specific crisis events not identified 
Improvement required in communicating security issues to al l concerned parties, particularly 
with regard to expectations, procedures and responsibilities. 
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6.0 INTRODUCTION 
Securitas Security Services Ltd was tasked by Customer to provide a strategic and operational security 
review (SOSR) in  order to establ ish the key security requi rements for the operational building known as 
Confidential. The (SOSR) covers al l  perceived threats/hazards as identified within the physical security 
template provided as part of the Customer information pack. 
The Securitas Security Risk Management Department was instructed to determining the level of exposure, in 
terms, of the natura l ,  human, environmental threats that exist at this location. Additionally, we were required 
to evaluate the managerial , operational and technical control measures to establish both the likelihood and 
impact factors and understand the threats/hazards levels that exist at the customers office. 
The aim of the review was to: 
Identify the nature, probabi l ities and levels of threats posed to the commercial office. 
Survey the current physical security measures. 
Make recommendations and areas for potential improvement. 
The document is formed of the following parts: 
a. The Risk Assessment has been compiled to help identify, rank the potential threats facing the Customer 
Assets in Confidential , so that the security procedures, equipment, alarm monitoring, incident response 
and security awareness tra ining can be established at an appropriate levels commensurate to the risk. 
b. The Security Audit reviews the existing security arrangements by comparing the existing measures with 
best practices. We use the security audit to provide the baseline results from, which we establish the 
Operational Security Plan (OSP). 
c. The Operational Security Plan wi l l ,  where appropriate: 
Set out, the steps that must be taken to effectively mitigate the various security threats facing 
Customer employees, visitors, property and premises. 
Utilise technologies and innovation to produce cost effective processes designed to mitigate the 
identified security threats. 
Ensure that all recommendations comply with the Customer security strategy. 
Ensure that practical arrangements are in  place for consultation and exchange of information 
regarding the onsite security measures. 
Recommend site specific procedures, working practices and instructions to take into account any 
new requirements. 
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7.0 PHASE ONE • SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT 
7.1 Introduction 
Following recent discussions with Customer it was agreed that there was a requirement to carry out a 
security review. The purpose of the review is to ensure that the potential threats, strengths or weaknesses in 
protecting the company assets were identified and possible operational efficiencies highlighted. The 
objective of this exercise, therefore, is to ensure that all potentialities for hazard are recognised and that 
systems, procedures, documentation, manpower and training are in place and co-ordinated so as to 
adequately manage the risk profiles quantified within this review. 
Within this report there are a number of items that may seem emotive, however none of these points are 
intended to offend and are designed to support Customer in providing a first class integrated security 
solution to protect people, property and assets. 
To provide a professional security strategy for Customer, it is essential for the key stakeholders to 
understand the security operational requirements. The service should be operated around risk management 
principles, which will include the evaluation of the physical security, systems, policies and procedures. The 
key to providing a high profi le security service for Customer is risk management, which should be based on 
relevant security risk assessments and security audit programmes. 
During the discussions it was agreed that there would be a number of omissions, which are deemed to be 
outside the scope of this review. We will comment, as appropriate, at the forthcoming presentation of our 
observations made during our site visit, but the omissions include the fol lowing areas: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Collusion 
IT security 
Proprietary information 
Business continuity planning (BCP) 
Cash handling 
Fire risk assessments 
Health and safety risk assessments . 
lt was, therefore, agreed to conduct a review from which we could produce a risk assessment and security 
audit, both of which could be used to form the basis of the future security strategy. lt was also agreed that we 
would conduct interviews with key stakeholders, produce the necessary benchmarking questionnaires and, 
following this initial review, make the necessary recommendations with regard to the operational 
requirements. 
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7.2 Risk Analysis 
The risk analysis is a process to identify threats and vulnerabilities, analyse them to ascertain the exposures, 
and highlight how the impact can be eliminated or reduced. Suffice to say that risk management and security 
vulnerability must be considered side by side as 'no security plan, or programme can be effective unless it is 
based upon a clear understanding of the actual risks it is designed to control'. 
Securitas Security Services Ltd's definition of security risk is: 
"The potential for damage to or loss of an asset or severe disruption to operations" 
Our Risk Assessment procedures consider the risks associated with specific security events. The 
assessment establ ishes the relationship between two equally important variables in its definition of risk: the 
likel ihood of a security event occurring and the impact the event would have if it were to occur . 
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Figure 7.2.1 - The relationship between Impact and Likelihood 
The appl ication of an integrated security design should be based on a project-specific risk assessment that 
looks at threat, vulnerability, and consequences, three important components of risk. The l ikelihood of any 
security event occurring is complex and involves the interaction of three critical elements; the relationship 
between threat, target attractiveness and the vulnerability of an asset. The bui lding's specific security 
requirements should be based on a risk assessment done at the earliest stages of the development project 
and should be aligned with the operational requirements of each business unit. 
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Target Attractiveness 
Figure 7.2.2 · The relationship between Vulnerability, Threat and Target Attractiveness 
7 .2.1 Purpose 
The purpose of conducting a risk analysis is to help identify and rank potential threats, so that security 
procedures, equipment, training and resources can be specified at the appropriate level. The reduction of 
risk should be the desired objective of the correct application of security practices. 
The assessment of ongoing risk, often known as 'issue monitoring' is essential as in any type of risk, events 
can happen which might raise the level of risk. I n  this respect one of the most important issues is to identify 
triggers - events that could lead an organisation to take further defensive measures should the level of risk 
increase. Scanning the environment for these triggers is an essential part of ongoing risk management. 
7 .2.2 Methodology 
The methodology in this risk determination is: 
A review of past incidents supplied by key stakeholders and the Police. 
Direct observation and documentation examination. 
Interviews with management, employees, security personnel and the police. 
Review of externally produced crime figures and socio-political trends. 
7 .2.3 Vulnerability Analysis 
Security vulnerability requires a clear idea about the kinds of loss events or risks, which a security 
p rogramme is concerned. Consideration also needs to be given to the conditions, circumstances, objects, 
activities and relationships that can produce a given loss event. 
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This report is concerned solely with what are known as 'Pure Risk' loss events, as distinct from commercial 
risks. Pure risk events will only ever have a 'downside' and may be: 
1 .  Natural :  flood, earthquake, tsunami, h igh winds, severe snow/ice, fire 
2 .  H uman: threat awareness, terrorism, murder, kidnaping, espionage, sabotage, etc 
3 .  Environmental :  power fai lure ,  fuel shortage, fire, explosion, water and comms fai lures, etc 
4 .  Managerial Controls: general management, site security plans, etc 
5 .  Operational Controls: resource documentation, evacuation, restoration,  response, etc 
6 .  Technical Controls: access control ,  fire protection equipment, information processing, etc 
lt should be appreciated that the measurement of risk and its quantification is, often ,  a subjective process, 
which entails both the identification and measurement of past incident history as a means of predicting 
possible future developments. Some of the risks, which may be foreseen and which, on the surface, may 
appear to have l imited potential for loss, could impact more severely than they should due to the absence of, 
say, a well rehearsed emergency management response, where a m inor incident becomes an emergency. 
In any commercial enterprise, the exercise of risk analysis would endeavour to profi le those risks identified 
as having a possibi lity of occurring ,  within the operating environment, and then analysing the l ikelihood 
(probabi l ity) of any of the events identified occurring. The next part of the exercise, for any profit orientated 
operation would be to establish the impact (critical ity) of an event, that is, the financial loss that would flow 
from the event. 
7 .2.4 Loss Event Likelihood 
Loss event l ikel ihood is measured as 'the number of ways in which a particular event can result from certain 
activity, divided by the number of events which could occur from that activity'. I n  simpler terms we can say 
that, 'the more ways a particular event can occur, in given circumstances, the greater the probability that it 
will occur'. Many factors affect probabil ity of loss, be it, say, proximity to a chemical facil ity, being located on 
a flood plain, poor social conditions and increasing crime levels. Risk is therefore, not a finite science and 
whi lst mathematics may help us to calculate probabilities, we cannot know, understand or control everything. 
Among the conditions and sets of conditions that wil l  worsen or increase exposure to risk of loss, major 
clusters and categories can help focus attention such as: 
Physical environment 
Social environment 
Political environment 
Historical experience 
Criminal expertise 
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7.2.5 Loss Event Impact 
Assessing the impact ( criticality) is the third step in the vulnerabi l ity assessment in respect of the approach to 
eventually prioritising risks. lt is  only common sense to elect that highly probable risks may not require 
countermeasure attention, if the net damage that they would produce is small, and the cost of such 
countermeasures are high. Equal ly, a moderately probable risk may require attention if the potential size of 
the loss is great. The overriding principle is cost justification, meaning not spending more than the benefits 
derived are worth. 
Loss impact can be measured in a number of ways and for a commercial organisations the overal l  measure 
is usually money, be it direct costs, real costs and/or indirect costs, such as reputational loss and/or loss of 
staff morale. Increasingly, however, the impact of social responsibility and community relations has to fit 
within a security programmes aims and objectives. 
The consequences of events we identify occurring may be: 
Loss of l ife 
Cost of damage 
Cost of loss 
Interruption to businesses 
Loss of customer confidence 
Loss of internal morale 
Adverse publicity. 
7.2.6 Threat Potential 
There are many factors that contribute to the threat potential, including the following: 
The propaganda value of the proposed action. 
The adequacy of security faci lities and security practices. 
The nature of the environment. 
Existing security practices. 
Potential targets within the site. 
Management culture. 
7.2.7 Threat Severity 
The severity of any threat is affected by parameters not always within the control of the establishment and, 
when one evaluates threat severity, consideration must be g iven to the following; 
Nature of the threat attempt. 
Physical conditions of the target. 
Protective features. 
Emergency response capability. 
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I! is not our intention in this report to go into detail over these four areas, as inference can be drawn from the 
report in general, about how many site factors could increase the severity of an incident. For example, in the 
event of a fire, and without the benefit of an  accurate 'roll-call ' system,  it would not be possible to provide the 
Fire Service with an 'audit' of people believed to be onsite. The same issue can be considered alongside 
poor lone worker practices. By contrast, an access card system would accurately record who occupies a 
building and who has, or has not evacuated. 
Similarly, the absence of a well rehearsed crisis and contingency team this may turn what starts off as a 
minor emergency into a crisis or worse. We were made aware that little headway has been made in relation 
the crisis management at Customer, i n  that the crisis and contingency teams have yet to be established. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to ascertain the full extent of the planning, communication and training 
arrangements as these were a lso still in  the development stage. 
7.2.8 Threats, Hazards and Risks 
Risk is defined as the product of the l ikelihood and impact of a given hazard or threat. Although often used 
interchangeably, a hazard is an accidental or naturally occurring event, whilst a threat is the intent to cause 
harm, loss or damage. 
The perceived threats and hazards are: 
1 .  Natural : flood, earthquake, tsunami, high winds, severe snow/ice, fire 
2 .  Human:  threat awareness, terrorism, murder, kidnaping, espionage, sabotage, etc 
3 .  Environmental :  power fai lure, fuel shortage, fire, explosion, water and comms fai lures, etc 
4.  Managerial Controls: general management, site security plans, etc 
5 .  Operational Controls: resource documentation, evacuation, restoration, response, etc 
6. Technical Controls: access control , fire protection equipment, information processing, etc 
The above examples are il lustrative but not exclusive. 
7.2.9 Assets and People at Risk 
The following classes of people and assets have been identified as potentially vulnerable to the above 
threats, which could have a negative effect on Customer, or impact on its image and operations, should 
injury, loss or damage occur. 
1 .  Employees and visitors - loss of l ife o r  injury. 
2 · Physical structure of building - cost of damage or consequential loss. 
3 .  Company property - theft o r  damage and cost of loss. 
4 .  Staff property - theft o r  damage and cost of foss. 
5 .  Visitor property - theft o r  damage. 
6. Morale of staff. 
7. Adverse publicity and image. 
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7.2. 10  Risk Measurement and Profiles 
Different levels of risk can be measured by evaluating the likelihood (probabil ity) of the threat occurring and 
the criticality ( impact) of the resultant loss or damage to people and assets. Simply multiplying the two gives 
an assessment of risk. 
When each of the threats is examined in turn and the level of risk is identified for each, this information is 
used to provide the baseline results, and then an assessment of the relevant control measures is undertaken 
to provide the residual risk rating, so that improvements can be implemented to reduce the identified risks. 
The greater risks are associated with hazards or threats, which have a higher impact and medium to high 
likelihood. Conversely, low risks will reflect hazards and threats where the impact is low and the l ikelihood is 
low to medium. As we explain further, in the next paragraph, the more difficult cases are those hazards and 
threats where the l ikel ihood is low and the impact very high (terrorist threat), or vice versa. These risks often 
defy simple categorisation. 
7.2.1 1  System of Evaluation and Risk Exposure Rating 
A problem arises in using a traditional risk matrix when assessing the risks from both crime and terrorism. 
The technique produces a 'score' ,  which is a product of the probabil ity and impact. However, far more 
uncertainty obtains as a consequence of the fact that the intentions of terrorists and criminals remain h idden 
to us and unanticipated. Crime is the easier of the two, given the size of historic data, but despite the degree 
of uncertainty in certain areas the risk matrix remains the best tool to present these judgments. The risk 
matrix has val idity in that, from this point in time, regular reviews of both crime figures and the political threat 
levels wil l al low our risk assumptions to be modified , over time, and i l lustrated on a future matrix. 
Whilst risk scoring is a useful guide, it is not the only driver in the risk management process, but most 
institutions have implemented the concept of using the impact and l ikelihood criteria, with the most common 
way of assessing each criterion being to use high, medium or low (one, two, three) or a scale of one to ten. 
Commonly a nine-box matrix (three by three) using high, medium and low impact and l ikelihood is used to 
i l lustrate the risk profi les; however, it is our belief that this matrix gives insufficient flexibil ity to separate risks 
with dissimi lar profi les that often end up with the same rating. 
We have, therefore, util ised a 25-box risk matrix, based on the following divisions: 
Impact - Extreme, Major, Moderate, Limited and Insignificant 
Likelihood - Certain, Likely, Credible, Unlikely and Remote. 
Each segment of the risk matrix has been a l located score, based on a five-point scale, to indicate the risk 
rating. The use of a colour key gives five divisions of the overal l  risk rating (see section 7 .2. 1 3) and the table 
below depicts the eight bands of risk and the score range used for this assessment. 
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Risk Score (%) Risk Rating 
0 - 4  Very Low 
5 - 1 2  Low 
1 3 - 1 6  Medium I Low 
1 7 - 36 Medium 
37 - 40 Medium I High 
4 1 - 60 High 
6 1 - 80 High I Very High 
81 - 1 00 Very High 
Table 7.2. 1 1 . 1  - The relationship between the Risk Score and the Risk Rating 
7.2 .12  Definitions 
The likelihood and impact ratings need no further definition . Certai nly in respect of the impact categories they 
can mean 'all things to ail organisations', particularly within commercial entities, such as Customer, where 
the consequence of an event cannot, in respect of calculable financial losses, be easily arrived at. 
However, at some time in the future this exercise should be repeated to see if strategies and operational 
changes have impacted positively. One caveat though is that the further we look ahead the more uncertai nty 
we face in trying to be prescriptive as to the probability of risk occurrence. 
7.2 . 1 3  Risk Matrix 
The following risk matrix plots the eight threat categories examined as part of this programme. The small 
blue dots depict the actual results and alphabetical tags have been added to assist with identification. The 
results of the threat categories, are shown below in the threat category risk table (see figure 7.2. 14 . 1  ), which 
have been correlated to provide an arithmetic mean for each category under scrutiny. In order, to provide 
Customer with an accumulated average, we have included the 'G' tag, which indicates a 'High' exposure 
rate exists with an arithmetic mean risk score of 42. 14.  
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Figure 7 .2.1 3.1 - The Risk Matrix plotting the Arithmetic Mean for each Threat Category. 
7.2.14 Threat Category Table 
The fol lowing table represents the six threat categories headings for the Customer physical security survey -
general office template provided as part of the information pack. This table presents the arithmetic means of 
the sub-threats, which examines 41  areas of concern (see appendix 1 ) . 
Likelihood Impact Risk Score Risk Rating 
A. Natural Threats 4.00 9.33 37.33 Medium/High 
B. Human Threats 5.00 6.57 32.86 Medium 
C. Environmental Threats 6.00 7.33 44.00 High 
D.  Managerial Controls 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
E.  Operational Controls 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
F. Technical Controls 5.33 8.00 42.67 High 
G. Overall Rating 5. 1 7  8.54 42.14 High 
Table 7.2.14.1 - The (Arithmetic Mean) Threat Category Results. 
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7.2. 1 5  Top 1 0  Risk Results 
The following table represents the top 1 0  risk results for Customer - Customer, at the time of writing this 
report, and a full breakdown of all the risk results can be found in Appendix 1 .  
TOP TEN RISK SCORES likelihood Impact Risk Score Risk Rating 
Information Processing 6.00 1 0.00 60.00 High 
Evacuation Procedures 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
Facility Restoration Planning 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
Incident Response Capability 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
Communications Fai lure 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
Espionage 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
Sabotage 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
General Management Controls 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
Asset Identification 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
Site Security Plans 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
Table 7.2.1 5.1 - The Top 10 Risk Results. 
lt is important to recognise that Customer - Confidential should adopt the information security standard 
principles as specified within IS027001 :2005 to protect the organisations information. We identified that the 
Customer Department handles sensitive confidential embargoed information and this places an additional 
level of vulnerability and therefore, these offices should be strictly controlled with access only permitted to 
authorised personnel only. We would suggest that this department along with the secure equipment rooms 
are located on the first floor to provide an additional level of protection, which being located on an upper floor 
provides. 
We identified it has been over two years since the last fire evacuation drill and that there are no fire marshals 
allocated at this location .  When predicting the future in relation to risk, accumulated statistics, which record 
not only the type, but also the scale, patterns and trends of incidents is vital . Incident records were not 
available, however we reviewed the local crime figures provided by the police, but in respect of onsite 
incident data it is not possible to analyse the incidents by type, frequency or volume as there is no single 
database that can be interrogated for the information necessary. Most of the incident data gathered is stored 
in the corporate knowledge bank and we can confirm that this is currently not used to assess the security 
risks facing the organisation in this location. 
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7.3 Risk Management 
Risk management is a term used to describe efforts to identify, understand and respond to risk and is a 
process that provides a framework for managing uncertainty. lt is also a way of constantly thinking about 
change instead of reacting to it and also provides us with a common language for dealing with uncertainty. 
Allied with the process of thinking about change is a valuable tool we refer to as 'horizon scanning' -
meaning we keep an eye and a ferti le imagination on future events, whilst at the same time learning from 
past experience. 
Actions for improvement should be designed to treat the risks that are considered unacceptable by 
Customer. A number of options are, traditional ly, available 
1 .  Avoid the risk - cease operations. 
2 .  Accept the risk - do nothing. 
3 .  Transfer the risk - insure it. 
4 .  Retain the risk - bu t  endeavour to reduce it. 
This report is primarily concerned with the fourth option, but we will comment appropriately on those risks 
which are inevitable and for which we have to accept that no increased effort or procedure wil l  prevent. 
For any organisation there wil l be a trade-off between the level of risks and the cost of reducing them to an 
acceptable level. The analysis of risks should provide sufficient understanding of the factors, which wil l  affect 
the likelihood and consequences, so as to suggest methods by which risks can be reduced. 
The most effective methods of risk reduction are those, which redesign the systems, procedures and 
processes, so that the potentia l  for an adverse outcome is reduced. At Customer, these redesign methods 
have considerable merit as wel l  as opportunity. 
When considering actions for improvement, the type of solution also needs to be considered: 
A satisfactory (but not optimum) solution. 
The most cost-effective solution . 
The most accepted practice (industry norm, good business practice). 
The best achievable result (given current technology). 
The absolute minimum result that could be accepted. 
Which solution is acceptable depends on the circumstances and the established risk context - defined by 
Customer 'appetite for risk'. 
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8.0 PHASE TWO - SECURITY AUDIT 
8.1 Key Stakehoider Interviews 
In order to provide an integrated approach to security it is important to understand the risk perception issues 
that face the key stakeholders. We believe that canvassing key stakeholders opin ions, along with requiring 
them to complete a specifically designed questionnaire, provides an effective i ntell igence gathering and 
evaluation platform for our research. As part of this programme we intended to util ize a security best practice 
benchmarking questionnaire to solicit the opinions of Confidential and Confidential. However, unfortunately 
both these individuals were unavailable during our visit and therefore, Confidential kindly assisted us by 
completing the questionnaire (see appendix 4). We have provided an overview of the results below and 
summarized the findings to provide the following sample data. 
Section 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
' 
Title 
The Role of Security 
Review of Threats 
Management Responses 
Recognition of Security ------- � -� 
! Results of Security 
! - -i 
I_· �--� - TOTAL 
Possible Actual Percentage 
45 30 66.67% 
75 45 60.00% 
1 60 1 04 65.00% 
55 31 56.36% 
290 1 1 8  40.69% 
625 328 52.48% 
Table 8.1 .1  Key Stakeholder Benchmarking Questionnaire Category Results. 
Interestingly, out of the 1 30 questions answered only one question received the maximum score, indicating 
that best practice was being followed and there were no questions deemed as being not applicable. This 
would suggest that there are 1 29 areas where potential improvements could be achieved. The results 
indicate that in 22 areas the organisation is close to achieving best practice, in  92 areas the element exists 
but that they are not fully implemented and that 1 5  other areas are some distance away from delivering 
services in l ine with best practice. 
We reviewed all the main category headings and discuss the 1 5  main areas of concern below: 
Review of Threats (5} 
Management of Responses (5) 
Recognition of Security (2) 
Results of Security (3) 
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The 5 areas identified within  the Review of Threats section indicate that the main areas of concern are; 
Sharing of information about the threats 
Record keeping of key assets 
Assessing security threats 
Risk assessment measures I indicators 
Security by design evaluation 
The 5 areas identified within Management of Responses section indicate that the main areas of concern are; 
Dissemination of organisational risk acceptance 
Documented physical security measures 
Security procurement procedure 
Security audit inputs acted upon 
Security training 
The 2 areas identified within Recognition of Security section indicate that the main areas of concern are; 
Active employee involvement 
Security awareness programmes 
The 3 areas identified within the Results of Security section indicate that the main areas of concern are; 
Active within community crime prevention groups 
Crisis and contingency planning 
Specific crisis event identification 
We have not dealt in this report with the issue of information security either in the form of paper or electronic 
data. We would make the point that the ease with which thieves could access the site and steal assets puts 
valuable information at risk. Whether this be physical assets in the form of hard drives, servers, etc or other 
intellectual property and proprietary information. We would suggest that an IT security audit based on BS 
27001 :2005 protocols, should be carried out, which in our opinion would make very interesting reading and 
identify further vulnerabifities. 
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8.2 Control Measure Evaluation 
Customer, a four-storey commercial building, which incorporates an underground car park. The building is 
constructed from a reinforced concrete frame with an external render fin ish. There is no perimeter security in 
the sense that access is restricted by means of fences that would deter and keep out unauthorised people. 
The main entrance is two double sets of glazed doors that are fitted with a manually operated electric lock 
and there is a sign located on the frame, indicating that the release button is behind the reception desk. The 
external door is supported by an audio intercom and is covered by a static CCTV camera. An external 
access control reader provides authorised access and the Confidential ACS is installed and currently blank 
identification cards are used. There is a roller shutter door installed, but we were informed that this is no 
longer used. The internal door is passively infrared controlled and allows access into the main reception 
area. This area has a physical presence from OOOOhrs to OOOOhrs and provides the onsite alarm monitoring 
functions along with managing visitors. The lobby area has two access control led lifts and currently the 
system is programmed to allow access to every floor. The security equipment located at the reception area 
includes a Confidential alarm monitoring panel and an obsolete intercom handset. Additionally, there is an 
external door release button, but no duress alarm or passive infrared detection has been installed within this 
area. There is an access controlled internal wooden door, which is read in/out, providing access to the 
ground floor corridor. 
We have provided an overview of the protective measures located within the various offices as part of 
systems components (see appendix 3). We identified 27 card readers, 8 CCTV cameras and partial intruder 
detection. The lDS focuses on the ground floor external building apertures and a l l  the doors and windows 
have magnetic contacts installed. The roadside of the building is also covered with duel-tech detectors, 
covering the 001 , and there is an emergency exit in the form of a single half-glazed panelled PVC door within 
this area. 002 is covered by passive infrared detectors and windows areas are covered in 060. The 
remaining external fire exits are steel and fitted with panic alarmed crash bars. The computer preparation 
and loading bay external doors set are heavy-duty security doors, that are fitted with electric strike locking 
mechanisms. The windows are internally covered with clear anti-shatter fi lm,  but no specification or 
installation information was available. The key locks in use are Confidential patented cylinders, which are 
tested according to EN 1 303, key-related security grade 6. The keys are stored in a drawn behind the 
reception desk and they are issued by the receptionist and we were informed that there are no master key 
records available. 
All the building windows are fitted with manually operated external blinds, which provide anti-glare and an 
element of privacy when drawn . In  terms of the buildings anti-climb measures there are no drain pipes on the 
front evaluation, however there are bins located next to the building, which could offer assistance, and there 
are three wire cables strung from the neighbouring buildings supporting the street lighting. The rear of the 
building is more vulnerable to attack as the first floor windows are easily reached from a metal container and 
lamp posts adjacent to the building. 
The 1 st floor has very l imited intruder detection with only the fire exits corridors covered with passive infrared 
detection. Fire exit 16 1  has a local alarm fitted and the PlR is partially covered by the emergency signage. 
058 is also covered with a P lR and the self closer on the fire door is faulty. The windows have no anti-shatter 
film and the remaining floor area and offices are not covered by the lDS. The floor main access/egress point 
is the access control lifts previously described. 
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The CCTV transmission system is a stand alone system supplied by Confidential and the model is a 
Confidential. There are eight cameras installed at the property, 5 internal and 3 external and we have listed 
there locations in 9.67 of the control measure evaluation (see appendix 2). Currently, all the security system 
control equipment is located in the third floor data centre and the keys for the enclosures were in the cabinet 
locks. The CCTV transmission is located in a separate data rack and is pin code protected. The operational 
manual was available, next to the system, and contained the pin-code on closer examination. There are 4 
other alarm related data racks, in the data centre, these are for the fire system, technical alarms, lDS and the 
ACS system, which includes the fou r  door controllers. 
The security detection systems are monitored by an external provider known as Confidential. The alarm 
activations are escalated in l ine with the standard operating procedures and the first-response service is 
provided by Securitas. Also, there are twice n ightly patrols and various guard tour control points located 
around the building provide a site visit audit trail. In terms of incidents, three months ago a cleaner was 
arrested for stealing six company computers, both new and old, which were subsequently recovered from his 
residence. We understand that this information was not escalated to the Corporate Security Department and 
that this matter was dealt with in Country. 
8.3 Conclusions 
In summary the security equipment installed at this location with the exception of the CCTV transmission 
system and the duel-tech detectors i nstalled in 001 are no longer supported by the manufacturer and we 
would suggest that they are renewed inline with the customer technical and operational requirements. The 
building in the main is reasonably secure, but given the nature and sensitivity of the information handled we 
would recommend that the building and its departments should operate to the protocols as specified within 
IS0:27001 :2005. The office consolidation project the offers not only the opportunity to upgrade the physical 
security measures, but also to implements an information security management framework to ensure that the 
audit inputs and outputs are driven from a risk-based continual improvement perspective. 
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9.0 PHASE THREE • OPERATIONAL PLAN 
9.1 Risk Mitigation Evaluation 
The risk assessment identifies the 41 sub-threat categories and the top ten threats have been outlined, with 
information processing topping the list with a risk score of 60.00%. The management and operational 
controls are considered as the highest threat categories scoring a risk score of 48.00% respectively. We 
have considered the various physical security measures and found them to be insufficient to meet the needs 
for Customer. Additionally the lack of a corporate security policy and strategy, which is structure around the 
principles of 18027001 :2005 leaves the organisations information vulnerable. 
9.2 Develop Operational Requirements 
The Zurich guide for the design and fit out of the offices at Confidential specifies a number of the specific 
security requirements needed at this location. This includes the need to house three secure areas for the 
telephone, computer and satellite equipment. We would also suggest that Confidential and the Confidential 
are given special consideration due to the sensitivity of the information handled by those business units. At 
this stage we have been unable to determine whether the location of the secure equipment areas has been 
agreed, but we would suggest that these should be located on the first floor and that access to this floor 
should be strictly controlled, inl ine with BS5979:2007 protocols. 
We have mentioned the use of 18027001 :2005 principles to protect organisational information and the key 
stakeholder security benchmarking questionnaire confirmed that an ISMS framework would provide the 
necessary structure to assist with addressing the major areas of concern identified. In our opinion a security 
policy is the essential basis on which an effective and comprehensive security programme can be 
developed. This critical component of the overall security strategy, however, is often overlooked. The security 
policy is the primary way in which management's expectations for security are translated into specific, 
measurable, and testable goals and objectives. lt is crucial to take a top-down approach based on a well­
stated policies in order to develop effective security principles. 
The definition of security principles is an important first step in security policy development as they dictate 
the specific type and nature of the security policies most applicable to one's environment. A security policy 
should be economically feasible, understandable, realistic, consistent, procedurally tolerable, and also 
provide reasonable protection relative to the stated goals and objectives of management. The security policy 
defines the overal l  security and risk control objectives that an organisation endorses. 
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The basic structure of a security policy should contain the following components: 
• A statement of the issues that the policy addresses. 
• A statement about your position on the policy. 
• How the policy applies in the environment. 
• The roles and responsibil ities of those affected by the policy. 
• What level of compliance to the policy is necessary. 
• What actions, activities and processes are allowed and which are not. 
• What are the consequences of non-compliance. 
In  order to build an appropriate security programme, an organisation should assess and define their specific 
security requirements, design a solution that meets those unique requirements, deploy the necessary 
policies, technology and procedures, and continuously maintain, adapt and improve that solution. An 
organisation's overall security strategy provides the framework for defining those elements necessary in 
building and maintaining a sound security management programme. 
Strategic planning can take many forms, but the end result should yield a documented approach for 
achieving goals set within the framework of specific strategic objectives. In  developing the security strategy 
an organisation should first determine their business requirements for security and how security fits into the 
overall goals of the organisation. 
Once a clear understanding of the desired outcome for the security programme is established the approach 
for how to reach that outcome can be developed. The work during this stage of the planning process is to 
determine the approach necessary to implement general security controls that will meet the security policy 
requirements. The fol lowing topics should be addressed : 
• strategy objectives and measurements 
• assumptions and constraints 
• strategy approach. 
The strategic planning team must then determine how they will go about satisfying each requirement for their 
security management programme. During this stage of the planning process the team will outline the 
strategy's approach. The security strategy approach will likely consider the fol lowing areas: 
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• asset valuation 
• vulnerability and threat assessment 
• legal and regu latory requ i rements 
• security policy and standard development 
• technology implementation 
• security by design 
• procedural development 
• staffing and training 
• ongoing security management 
• performance monitoring. 
The events and results from each phase of the planning process should be documented and should reflect 
the consensus of the team. This document should outline the strategic plan in terms of: 
• security mission 
• security management program requ i rements 
• strategy objectives, measurements and approach 
• assumptions and constraints 
• roles and responsibilities 
• program risks 
• project plan or road map 
• project management and administration procedures. 
9.3 Recommendations 
We have outlined the security systems, some procedural and training issues as part of the report and in brief 
we offer the following summarized points for consideration. 
• secure equipment room located first floor. 
• controlled airlock style entrance door 
• window grills on first floor windows within easy reach. 
• opaque anti-shatter film on the glazed areas. 
• upgrade lDS, ACS, I ntercoms and improved CCTV coverage. 
• implement IS027001 :2005 protocols 
• integrated incident management system 
• approve security awareness 
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1 0.0 CONCLUSION 
We have conducted are site visits and conducted a security survey to determine the current security 
arrangements, in terms of there physical ,  systems, technical and operational areas, in addition to carrying 
out a risk assessment, interviews and the necessary supporting research . We became occupied with the 
deficiencies exposed during these visits and as a result of our findings we have provided , within this report, 
as a broad overview of the fundamental shortcomings that exist. 
The following are some of the issues, which will need to be addressed: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Lack of co-ordinated security pol icy . 
Lack of co-ordinated security strategy . 
Lack of clarity as to what is expected from individual departments . 
Lack of co-ordination in relation to physical security measures . 
Poor use and management of security technologies . 
A culture of openness that influences basic security and safety issues . 
Inefficient use of security resources to meet policy objectives . 
Poor sharing of information about security threats, 
Insufficient record keeping of key assets, 
Insufficient risk assessment measures I indicators, 
Poor dissemination of organisational risk acceptance levels, 
Lack of documented physical security measures, 
Lack of active employee involvement 
Poor internal security awareness programme 
Lack of crisis and contingency planning 
Specific crisis events not identification 
Improvement required in communicating security issues to all concerned parties, particularly 
with regard to expectations, procedures and responsibilities. 
How senior management view security in general ,  and the security protocols in particular, colours everyone's 
views. In particular, the lack of an agreed site security policy, which should in turn informs the security 
strategy, has meant that the security services provided at this location would not currently comply with the 
principles specified within !80:27001 :2005. As a consequence, it has become difficult to both effectively 
manage and evaluate their performance for the wider security effort, but it is fair to say that the office 
consolidation project offers an ideal opportunity to address many of the areas of concern identified within this 
report. 
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1 1 .0 APPENDIX 1 - THREAT CATEGORY TABLE 
S u b  Threat Categories Likelihood Impact 
Natural Threats 4.00 9.33 
Flood 4 1 0  
Earthquake 4 1 0  
Tsunami 2 1 0  
High Winds 4 8 
Severe Snow/Ice 6 8 
Fire 4 1 0  
Human Threats 5.00 6.57 
Threat Awareness 6 8 
Terrorism 2 1 0  
Murder 2 8 
Kidnaping 2 8 
Assault 6 6 
Arson 6 8 
Espionage 6 8 
Sabotage 6 8 
Civil Disorder 4 6 
Threatening Behaviour 6 4 
Staff Harassment 
... 
6 4 
Trespass 6 4 
Internal / External Theft 8 6 
Labour Issues 4 6 
Other (Hoax Callers) 6 6 
Environmental Threats 6.00 7.33 
Power Failure 4 1 0  
Fuel Shortage 4 8 
B uilding: Fire 4 1 0  
B uilding: Explosion 4 1 0  
Water Failure 4 8 
Communications Failure 6 8 
Hazardous Material Release 6 8 
Pollution 6 6 
Risk Score Risk Rating 
37.33 Medium/High 
40 Medium/High 
40 Medium/High 
20 Medium 
32 Medium 
48 High 
40 Medium/High 
32.86 Medium 
48 High 
20 Medium 
1 6  Medium/Low 
1 6  Medium/Low 
36 Medium 
48 High 
48 High 
48 High 
24 Medium 
24 Medium 
24 Medium 
24 Medium 
48 High 
24 Medium 
36 Medium 
44.00 High 
40 Medium/High 
32 Medium 
40 Medium/High 
40 Medium/High 
32 Medium 
48 High 
48 High 
36 Medium/High 
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Sub Threat Categories Likelihood Impact Risk Score Risk Rating 
Managerial Controls 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
General Management Controls 6 8 48 High 
Asset Identification 6 8 48 High 
Risk Treatment 6 8 48 High 
Site Security Plans 6 8 48 High 
Security Awareness 6 8 48 High 
Operational Controls 6.00 8.00 48.00 High 
Resource Documentation 6 8 48 High 
Evacuation Procedures 6 8 48 High 
Facility Restoration Planning 6 8 48 High 
Incident Response Capability 6 8 48 High 
Technical Controls 5.33 8.00 42.67 High 
Access Control 6 6 36 Medium 
Fire Protection Equipment 4 8 32 Medium 
Information Processing 6 1 0  60 High 
Note: We have utilised the threat category and sub threat category headings from the Customer Physical 
Security Survey Guidance Document. 
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1 2.0 APPEND IX 2 - CONTROL MEASURE EVALUATION 
5 Building Design, Construction & Populous 
Ref Question Answer 
'5.1 !What is the building grade? c 
5.2 Is the building owned/leased? Leased 
5.3 If leased, who is the building management company? Company details: 
5.4 Is the building shared with other tenants? 
No 
5.5 How many floor are there in the building? 4 
5.6 !Which floors are occupied by Customer? Floors: 
5.7 !What are the numbers of staff and contract staff based at Staff: 
the building? Contractors: 
Estimated: 1 00 
5.8 What is the primary business function of the 
ocation under audit? e.g Financia l ,  Scientific, 
Legal 
5.9 Is the building detached or adjoined to neighbours? Adjoined 
5.10 �re any obvious proximity risks observed? 
Details 
I ! -
I 
I 
-
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6 Signage 
6.1 The display of company 
signs and logos outside data centres is allowed 
pubject to there being no identified increase 
in risk to the building and its occupants, but 
drawing attention to people and/or the 
�unctions within a Computer rooms is not 
permitted. Indicate whether compliance with 
his policy has been achieved in the bui lding: 
6.2 �re buildings or parts of buildings, both internally and 
�xternally, identified as data centres, computer centres or 
computer rooms on signboards or directories? 
6.3 �re managers, executives, editors or other staff identified 
by name in directories or signboards in public areas 
unless such information is already freely available in the 
public domain? 
�.4 Are the locations of departments or functions 
varried out within the office displayed on 
signboards or in directories? 
6.5 �re car parking spaces or areas identified as 
belonging to Customer? 
-
Copyright 201 1  Securitas Security Services ltd 
N/A 
Externally: 
No 
Internally: 
No 
No 
Reception: 
No 
On Office Floors: 
No 
Yes 
Location of parking: 
South side of Building 
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7 Processing Areas 
7.1 Does the bui lding have mailroom No 
sorting and distribution office? Building: 
TR Office: 
- -·- - -- - - -- -·---- -�---·· 7.2 Is the mailroom operated by the 
landlord or by personnel? N/A 
7.3 Is the central mailroom sorting and 
distribution office a self-contained 
room with the abil ity to secure against N/A 
intrusion? 
7.4 Is the mailroom located away from 
public facing areas of the building? N/A 
7.5 Is the mailroom equipped with an x-
ray scanner or trace detection device? No 
7.6 [Are mail room staff trained to identify 
!suspicious items and aware of N/A 
reactive procedures? 
7.7 Does the building have a Loading Yes Dock/Area? 
7.8 Is the Loading Dock/Area operated by 
Landlord or personnel? N/A 
7.9 !Are del ivery vehicles held in a neutral 
location and del ivery validity checked prior to No 
!entry being approved? 
7.10 1Are delivery vehicles subject to 
security checks, i .e. searches, prior to No 
entry being approved? 
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8 Computer and Communication Rooms 
8.1 {\re computer and communications 
rooms located on site? Yes 
8.2 Do computer rooms house production Production: 
or development based equipment peveloprnent: 
Both: 
8.3 lt is preferable that Computer and 
communications rooms are not sited 
in basements. Where this is NIA 
unavoidable have measures been 
aken to prevent flooding? 
8.4 If computer and communications 
rooms are sited on ground floors of 
buildings, are they situated at the rear Yes 
or centre of the building away from 
publicly accessible areas? 
8.5 �indows in computer rooms should 
be avoided, but where they exist and 
!cannot be removed or blocked up, has an Yes 
opaque type film been applied internally? 
8.6 Are computer rooms securely sealed 
from real floor to real ceil ing, including No 
�ntry/exit points? 
- - - - ------ -
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9 Physical Secu rity 
9.1 
--
9.3 
9.4 
�.5 
9.6 
9.7 
�.8 
9.9 
If the external fa<;ade of the building 
has balconies or ledges from which 
access could be made from 
adjacent properties to floors 
ccupied by ; have suitable 
metal l ic barriers or other obstructions 
been ut in lace to revent this? 
here the roof is accessible to a 
neighbouring building, have suitable 
metal l ic barriers or other obstructions 
bee_l}j)ut in  pjace to prevent this? 
Main entrance door type 
Are perimeter entrances doors (including final 
exit fire doors) substantial in construction to 
prevent intrusion? Describe the type of door 
construction. 
�re the entrance doors providing access to 
offices made from materials of sufficient 
strength to withstand a determined attack for 
several minutes? 
Are final exit fire doors locking mechanisms/ 
panic bars appropriate for their purpose? 
Is there adequate external lighting? 
ifype of l ighting in use: 
How is lighting operated? 
�- -�-- -- -····-
I 
N/A 
Revolving: 
Sliding: Yes 
Conventional : 
Yes I No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Sodium: 
Mercury Vapor: 
Halogen: 
Fluorescent: 
Metal Halide: 
Manual: 
Photosensitive: 
Motion activated: 
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9.1 0 
9.1 1  
9 . 12  
9. 13  
I 
9.14 
9.1 5 
9.1 6 
9.1 7 
9.1 8  
9.19 
�.20 
'A 
9.21 
9.22 
9.23 
9.24 
Is l ighting regularly tested? 
Is there a perimeter fence or wal l  which meets 
security requirements and is regularly 
maintained? 
Full or part coverage of perimeter? 
Have the external facing windows been fitted 
jwith anti-shatter film? 
(Note: In areas where bombs can be placed or 
are likely, it will be necessary to protect 
windows up to a height of 1 50 m (450 ft.) by 
Fitting ant-shatter film. Such film has a lifetime 
of approximately 3 years when applied to the 
external face of the window and up to 1 0  years 
when applied to the internal face.) 
What is the grade of film used? 
When the film was last applied? 
Is guarding supplied by a 3rd party or is it 
proprietary? 
Are Security Officer Post Orders/Assignment 
Instructions present? 
Do the security officers comply with local 
governmental i ndustry standards? 
Are Security personnel subject to a training 
regime and assessed regularly? 
Is the building access controlled by a dedicated 
electronic access control system? 
If No, what measures are in place? 
Is the system proprietary or landlord owned? 
Who administers the system? 
Are user log in's password protected? 
�hat company maintains the system? 
N/A 
Wal l :  Yes 
Ful l :  
\Part: 
i (.l, mera! office space: 
Yes 
Editorial office space: 
Yes 
Computer rooms: 
Grade: 
Date: 
3rd Party: 
Yes 
Proprietary: 
Companv Details: 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Proprietary 
TR: 
Yes 
Name of company: 
- - - --- - ---- -
- �---- --- - ----
I 
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9.25 
�26 
9�27 
9.28 
�.29 
9.30 
9.31 
9.32 
19.33 
9.34 
19.35 
�.36 
�.37 
9.38 
Is the maintenance company registered with 
any industry standard? 
What card format is in use? E.g. H ID ,  Mifare 
Is the access control system located in a 
secure environment? 
Is the access control system backed up 
reoularlv? 
Is the access control system backed up by an 
internal UPS system? 
Do all access control doors fai l  safe in the event 
of a fire alarm? 
Fail safe single knock? 
Fail safe double knock? 
Do all access control doors fail secure in the 
!event of a power outaqe? 
Are a l l  emergency exits for the location well 
marked and equipped with manual override 
�apabilities if access control devices fail release 
leoress restrictions? 
Is access to the building controlled by the 
access control system? 
Can access to the building be made by means 
of bv-passinq access control? 
Is suspicious access activity investigated and 
/appropriate action taken? 
Is the access control system installed to cover 
critical doors and areas? -- - --- --- -
Yes 
Format: Unknown 
Prox: Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Yes 
Yes 
Main entrance door: 
Yes 
Rear entrance door: 
No 
Turnstile entry: 
No 
Loading Dock: 
Yes 
Car Park: 
No 
Potential ly 
Yes 
Yes 
! 
! 
-- - ---- ---- -
�-
- ------ -
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9.39 Are the following doors and areas covered by 
he access control system? 
A Entrance and exit doors and selected internal 
�reas of computer and communications rooms. 
B Office floors 
!C Managerial Offices 
D Plant rooms, security control points, roof areas, 
loading bays, storage rooms, water tank rooms 
�nd other places where a risk of intrusion is 
present 
9 .40 Is a written procedure in place to cancel al l  
security access rights and recover any access 
control cards after any staff member or 
contractor leaves employment or finishes their 
contractual term? 
�.41 Is there a form in place requiring authorisation �or access to restricted areas? 
�.42 Is the access approval list commensurate with 
he access requested? 
�.43 Are forms fi le d  for refe r ence? 
9.44 What type of locking mechanisms are in place �or (e.Q. MaQnetic Lock, Electronic Strike Lock_}: 
� Main entrance doors: 
B Office floors: 
c Computer floors/rooms: 
D ROCC/NOC 
E Editorial Offices: - ---
Yes 
"'f�:s 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Location of files: Off Site 
-····-···· 
List exceptions: 
---- -----�----·-- -- -�- --------�-
-- -- ---�- -----··-------- ------ ---�-------------- -------------- -� 
List AX l l li::i 
List exceptions: 
Duration kept: 1 2  months 
Electric Strike 
Electric Strike 
N/A 
Electric Strike - -- --- - -- -'------ -·-·· - - ----
I 
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�.45 Where doors are secured by combination locks, 
pre entry codes changed periodically 
9.46 If plant rooms, water tanks rooms, media 
storage rooms and PTT/Aiternative carrier 
cable termination rooms are not covered by the 
main ACS system are any of the following 
lorovided aaainst intrusion? See Belmty:_ _ _ _ __ _  . ... 
9.47 Mortise deadlocks mounted doors, each 
deadlock havinq at least 5 cylinders 
9.48 Keys to such rooms being sequentially 
numbered 
�.49 Key issue restricted to essential members of 
!securitY and contract maintenance staff. 
�.50 [Are al l  keys signed out/in and recorded in a 
dedicated key reqister? 
9.51 I s  There a Computerized Key Cabinet in use? 
�.52 [Are office door locks arranged in a 'suited' 
[arrangement so that security levels can be 
successively increased according to the 
importance of the information or assets 
contained within? 
�.53 ]Are 'master' keys available that can open al l  
locks? 
�.54 If 'master keys' are available are they 
numbered and a register kept of staff who have 
lsiqned for receipt of them? 
9.55 Is there a process to ensure that 'master keys' 
are returned to the 'Security Officer' when the 
recipient no longer needs them or is about to 
leave employment? 
�.56 Is a CCTV system in operation? 
[9.57 Is the CCTV system landlord owned or 
!proprietary? 
[9.58 DVR Recording? 
[9.59 If digital, what is the frame rate recorded? 
�.60 ]Where is the recording system located? 
N/A 
i 
N/A 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
N/A 
Yes 
Proprietary 
Yes 
Frames Per Second 
Location: 
' 
- · · ·- . · - · - ·------· - - -
I 
I 
·---- ·- --- -----· ---- -----
I 
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9.61 
9.62 
9.63 
9.64 
9.65 
�.66 
19.67 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
/9.68 
�.69 
9.70 
19.71 
19.72 
\9.73 
9.74 
Is the storage of footage secure? 
Make and model of CCTV system? 
Is the CCTV system stand alone or networked? 
Who has access to CCTV footage: 
Who monitors CCTV footage: " -
Are CCTV images visible to non-security 
!personnel? 
)Are the below doors and areas covered by the 
CCTV system? 
Main and rear entrance doors: 
Reception areas, car parks, approach roads,  
loadinQ bays and storaQe rooms? 
Office entry doors: 
Editorial office doors: 
Loading Docks: 
Plant rooms, security control points, roof areas, 
lolaces where a risk of intrusion is present? 
Final exit fire doors 
]Are the CCTV cameras high resolution colour 
devices? 
Is the CCTV system backed up by an internal 
UPS system? 
Does the building have an Intruder Detection 
land Alarm system? 
Is the system proprietary or landlord owned? 
Is the system monitored remotely or locally? 
Is the system l inked by leased l ines or 
Yes 
Make: 
Stand alone: 
·-·· ---- --- -�-
Yes 
Yes 
Yes I No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Internal: No 
External: No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Proprietary 
Local ly: Yes 
Remotely: Yes 
communications circuits continuously monitored Yes 
or inteQrity to a remote monitorinQ station? 
!Are al l  alarm activations reported, investigated Yes 
land recorded? 
I I " "" ----- -----·····-··---- - ·-- -----···-··--
�- -----��- ··-
·- -- · ·· · · · ·  
--
·· -
· ··
·-
--
··---
- ----
----- --------- ---- -
I 
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9.75 
9.76 
9.77 
� 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
[9.78 
� 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
�.79 
� 
B 
[9.80 
9.81 
Who investigates alarms, is investigation -1 
physical or remote? Physical I 
Is the system integrated into the Access Control No 
System? 
--- -
--+- -
-- - ------------------ -- --------- ------------- - - ------ ---- -----
Indicate which of the following parameters are i 1 ' 
connected to the alarm system: i 
I ntruder detection system activation 
Door contact sensors 
Panic button activation 
Motion sensors 
Glass break sensors 
Break-glass sensors 
!Are the following areas covered by the lDS? 
Main and Rear entrance doors: 
Reception: 
Fire exit doors: 
Office floors: 
Computer rooms: 
Loading dock/area: 
/Windows: 
Have panic buttons been installed? 
!Are panic alarm response procedures in place? 
/Are panic buttons subject to regular testing? 
1\Nho are issued with the alarm codes? 
[Are alarm codes issued generically or 
individually? 
- �·--- - - - - --- --- -
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Partial ly 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
N/A 
N/A 
- --
. -�- -- -----·-·----·-- ---- ------·--··-· 
-
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9.82 re alarm codes changed when an employee 
is relocated or employment terminated? No 
1 0  Fire & Safety 
1 0.1 Can the local offices of the emergency 
services (Police/Fire/Medical Yes etc) respond to an emergency request within 
1 5  minutes? 
1 0.2 Can parking spaces outside the building, and 
access routes within, be cleared if a call is Yes made requesting attendance by the 
emerg_ency_ services. I 1 0.3 Does the building fire alarm system contain 
any of the following elements: 
A Control & indicating panel Yes 
8 Manual call points throughout the building Yes 
c Fire and smoke detectors (optical, ionisation, Yes rate of rise etc.) 
D Fire alarm devices (bells, sirens, warning Yes signs etc.) 
E Mains & standby power supply Yes 
1 0.4 If do not occupy the entire 
building, is the fire alarm 
connected to the building general fire alarm Yes 
so that alarms raised anywhere within the 
building will activate the alarm? 
1 0.5 Does the alarm automatically call the fire �epartmenUmonitoring centre or is this a Automatic 
manual action? 
1 0.6 Confirm that emergency escape routes are 
protected by way of fire barriers, smoke Yes 
control measures and emergency lighting . 
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1 0.7 If the offices are located in 
: 
a building with more than 8 floors, is the 
building protected throughout by automatic 
sprinklers systems? NIA 
(Note: Hose reels and dry risers may I I ! 
provide useful additional back up ! 
protection , but should not form the 
main fire defence method .) 
1 0.8 !Total Number of Fire Extinguishers on Each Floor 8 Per Floor 
1 0.9 Has a building evacuation dril l been carried No but in the last twelve months? 
1 0. 10  !Are all computer & communications rooms 
hat exceed 49 sq . m .  (527 sq . ft.) in floor area Yes 
protected by a gaseous extinguishing system 
1 0. 1 1  I f  a the gaseous fire extinguishing system i s  in  
pperation does it contain a l l  of the following 
components to ensure safety of staff and 
buildino contents: 
[A lA control and indicating panel? Yes 
B lA communication network to receive and 
ransmit signals to other elements in the fire No 
alarm and security systems? 
c lA bank of gas bottles and a network of pipes Yes and nozzles? 
D !At least one 'hold off control ' switch - colour 
coded to prevent confusion with the 'manual Yes 
release control' switch? 
E �isual devices outside all entrances and exits 
o indicate the status of the system (manual or Yes automatic) and to positively indicate gas 
release? 
F Devices to prevent excess pressure build up Yes (inert gas systems only)? 
G !An extract system for the protected area? Yes 
1 0. 12  I s  al l valuable and flammable property that 
must be kept on-site protected in fireproof No 
containments? 
--- -- ---- --- -- - - -
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fA-re excess paper, boxes, and other 1 0. 13  �ammables removed from critical and 
non critical areas, to prevent build up 
of combustible materials? 
1 0. 14 Have the risers been fire and smoke sealed at 
each level and fitted with l ighting and smoke 
detection? 
1 0. 1 5  Where dedicated security control rooms 
and/or equipment rooms exist, they should be 
constructed so that the walls provide at least 
1 hour fire resistance and a l imited level of 
blast protection. Does this conform? 
1 0.16 Confirm that procedures and controls are in 
place to ensure that staff and contractors are 
made aware of the following: 
A Emergency escape routes, procedure to 
summon help or raise a general alarm.  
B Access control and security procedures (i.e. 
identification of visitors). 
c Fire safety procedures (including extra 
precautions required for 'hot works') .  
D Fire suppressant 'dump' & 'abort' procedures 
lljf agQiicable). 
E How to recognise a fire alarm, and to 
evacuate the building to a pre-defined fire 
evacuation assembly point. 
F How to recognise a security incident alarm, 
and to evacuate the building to a pre-defined 
security incident assembly point (this may not 
be the same as the fire evacuation point). 
1 0.1 7 If the location contains hazardous 
material , have adequate controls been 
established to prevent their release? 
1 0. 18 I f  the location contains hazardous 
material , have emergency procedures 
been established in case of their 
accidental release? 
Yes 
N/1\ 
N/A 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
N/A 
N/A 
List deficiencies if applicable: 
Describe protection: 
�-- -� 
- �� 
I 
I 
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1 0.19 Does the location under survey have an 
Automated External Defibrillator (AED) for use 
in an emergency? 
1 0.20 If Yes, where is the AED located and is it 
readily available for use? 
1 0.21 Are staff trained to operate the AED, how _ ____ __ _  ------
often is training carried out? 
10.22 Is there a list of trained persons 
accompanying the AED? List names of 
rained personnel: 
1 0.23 How often is the AED inspected for 
operabil ity? 
No 
N/A I ! 
·--·------- - ------
I 
- - - - -- --�- - ------ -- - -- --
-
-- - --+--------- --- ------ -- -
-
-------------- ---- -- - - - -- - - - - - - - -- - - - ---
-
- - - - -
-
-- - - - ---- --
-
- ------- -- --- --Yes 
Frequency: Unknown 
No 
N/A 
1 1 .  Process & Procedures 
1 1 .1 IAII staff in offices must display a photo ID card . Is  N/A sionaoe oosted? 
1 1 .2 ID Cards are colour-coded as per No standard 
1 1 .3 IA"re casual visitors to offices who do not have a pre 
!arranged appointment with either a member of staff or 
la resident contractor who has authority to receive Yes !visitors on behalf of, met at a neutral location 
(preferably outside) and interviewed before being 
!allowed access to anv other areas of the buildinq. 
1 1 .4 Are visitors held in a controlled observable 
�rea unti l collected by their sponsor and not Yes 
!al lowed free access to the building 
1 1 .5 IAre all visitors who do not 
have a valid photo ID  card and access No rights to the building issued with a visitors 
badqe? 
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1 1 .6 
1 1 .7 
A 
B 
c 
D 
1 1 .8 
1 1 .9 
1 1 .1 0  
1 1 .1 1  
1 1 .1 2  
1 1 .1 3  
I s  the policy of ensuring that visitors wear 
heir badges whilst in the centre enforced 
rigorously? 
Do visitor's badges display the following 
information: 
The name of the visitor. 
- -·-·-
·---·
-�- .---···· ·· 
N/A 
_,. �"'" 
The company or organisation they represent-. -----
- -�- - �--··--· - ----- · 
No 
The sponsor of the visitor. No 
:fhe date and time when the badge expires. No 
[Visitors who return to the building several 
imes in one week may be issued with a 
pre-programmed access control card or 
!similar, which only al lows them entry to the 
specific area where they are working. (Note: 
Such cards can only be issued after their 
sponsor has personally identified the visitor No to the person issuing the card.) 
If this practice is al lowed the visitor card and 
pre-programmed access control cards must 
be returned to the receptionist on a daily 
basis and re-collected by the visitor when 
next entering the building. Is this process in 
!place? 
!Are security 'incidents' reported to the No Reaional Security Manager? 
Are site emergency contact l ists held by Yes Security, available and kept up to date? 
Are there documented security violation 
�scalation procedures and are security No 
!Personnel trained in these procedures? 
Has the location security and risk 
controls plan been approved by key No 
!affected parties and management? 
Does the plan contain location security 
requirements and controls planned or in 
place to mitigate risks, and the No 
responsibil ities of building support 
/personnel and building occupants? 
How: 
-- --·· 
- -·-· . .  -. .. -.-� . 
- -- -- - - ---·- ···-- ------- -- ---·----- - ---
-
�·- -
---- ------·--- · · ··--·--·-
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1 1 .14  I s  a summary of the plan incorporated 
into the location emergency No 
manaQement procedures? 
1 1 .1 5  I s  the plan reviewed periodical ly and 
adjusted to reflect current conditions l No : 
and risks? ' -- --·----- -- ------------··--"--' ----·-·----·-··-·--- ----··-····------- ------- ------------- -- ------1 1 .1 6  I s  the site security plan reviewed periodically and 
adjusted to reflect new standards, technologies, and No 
controls strateQy chanQes? 
1 1 .1 7  lfhe senior company officer in each office must ensure 
hat theft prevention receives a high priority in day-to-
!day business operations. Are any of the following 
procedures in place in the Office: 
A A safe, fixed rigidly into the foundations of the 
building, must be provided for the safe keeping of N/A large sums of cash (i .e. over GBP 1 ,000), company 
chequebooks, and other readily convertible assets. 
B Staff should take al l  reasonable measures to protect 
k;ompany valuables such as laptops, PDAs, cameras, Yes �nd other portable devices by taking them home or 
lockinQ them awav each night. 
c Written property pass system for the removal and or 
� isposal of equipment such as desktop PCs, and Yes 
bther valuable office equipment. 
D Have you Reviewed the Property Pass System for No �his Location? 
1 1 . 1 8  fA-re there existing Fire and Bomb Fire: Yes 
�vacuation procedures for the building? Bomb: No 
1 1 . 1 9  !Are these procedures up to date? Fire : No 
Bomb: No 
1 1 .20 !Are they available to al l  residents and visitors? No -
1 1 .21 Is confidential waste collected and disposed of in a Yes I No 
secure manner? 
1 1 .22 !Who carries out collection and destruction of Company name: 
confidential waste? 
Regularity: 
1 1 .23 Is the "Clear desk policy" in operation? No 
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1 2  BCDR 
1 2.1 Does the Facilities Department have a 
BCDR plan in place? 
1 2.2 Do they have an alternate site identified? ___ 
1 2.3 [Where is the alternate site located? 
1 2.4 When were the BCDR plans last tested? 
1 2.5 Is There a Back-up Generator for the 
location under survey? 
1 2.6 Date it was last tested: 
1 2.7 How long would fuel for back-up generators 
be expected to last if not re-supplied? 
1 2.8 Does the location have a Satellite phone? 
1 2.9 Who is the Satellite phone allocated to? 
12.1 0 Is the phone subject to regular checks? 
I No 
· - -· - ·  
No 
N/A 
N/A 
Yes 
1 day 
N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
··- ,_ 
I ! 
,,,,  - - - - - - - - ------------- -- --------------- -- - ----- -- -- , , ,  - - - - - -- ----------------------- -- --- ------ -----
! 
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1 3.0 APPENDIX 3 - SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION CHART (Ground Floor) 
I I / / ! ' : i I 
I !!: {i I .s .s 
ii "' I J ia I I 8 l 4 " § :I "tJ J!l ,§ ! I .: 
-.1 41 4 .... I j I it ;:::. j G 8 " <11 l lC ... iS 11 -.1 "' : 'tJ 
; I 
I -" .. , '-
J § G (.j .:: I .YJ :I i I 
g. .s I I � 1 � I I 
� : "' 1 ..!!! 1$ I I I 0: � I I I 0 1 .... I I ! -.1 J � I J!. J!l /f Area Reference No: 0: � .s .s 4 � 4 I Q; I I Q I Comments 
62 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 Main Reception Area 
71 2 1 1 Passenger Lift 
72 1 1 2 Goods Lift 
60 1 1 1 2 1(1) 3 3 1(_3) 2 Computer Preparation Area (Lab) 
59 1 1 (1) 2 2 (2) Communal Rest Area 
56 1 1 1 2 Gnd Floor Entrance Corridor 
so 1 1 1 2 Del ivery Entrance 
51 1 1 2 2 Storaqe Area 
1 Jll 7 7 (7}_ O_Q_en plan office area 
2 2 4 4 (4) Open plan office area 
52 2 Open plan office area 
80 1 1 2 2 (2) Meetinq Room 
81 1 1 1 1 ( 1 )  MeetiQg Room 
53 1 1 1 3 3 Oraise Office Area 
54 1 2 Fire Escape Corridor 
55 1 1 Cable Riser 
73 1 1 3 2 1 Fire Escape 
70 1 2 2 Basement Fire Exit 
Sub-Total 3 1 5 2 4 1 0 11 0 8 10 1 6 0 26 26 5 10 
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1 3.0 APPENDIX 3 - SYSTEM COMPONENT LOCATION CHART (First Floor) 
I I I I I I ! I ! I ! I ! I I I I --�� I I ! j I 1 I I ! I I -.. 
I !!! fJ '-.s .s J!J () G () 1i ./!! 1$ J9 
1 � ,j 'lj r: § !!! i 0 ./!! E 8 (j .s 
J 
• .: "" 'H ,j if e it � ..... I § I E 8 ,: .. () 'S ; ._. ... :s E : ;r .. iS .g 11 /i :J: ;c -g "" 0 .s t! D l 8' I � 1 § 5 .f:i 1 .!g J¥ l :s Q; • & ft .f:i � tl1 
J 
.. I I 
1: e / � ./fj "" or : /J . '2 .... Jl � .. i 1 ./!! � i � 8 .!g � I ,& Area Reference No: ,f .s .... Cl cJ � 4i � tf (!j or Cl " Comments 
101 5 Ooen olan Office Area 
102 2 Ooen olan Office Area 
103 6 Open plan Office Area 
104 3 Open plan Office Area 
158 1 1 1 1 2 Fire Exit Corridor 
159 1 1 Cable Riser 
172 1 Fire Exit 
105 1 Office 
106 1 Office 
107 1 Office 
108 6 Ooen olan Office Area 
152 Entrance Corridor 
180 MeetiQg Room 6 
156 Stationarv Store 
1 5 1  Meetino Room 7 
157 Photocopier Area 
109 1 Office 
183 1 Meetino Room 1 
182 Meetinq Room 2 
161 1 2 Fire Exit Corridor 
Sub-Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 0 27 0 5 � 
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1 4.0 APPENDIX 4 - KEY STAKEHOLDER QUESTIONNAIRE 
Security 
Bench marking 
Questionnaire 
for 
Customer 
DATE: MARCH 201 0  
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Company and Personal  Data 
Contact Details Details 
-- -- --- ··- - - ··- · ·-· ·- ·-- - --· --
-
--
First Name 
---------------------------------
Last Name 
Department 
---------------------------------
Company Name 
---+----- -- -- -- ---------
Addre:oi' 1 
Town ! City 
�--�------ ·-- · ----
Countr� 
Telepf::, 1e ' 
c·-···· ···---- ···-·····- -t-- -··----··--·- ··-····-- ··--·--·- -·-- ·--
Emaii 
Sectic,n 1 :  The Role of Security 
In each ::-,o1Jction, the scores relate to one of the following choices: 
5 means 'This is definitely the case in our organisation' 
4 means 'This is close to the case in our organisation' 
3 means 'This exists but is not completely the case in our organisation' 
2 means 'This is some distance away from being the case in our organisation' 
1 means 'This is definitely NOT the case in our organisation' 
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Section 2 :  Review of Threats 
Our assessments effectively take account of threats occurring from the behaviour of 
humans as well as those that may occur naturally 
We re9ularly conduct effective assessments of our security risks that take account of the 
probabi i : ty and impact of potential events 
Section 3:  Management of Responses 
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The Board of our company has identified the extent to which it wil l  accept certai n  types of 
security risks 
We hav � effective and proportionate physical security measures in place deter, detect and 
delay cr ;me and disorder 
We hav:a specifical ly considered measures to protect the integrity of the brand, and 
implemented effective responses 
We document what physical security measures we have and how they are expected to 
respond to different types of risks 
We have effective policies and procedures in place to deter, detect and delay crime and 
discord 
All employees and relevant third parties sign up to a security policy indicating that they have 
understood what is expected of them 
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Our organisation has an effective ongoing programme designed to maintain security 
awareness across the organisation 
Sect: :· <)n 4:  Recogn ition of Security 
; an effective process in place to review employees' adherence to security 
nents and to respond effectively to any breaches 
Copyright © 201 1 Securitas Security Services Ltd 303 
Section 5: Results of Security 
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We have assessed our liabilities if an employee or someone else fails to comply with the 
la�;v :and we have appropriate mitigation in place 
nave an effective approach to respond to all breaches of information security 
:nformation security policy has been effectively tested and wea knesses remedied 
responsible for implementing the fraud policy have been appropriately trained 
fraud policy is regularly communicated to all members of staff as well as contractors 
suppliers 
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Section 6:  Summary 
Section Title Possible Actual 
1 The Role of Security 45 30 
2 Review of Threats 75 45 
t------ ' 
3 Management of Responses 1 60 1 04 
t------
4 Recognition of Security 55 31 
f-- -
I � _ -l R�sults of Security 290 1 1 8  
L__ 
TOTAL 625 328 
- -�-
In section 8. 1 Key Stakeholder Interviews of the main document theses results are summarized. 
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